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ABSTRACT
The alternative Marxist approach to literary criticism in the present 
study consists of three "vocal" modes of interpretation: the public voice, the 
private voice, and the homeless voice of the self. The public voice represents 
authorial visions of the ideological real projected by dominant ideology that 
covers up the "objective" real, while the private voice corresponds to the 
authorial conscious or unconscious insertion into radical ideology th a t turns 
the "objective" real into the ideological real. However, the homeless voice of 
the self obliterates any ties with history and authorial ideology. A 
personification of the Marxist "particular interest" of the self, the homeless 
voice echoes in the open space of the text and reaches for the distant real 
shaped by the reader’s interpretive paradigms inside or outside the 
constraints of the institutional discourse. Incorporating both traditional and 
poststructuralist Marxist insights, the current Marxist framework departs 
from the traditional conviction of a neutral reality and from the postmodern 
concept of the totalizing ideology. I t acknowledges the role of the dialectical 
real th a t is simultaneously "objective" (edited out by dominant ideology) and 
"subjective" (picked up by radical ideology to be molded as the ideological 
real). The alternative Marxist approach also attaches relative importance to 
authorial intention, the text, and reader response in an interpretive activity 
and values both historical studies and theoretical elucidations because the
in terp lay  between the two apparently  contradictory modes of criticism may 
reinforce and supplem ent each other in  the ir shared territory  of the study of 
the private voice of the se lf in  the text, although the public voice is more 
oriented towards history and  the homeless voice towards theory. The different 
voices of the self a re  exemplified in  a  study of Daniel Defoe’s Robinson 
Crusoe. C aptain Singleton. Moll F landers, and Roxana, which profits from 
both m odem  critical theory (deterritorialization, Schlegelian irony, and 
fem inist theory) and historical insights into Defoe’s fiction.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
There has been a tomato/tomahto thing going in  the field of eighteenth- 
century studies: a debate over tradition versus theory or literature versus 
"m etaliterature." The defense of the m ainstream  tradition rose to its climax 
a t the April 1987 conference a t Georgetown, the addresses of which were 
published in  a book entitled Theory and Tradition in Eighteenth-Century 
Studies in  1990. The authors in th is conference collection, led by Donald 
Greene, have launched attacks on modem critical theory, the "French clerks," 
and especially Joel Weinsheimer and other critics for their rem arks on the 
tendency of being "relatively unresponsive to new critical systems and literary 
theories" and on barely having "something new to say" in  eighteenth-century 
studies.1 While one side of the argum ent encourages new theoretical 
developments and deplores traditional historical studies, the other side tu rns 
its back on the workings of theory in the critical enterprise and values the 
tapestry  of historical weavings th a t contributes to our understanding of the 
author’s artis try  in a  literary  work. At one extreme, literary  criticism may be 
understood as "tomato" because the tradition of historical studies is, as 
Greene pu ts it, w hat we grew up with. A t the other extreme, "tomahto" may 
be the  righ t term  because Weinsheimer, as the founding editor of The
1
2Eighteenth Century: Theory and Interpretation, is a leader of the radical new 
generation who has close ties with the thoughts of the French and other 
European chefs and is determ ined to question the value of the m ain recipe in 
the kitchen. They both represent w hat they stand for, and they are both 
involved in  the political power struggle for a m ainstream  representation up 
front in the critical arena: one tries to push theory forward to the cutting 
edge while the other hangs on to tradition and preserves i t  in the front range. 
Basking in  the wisdom and insight of both sides, students of literature are 
easily puzzled by the contradictory nature of the debate. B ut they are faced 
w ith a  Foucauldian choice th a t they have to make between "filiation" with the 
"natural" critical tradition and "affiliation" with the institutional practices 
th a t have gained grounds in some other fields. Are we bound to make such 
a choice? I t  does not have to be th is way.
The present study aims to harmonize the conflict between history and 
theory and incorporates both historical and theoretical insights into a reading 
of Daniel Defoe’s fiction. Based on an  alternative M arxist approach, this 
project absorbs elements of both traditional (classical and cultural) Marxism 
and postmodern or poststructuralist Marxism. I t proposes a framework of a 
split self th a t possesses three kinds of voices: the public voice, the private 
voice, and the homeless voice; w ithin this framework, both history and theory 
occupy a place, although the ir contradictory nature is not effaced. The public 
voice of the self, which is related to the author’s public image defined by
dominant ideology, can be the sole interpretive domain in  which historical 
studies play a leading role in making a connection between the author’s aims 
in  the text and history as reflected by dominant ideology or the conventional 
ideas of a  certain historical period. History and theory may reinforce or 
supplement each other when it comes to a study of the private voice of the 
self, which promotes and advances radical ideology in  struggle with dominant 
ideology. A repudiation of the established historical principles, the private 
voice of the self makes it possible for the critic to approach the literary text 
from both a historical and a theoretical point of view or to rely on one to 
make sense of the other (which is w hat I attem pt for the most p a rt in the last 
three chapters on Defoe’s Action). However, the "homeless" voice of the self, 
a  term  borrowed from Georg Lukacs, can make sense only by applying theory 
to the text, for i t  is characterized as a dissonance from both history and 
ideology. In short, both history and theory ought to be valued in  literary 
criticism because a work of a r t may unfold the split self with those three 
voices.
That the present study proposes an alternative M arxist approach is 
obvious in  the origin of the three voices. Both the public and private voices 
are derived from the Marxist notions of ideology, the traditional M arxist 
notion about ideology th a t represents the dominant class’s interest as the 
common interest to cover up the real or the postmodern M arxist concept th a t 
rejects such a real and constitutes the real as ideological. But the homeless
voice departs from history and ideology and therefore goes beyond both 
traditional and poststructuralist Marxism. Although the term  "homeless" is 
borrowed from Lukacs’s notion of the "transcendental homelessness of the 
novel," the homeless voice differs from such a Lukacsian notion. For Lukacs, 
the home or origin of ancient artistic forms is "the transcendental structure 
of the form-giving subject," a cosmic organic world th a t finds harmony and 
unity  in  the created a rt forms. The modem novel, then, is "an expression of 
th is transcendental homelessness," where the organic equilibrium between 
the form-giving subject and the artistic forms is destroyed or "is never again 
concentrated in  the forms themselves." That is, the fragmented modem world 
has replaced the ancient organic harmonious cosmic world, and this modem 
fragmentedness reflected in the novel has destroyed the "home" in the a rt 
form.2 Here, the novel’s "homelessness" is historically determined by the 
fragmented modem world. The "homeless" voice of the self in  the alternative 
M arxist approach, however, is freed from such a traditional M arxist 
argum ent and from the postmodern M arxist control of the institutional 
discourse as well, for the homeless voice, which represents a distant real, is 
cut off from ideology and history and moves outside social relations into a 
"horizon of future aesthetic experience" (to use Hans Robert Jauss’s term) 
with the reader’s interpretive modes th a t may or may not be influenced by 
the postmodern M arxist "interpretive community."
5W hat really threatens the dominant place of historical studies in
literary  criticism are anti-historical propositions in the new theoretical
developments. According to postmodern theories, the literary text has its own
force and does not im itate or reflect external realities. History for the
poststructuralists is not a neutral objective reality independent of the text.
As Hayden White points out,
the difficulty with the notion of a tru th  of past experience is tha t 
it  can no longer be experienced, and th is throws a specifically 
historical knowledge open to the charge th a t it is a construction 
as much of imagination as of thought...[which] puts historical 
discourse on the same level as any rhetorical performance and 
consigns it  to the status of a textualization neither more or less 
authoritative than  ‘literature’ itself can lay claim to."3
Here, White has turned history as a neutral tru th  of the past experience into
ju s t another form of discourse on the same level as the literary  text; the
Active and the real are all the imaginative workings of the hum an mind, and
there is no such thing as an authoritative reality th a t dictates w hat is real
and w hat is fictive. History in  the present study, however, is not a textual
construction; nor is i t  defined as an objective and independent real against
which literature is measured and studied. Rather, the historical real is
always a hybrid of the traditional M arxist objective real, the postmodern
M arxist ideological real, and the alternative M arxist dialectical real. The
ideological real is most often w hat we conceive in  the established accounts of
historical events, shaped by dominant ideology and tradition; the literary text
can be an expression of this external condition th a t is projected as the real.
6Digging deep down into the historical phenomena th a t are the projected real 
and beneath the established descriptions of them, we disclose the objective 
real th a t is covered up by dominant ideology or ignored by tradition-oriented 
scholars. But according to the alternative M arxist approach, the status of this 
objective real is unstable, for although i t  is blocked out by the interference of 
dominant ideology and remains outside the boundaries of the illusive real 
th a t dominant ideology aims to project, this objective real will be picked up 
by another ideology and become a projected real as well. Therefore, the 
objective real is always dialectical in  the sense th a t i t  bears within itself a 
tendency of being subjectified and advanced as an  ideological real by radical 
ideology. So besides the acknowledgement of the postmodern M arxist real 
shaped by ideology, the alternative M arxist approach also sympathizes with 
the traditional M arxist objective real and fuses the two into a dialectical real 
th a t is both objective and ideological, objective in  contrast to the illusive real 
molded by dominant ideology bu t ideological in relation to an emergent 
ideology. My argum ent does not am ount to saying th a t everything is 
ideological, which is the same conviction as the postmodern Marxists. W hat 
i t  boils down to, in term s of the difference of the alternative M arxist approach 
from both the traditional and the postmodern, is th a t the alternative 
approach treats the ideological blocked-out or filtered-out seriously. The 
traditional Marxists regard the ideological filtered-out as the objective real 
th a t somehow threatens the social formation of the dominant class and is
7determined by the material existence of the subjugated class, while the 
postmodern Marxists reject such an ideological cast-off. For them, ideology 
has a totalizing power and does not cast off any part of the real outside its 
grips; ideology constitutes the real. But for the alternative Marxist approach, 
ideology is always selective, and this alternative framework acknowledges 
ideological cast-offs, as in the distant real in its component of the homeless 
voice, which are neither historically determined nor ideologically constituted. 
These various forms of the distant real are cast off in various historical 
stages, first by dominant ideology and then by emergent ideology to shape its 
own real after picking it  up as the objective real filtered out by dominant 
ideology, and these forms of the distant real will be in contact with only the 
future reader’s interpretive paradigms influenced by or freed from the 
constraints of the institutional discourse.
The self has long been considered split from itself. For Jacques Lacan, 
the human being with its genetic label of gender is split first a t the moment 
of birth  from a primordial androgynous being. Lacan calls i t  the first "lack." 
The self is further divided from itself (the second "lack") as the child 
experiences the "mirror stage" or the Imaginary, where for the first time it 
identifies with an other (the mother or nurse), and passes into the symbolic 
realm of language acquisition (the Symbolic). By acquiring the symbolic 
system of language, the child is permanently split from the other half of itself 
and performs its roles in accord with cultural codes as dictated by the
8linguistic sign.4 More im portan t are W ayne C. Booth’s and Georges Poulet’s 
notions of the  split self a s  th e  au thor and the  reader respectively. Unlike 
Lacan’s psychoanalytical model, Booth’s and  Poulet’s models have direct 
bearing  on discussions about the au thor/reader relationship. Booth’s notion 
of th e  split au thor deals w ith  the actual au thor and the au thoria l "second 
se lf ' in  the  text. In  th is model of the  authorial split self, th e  au thor has 
au tho rity  over the  tex t and over the created reader’s in terp retation  of the tex t 
in  te rm s of reconstructing the  au thor’s aim  or in ten tion  in  it. In  the case of 
th e  sp lit self in  Poulet’s reader-oriented model, however, the  au thor is 
dropped from the domain of in terp retation , for the "thinking I" or the 
"thinking subject" th a t  is divided from the  reader asserts  to be the subject 
and  au thority  of the  ideas and  all th e  o ther "m ental entities" in  the text.5 
W ithin these two models, there  exists an  im passable gu lf between the au thor 
and  the  reader in  an  in terpretive activity. A lthough Wolfgang Iser’s model 
bridges the  gap between the  au thor and th e  reader, Ja u ss ’s is  the  closest to 
th e  a lternative M arxist approach to lite ra ry  criticism in  the p resen t study. 
Iser stresses th e  in teraction  betw een the tex t and  the  reader through the 
au tho r’s artistic  guidelines th a t  stim ulate the  reader’s im agination and 
im m ediate participation in  the  text. Ja u ss  also reads the  lite rary  tex t as the 
jo in t work of the au th o r and the  reader in  "continuing productivity." B ut more 
im portantly , Ja u ss’s insigh t into the aesthetic distance betw een a  work of a r t  
and  its  reception and in to  the work’s "horizon of fu ture aesthetic experience"
9characterized by a belated critical reception approxim ates the  d istan t real in  
the  alternative M arxist critical approach.6 The alternative approach, however, 
does no t exactly follow Jau ss  b u t deals w ith the  "horizon of fu ture aesthetic 
experience" on the basis of M arx’s notion of "the particu lar interest" of the 
individual, which m atches up w ith the future reader’s interpretive paradigm s 
influenced by or freed from the control of the  postm odern M arxist 
"interpretive community." The alternative approach also incorporates Jau ss’s 
traditional M arxist views of historical determ inism  into the  public voice of the 
authorial se lf and differentiates i t  from the homeless voice th a t dism antles 
relations w ith  history and authorial ideology. While assigning value to both 
authorial in tention in  the public voice of the self and the  reader’s interpretive 
strategies in  the homeless voice, the alternative M arxist approach also 
em phasizes the interplay between the  au thor and the  reader in  the private 
voice of the self, where authorial ideology is not necessarily in tentional bu t 
a  jo in t production by the au thor and the reader. Thus, the  split self in the 
p resen t study has th ree forms. The self th a t articulates a  public voice is the 
authorial public image defined by dom inant ideology, and the self th a t 
pronounces a  private voice is the author’s in tentional or unintentional 
insertion into radical ideology. B ut the homeless voice of the self is created 
by the  reader as a textual self th a t is alien to the  author. Such a study of the 
th ree  kinds of voices of the split self departs from Booth’s and Poulet’s 
notions of the  split self and Jau ss’s aesthetics of reception after incorporating
10
them  into the alternative M arxist framework, and i t  recognizes the relative 
importance of the role of the author, of the reader, and the interaction 
between the two.
The model of the split self w ith the public, private, and homeless voices 
is established in  Chapter 2, which offers a critique of both traditional and 
poststructuralist Marxism and advances an  alternative M arxist approach to 
literary  criticism th a t consists of an analysis of those three voices. Chapters 
3, 4, and 5 exemplify th is model in  Defoe’s fiction w ith an  emphasis on the 
private and homeless voices of the self, and the public voice is undertaken 
only in  contrast. Chapter 3 examines the private voice as shown in  Deleuzian 
lines of flight or deterritorialization. In contrast to Robinson Crusoe’s 
reterritorialization to authority  (the public voice of the self) after 
deterritorializing the religious boundaries, both Captain Singleton and 
Roxana deterritorialize w ithout coming to term s w ith authority. The private 
voice in  either of the novels echoes through to the end. In  Chapter 4, Defoe’s 
private voice is illustrated by Schlegelian irony in  Moll’s chaotic world of 
becoming th a t disrupts the sense of a universal order and the certainty of 
authorial intention. Chapter 5 indicates a reversal of Lacan’s model of the self 
th a t progresses from the primordial androgynous sta te  through the Imaginary 
to the Symbolic. The Symbolic system serves to perpetuate the hum an 
subject’s position in  society, which corresponds to Defoe’s public voice about 
Roxana’s gender roles as perceived through the "male gaze." Roxana then
11
reverses her role as a dependent woman in the male-dominated society in  the 
second stage of the Im aginary and becomes a whore who articulates a private 
voice and poses a th rea t to the male dominance. Finally, w ith a homeless 
voice, Defoe th ru sts  Roxana back to the primordial androgynous state and 
deconstructs h er distinctive cultural gender roles towards the end of the 
novel.
CHAPTER 2
VOICES OF THE SPLIT SELF: AN ALTERNATIVE 
MARXIST APPROACH TO LITERARY CRITICISM
The self in  the present study is defined as a split self, a self tha t 
articulates different voices, a self th a t borders on the domains of the author, 
the text, and the reader, and the present approach propels a dynamic motion 
of these relationships in  literary criticism. Such a study of the 
author/text/reader dynamism builds on a notion of the split self derived from 
various models already developed by Wayne C. Booth, Georges Poulet, and 
Hans Robert Jauss. Inherent gaps between the author and the reader are 
somehow bridged through the space of the literary text in  each of those 
models, but those critics stress either authorial intention, the authority of the 
reader, or historical determinism. The present study intends to resolve the 
author/text/reader/ dilemma and harmonize the confrontation between theory 
and history. By incorporating authorial dominant ideology into the sphere of 
the public voice of the self portrayed in the text and by studying the text’s 
departure from dominant ideology as the private voice and the textual open 
space void of authorial ideology and history as the "homeless" voice of the 
self, the following pages aim to lay a theoretical foundation for the next three 
chapters dealing with Defoe’s different voices in his fictional narratives.
12
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The author, for Booth, is a split self who creates an  "official scribe" or 
"second self.” The created "official versions" of the author play a different role 
or establish "a different air" depending on the needs of different works. 
Through such roles of "the implied author," the reader can trace intentions 
and value systems back to the biographical author. The created authorial 
second selves in Fielding’s Joseph Andrews. Tom Jones, and Amelia, for 
instance, Booth tells us, all "value benevolence and generosity; all of them 
deplore self-seeking brutality." And through Shakespeare’s plays, the reader 
knows what Shakespeare loved and hated, for "it is hard to see how he could 
have w ritten his plays a t all if  he had refused to take a  strong line on a t least 
one or two of the seven deadly sins." The "second self' helps convey the text’s 
meaning to another "second self," the created reader. Booth argues th a t "the 
most successful reading is one in which the created selves, author and reader, 
can find complete agreement."7 In Booth’s framework, biographical authors 
play a key role in the reading process: they create the implied author and the 
implied reader; their artistic m erit lies in their ability to bring the two in 
unison and in sharing the authorial values and intentions. The author 
communes with the reader but from one "second self’ to another. The "second 
self’ of a reader such as Booth is totally passive as i t  is created by the author 
and divided from the real historical Booth in  a particular reading context. In 
other words, there is a strong bond between the author and the text, and the 
reader vanishes from the picture.
14
As the other extreme goes, the biographical author disappears from the 
text, and w hat m atters, Poulet argues, is the "thinking subject" or "thinking 
I" of the reader. Here, the duality of the reader remains valid, for there is 
still a distinction between the "thinking subject" Poulet and the historical 
theorist Poulet. "Whenever I read," Poulet writes, "I mentally pronounce an 
I, and yet the I which I pronounce is not myself." I t is not the author who 
creates and separates the "second self' from the reader; it is language th a t 
surrounds the reader with "unreality" and spurs the reader to split a 
"thinking I" th a t is drawn into the God-like fictional world. I t  is a game the 
"thinking I" and language play on the author, who is isolated from the text. 
Although the text embodies the author's ideas, the "thinking I" or the second 
self of the reader breaks the ties of the ideas from their source or from the 
author’s authority. The "thinking I" celebrates the lost authorship of the text 
because as long as the "thinking I" entertains the "mental entities" such as 
language or the ideas in  the text, Poulet writes, i t  asserts itself as the subject 
of those ideas. Therefore, the text "is there within me, not to send me back, 
outside itself, to its author, nor to his other writings." The author, the created 
authorial second selves in  one text or the other texts, and the biography of 
the author are all a t the mercy of the "thinking I" of the reader in  a reading 
process. The text exists in the reader, and the "thinking I" enjoys full 
supremacy.8
15
The celebration of the author authority or the reader authority 
handicaps the author/text/reader relationships in  literary criticism. Such 
maimed relationships are remedied in Jauss’s "aesthetics of reception," where 
Jauss emphasizes the first historical reader’s response to the literary text in 
an interacted production of the author’s artistic greatness. "History of 
literature," Jauss argues, "is a process of aesthetic reception and production 
th a t takes place in the realization of literary texts on the part of the receptive 
reader, the reflective critic, and the author in his continuing productivity." 
Both the author and the reader play an im portant role in  determining the 
aesthetic value of a literary text, measured by the reader’s "horizons of 
expectations," the distance, or "the disparity between the given horizon of 
expectations and the appearance of a  new work." The greater the distance is, 
the more aesthetic the work may be. The greatest distance of all involves "a 
‘change of horizons’ through negation of familiar experiences or through 
raising newly articulated experiences to the level of consciousness." So on a 
scale from "culinary" or entertainm ent a rt to the a rt of "horizonal change," a 
literary work "satisfies, surpasses, disappoints, or refutes the expectations of 
its first audience." This "aesthetic distance" is connected to reception and 
"objectified historically along the spectrum of the audience’s reactions and 
criticism’s judgment."9
However, Jauss’s theory turns the author/text/reader relationship into 
a stagnant, historically determined mode and reveals a limited view of
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traditional Marxist aesthetics. His model is restricted to historical 
determinism and to conceiving the formal "horizonal change" as a product of 
history. First, Jauss’s emphasis of the continuing author/reader joint 
production of the literary text is mainly frozen a t the historical moment when 
the work first makes its appearance. If a literary work destroys the familiar 
and conventional "horizon of expectations," i t  is only determined by history 
and works on the domain of "raising newly articulated experiences to the 
level of consciousness." The "newly articulated" or radical experiences bear 
conflicting interests with the established or familiar "expectations" and are 
bound to find their expression or representation in a work of art. When this 
happens, according to Jauss, the first reader and critic alike will be so 
stunned by the radical elements in a work promising "horizonal change" tha t 
i t  achieves "gradual or belated understanding" in its reception. Literary 
criticism of later generations ought to trace the reactions by the first reader 
to assess literary value. The assumption is this: a  literary work is a product 
of history, a  product of its social, ideological conditions. A great work of art 
transcends established or dominant ideologies and interacts with radical ones 
th a t have been "newly articulated" prior to the historical moment of the 
work’s appearance. Second, Jauss’s historical determinism also finds 
expression in its implicit cause/effect relationship between historical 
conditions and artistic form. His ideal example of "horizonal change" is 
Cervantes’ Don Quixote (1605). In  it, the reader’s familiar "horizon of
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expectations" is  evoked, the "horizon" formed by a "convention of genre, style, 
or form." As Cervantes arouses the  reader’s "horizon of expectations" in  the 
form of the fam iliar medieval tales of chivalry, the  adventure of his knight 
destroys such a  "horizon" and becomes a parody of the conventional form. In 
other words, the  medieval artistic  form of chivalry no longer keeps pace w ith 
the early m odem  life, and the changed social reality  dem ands a  parody and 
negation of th e  out-of-rhythm form.
Among the three term s in  the author/text/reader relationship, Booth 
isolates the reader and Poulet isolates the au thor from the  other two term s. 
Jau ss’s model includes one layer of the public voice of the self in  relation to 
the fam iliar "horizons of expectations" and the  other layer of the private voice 
of the self in  breaking w ith the fam iliar and embodies a  "horizonal change" 
which is historically determ ined. My framework of the split self incorporates 
all of these models b u t goes beyond Jau ss’s paradigm  of historical 
determ inism  and deals w ith the homeless voice of the self th a t is not 
historically determ ined or ideologically constituted. The self in  the  present 
study, in its  vocal division among the public voice, the private voice, and the 
homeless voice of the self, provokes an  in terp lay  among the author, the text, 
and  the reader and  proposes an  alternative M arxist approach to literary  
criticism. F irst, the public voice of the self perta ins to the  au thor’s insertion 
into the dom inant ideology or adherence to the conventional "horizons of 
expectations." Second, the private voice of the self promotes radical ideology
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th a t is submerged by dom inant ideology and needs to be raised to the level 
of consciousness and shape an  ideological real out of it. U nder these 
circumstances, the reader’s role to dig out historical facts and make 
connections between history and fiction serves to m ake sense of the literary  
text. The homeless voice of the self, however, transcends authorial ideology 
and intention and in itiates a  whispered conversation w ith  the future 
in terpretive paradigm s. Such a distance between the au thor’s ideology and 
the  reader’s in terpretations occupies a space in  the literary  text, and the 
connection between the two is made possible w ith the application of critical 
theory. W ithin such a  framework of the self, history and  theory, in  the first 
place, have distinct functions. H istorical studies, on the one hand, m ake sense 
of the tex t in  term s of the author’s ideology and the socio-historical milieu 
th a t  produces ideology, e.g. the  public voice of the self. Theory, on the other 
hand, abandons history and historical determ inism  and tries to m ake sense 
of the tex t solely in  theoretical term s, e.g. the  homeless voice of the  self th a t 
transcends the au thor’s ideology and anticipates the reader’s interpretive 
strategies. In the second place, despite th e ir contradictions, history and 
theory also occupy an  overlapping area  th a t covers p a rt of both history and 
theoiy, e.g. the private voice th a t departs from the fam iliar "horizons of 
expectations" b u t taps into the  radical "horizons" of change-both  history and 
theory can, in  such cases, arrive a t  the same conclusions about the text, as 
in  the following chapters on deterritorialization, th e  chaotic world of
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becoming, and the reversal of gender roles in Defoe’s fiction. So the 
framework of the split self among the public, the private, and the homeless 
can be reduced to a simple model th a t involves history and theory and the 
author and the reader in  relation to the text: the public voice (authorial 
dom inant ideology and history), the private voice (authorial radical ideology 
and shared territory of history and theory), and the homeless voice (flight out 
of authorial ideology and history into the reader’s interpretive paradigms). 
Critical theory reinforces historical studies ju s t as historical studies reinforce 
critical theory in th a t shared territory of literary criticism. Literary criticism, 
i t  can be argued w ithin the present model, ought to recognize and value all 
of the three "vocal" spheres of interpretation, for a g reat work of a r t  can 
reveal a split self on all the three levels of its voices.
The following pages will be divided into two sections: (1) a critique of 
traditional and poststructuralist Marxism and (2) the voices of the self: the 
public voice, the private voice, and the homeless voice. The first section deals 
w ith the lim ited view of Marxism, in  which both traditional Marxism 
(classical and cultural) in  its historical determinism and poststructuralist 
M arxism in  its  ideological and institutional approaches are examined and 
revised. The second section first evaluates the public voice in  relation to the 
notions of history and the ruling class ideology in  traditional M arxism and in  
relation to the concept of the ideology-centered hum an subject in 
poststructuralist M arxist theories. Then, the private voice coincides with
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radical or em ergent ideologies. The homeless voice of the self is derived from 
Marx’s theory of "particular interest" in  contrast to "communal interest." This 
component of the homeless voice promises an alternative M arxist approach 
and enhances an expanded view of Marxism th a t moves beyond its traditional 
and poststructuralist variations. I t revises both in its departure from 
traditional M arxist historical determinism and in its awareness of the 
dissonance between authorial ideology and the reader’s interpretive 
paradigms, controlled by or freed from the "interpretive community," so th a t 
a literary text may obliterate its ties with both ideology and history, creating 
an  open space for the reader. In this sense, the author, with the public voice, 
the private voice, and/or the homeless voice of the self in the text, may or 
may not be manipulated by ideology; the same applies to the reader and the 
critic, whose interpretations of the text may or may not adhere to their 
ideology influenced by the institutional discourse and may leave an open 
space, too, for the future interpretive paradigms.
2.1. A Critique of Traditional and Postmodern Marxism
For Marx, the economic structure of society or the material productive 
forces constitute an  economic base th a t gives rise to a legal, political, and 
spiritual superstructure and to forms of social consciousness. Marx writes, "it 
is not the consciousness of men th a t determines their being, but, on the
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contrary, their social being th a t determines their consciousness." This is what 
Marx deems as the deterministic relationship between the economic base or 
infrastructure and the ideological superstructure. In  The German Ideology 
(1846), Marx and Engels regard "the m aterial activity and the material 
intercourse of men" as "the language of real life" and consider the production 
of ideas as conditioned by the productive forces. While the base contains all 
the m aterial existence in society, the superstructure consists of the State, the 
legal system, and all the ideological components such as religion, ethics, 
politics, a r t  and literature, etc. The function of the superstructure, in  Louis 
A lthusser’s terms, is to reproduce labor power’s "submission to the rules of 
the established order" or reproduce all the social relations required to 
m aintain the economic base. As the base determines the whole edifice of all 
social consciousness or ideology, and as a certain class dominates the 
productive forces in  society and therefore dominates th a t economic base, the 
dom inant class always produces a dominant ideology th a t becomes social 
consciousness. "During the time th a t the aristocracy was dominant," Marx 
and Engels tell us, "the concepts honour, loyalty, etc. were dominant, during 
the dominance of the bourgeoisie the concepts freedom, equality, etc." This 
idea of m aterial existence or social reality as the determ iner of ideological 
concepts is especially clear in Marx’s explanation of the English Revolution 
of 1688, where Marx regards m aterial factors concerning conflicting classes 
as the real cause for the overthrow of the English Restoration monarchy. In
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Marx’s view, the driving force for the Revolution is a class struggle for 
material benefits. First, it  was "the fear on the part of the great new 
landowners," who had to return  their property (seven-tenths of England’s 
land) they had acquired by robbing the church before the 1660 Restoration. 
Second, it  was the bourgeoisie who fought for freedom in commerce and 
industry. In the Revolution, the new landowner class joined forces with the 
commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, which was averse to Charles I’s 
interference with free competition and to the control of Catholicism over 
England’s industry and commerce.10 Behind apparent ideological demands for 
political privileges and religious freedom lies the material existence that 
determines the ideology of the oppositional classes in the Revolution. Marx 
and Engels even warn people of the misconception th a t ideology 
revolutionizes society. They argue th a t ideas may revolutionize society but the 
ideas are a product of historical conditions, for "within the old society, the 
elements of a new one have been created," and "the dissolution of the old 
ideas keeps even pace with the dissolution of the old conditions of existence." 
That is, the revolutionary or "emergent" ideology springs from the elements 
of a new society within the old one. And the "residual" ideology will dissolve 
if  the soil th a t begets its existence and fertilizes its growth is replaced by a 
new base or new conditions of existence. That is why, for Marx and Engels, 
as "feudal society fought its death battle with the then revolutionary 
bourgeoisie," Christianity, which had overcome the ancient world, succumbed
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to the eighteenth-century emergent bourgeois rationalist ideas and had to 
remain to be "residual" ideology.11
Classical M arxist historical determinism also cuts into art and 
literature as ideological forms and renders cultural Marxist readings of the 
text. W riters’ social consciousness cannot escape from their social existence. 
Marx regards "petty-bourgeois writers" as "shopkeepers" of the class they 
represent. The "shopkeepers" and the petty-bourgeois class cannot go beyond 
the limits of their "material interest and social position" and are driven "to 
the same tasks and solution." A rt and literature, for Marx, are part of the 
social process and have social roots in history. Revolutionary developments 
in literary form, in Terry Eagleton’s words, "result from significant changes 
in ideology. They embody new ways of perceiving social reality." Jauss’s view 
of Don Quixote, as discussed above, is such an example of the changed social 
reality and ideology as determiners of the artistic form. Eagleton’s evidence 
is derived from Ian W att’s formal realism in  The Rise of the Novel, as 
Eagleton argues th a t the novel "reveals in its very form a changed set of 
ideological interests.... I t shares certain formal structures with other such 
works: a shifting of interest from the romantic and supernatural to individual 
psychology and ‘routine’ experience." Themes of the romantic and the 
supernatural tend to give way to those of the individual and common life, as 
the social conditions have changed in favor of the modem artistic form, a 
form to better express the changed ideology. In Georg Lukacs’s cultural
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M arxist views, literary  form also reflects a  "metaphysical dissonance," which 
is determ ined by culture or, in  M arshall Berm an’s words, stem s from "the 
inner contradictions of its  historical and social milieu." For Lukacs, "every a r t 
form is defined by the m etaphysical dissonance of life which i t  accepts and 
organises as the basis of a  totality  complete in  itself." "Metaphysical 
dissonance" because the to tality  th a t  the a r t  form embodies renders a 
completeness in  itself, bu t completeness, Lukacs m aintains, is  "utopian." Both 
the epic and the novel th ink  in  term s of totality, and  the basis of such a 
to tality  or "the metaphysical dissonance" corresponds to the respective outside 
realities of the epic and of the novel. In  the  epic, Lukacs argues, the basis of 
the to ta lity  is  derived from the form-giving philosophy characteristic of the 
ancient world th a t  deems life and essence as identical concepts. Thus, the 
epic world and the  outside world kn it a "perfect rhythm ic system" where all 
characters in  the  created artistic  forms are a t  the  same distance from the 
essence. The organic ancient world, however, is disrupted by the fragmented 
m odem  world. The basis of the  to tality  of the novel originates in  this changed 
m odem  world, where "the immanence of m eaning in  life has become a 
problem." Then, the a r t  form personifies a totality th a t  captures "the life of 
the problem atic individual" ra th e r than  "the imm anence of meaning" or "the 
all-sustaining essence."12 As the  m odem  world has changed and has left no 
trace o f the cosmic essence th a t m arks the ancient world, the modem literary  
form likewise keeps pace w ith th a t  change.
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Historical determ inism  is perhaps best illustrated by Fredric Jam eson 
in  his th ree political or ideological horizons of w hat he calls a "Marxist 
m ethod of lite rary  and  cultural interpretation," which realizes the force of 
culture on poetics or the political in terest behind art. W ithin Jam eson’s first 
(narrow) horizon, the tex t or "the object of study" (the individual literary 
work) functions as "a symbolic act,” where social contradictions "find a purely 
formal resolution in the aesthetic realm." Political and  ideological ju s t as the 
first, th e  second (expanded) horizon refers to the text, which, construed as 
class discourses, "has widened to include the social order" and serves as "the 
ideologeme" th a t reflects "the essentially antagonistic collective discourses of 
social classes." The tex t in  this horizon, in other words, may be used as a tool 
to  m ain ta in  the reign of the  dominant social class and  to repress or resolve 
social opposition and ideological antagonism . Jam eson’s th ird  and la s t 
political and ideological horizon encompasses "hum an history as a whole" in 
the  form of cultural revolution. All of the three horizons are determ ined by 
modes of production. While the individual tex t (the fist horizon) and the 
collective ideologemes (the second horizon) are "sign systems which are 
them selves traces or anticipations of modes of production," the  u ltim ate broad 
horizon of cultural revolution enhances and perpetuates the dom inant place 
of the  new social formation or the new modes of production—as a  product of 
cultural revolution—and the new ideology th a t  is m ean t to justify  them. 
H aving established the th ree horizons of in terpretation, Jam eson calls for "a
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whole new framework for the hum anities, in  which the study of culture in the 
widest sense would be placed on a m aterialist basis."13 A rt and literature in 
Jam eson’s model are symbolic forms of ideology th a t enact social conditions 
or reflect class interests. These symbolic "traces" of the economic base or of 
the modes of production are all worked up towards cultural revolution, where 
the old modes of production give way to the new on which a  new ideology or 
social consciousness is based.
Traditional Marxism is often accused of claiming a dichotomy between 
a neutra l reality and ideology as false consciousness. In The German 
Ideology. Marx and Engels discuss ideology’s function of legitimation or 
universalization. "Each new class which pu ts itself in the place of one ruling 
before it," according to Marx and Engels, "is compelled, merely in  order to 
carry through its  aim, to represent its in terest as the common in terest of all 
the members of society, th a t is, expressed in ideal form: it  has to give its 
ideas the form of universality, and represent them  as the only rational, 
universally valid ones." To prevent the subjugated classes from knowing their 
true in terest in  society, ideology here is stamped w ith a ruling class 
tradem ark  in order to perpetuate the power structure and is conceived as an 
illusion alien to the objective external world. However, a r t  and literature, 
when activating radical ideologies, can pierce through the dom inant ideology 
or the false consciousness of the ruling class. Marx speaks highly of the 
nineteenth-century English realists such as Dickens, Thackeray, Bronte, and
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Gaskell for exposing the middle class and issuing to the world "more political 
and social tru ths than  have been u ttered by all the professional politicians, 
publicists and moralists pu t together." In his 1888 le tter to M argaret 
Harkness, Engels, too, believes in  the penetrating capacity of literature. He 
praises Balzac’s Comedie Humaine (1816-48) for being freed from the ruling 
class’s restrictive ideology and plunging into the objective reality of his era, 
for Balzac goes against "his own class sympathies and political prejudices" 
and admires "representatives of the popular masses." Literary form, in  the 
hands of Balzac, transcends ideology or false consciousness into tru th  or an 
independent external world. Here, we actually confront a dilemma in this 
dichotomy between an objective world and ideology as false beliefs. On the 
one hand, ideology functions to impose the dominant class’s will on all classes 
in society as a universal ideal th a t blocks the dominated classes from a true 
knowledge of reality. On the other hand, in helping us get a glimpse into 
tru th , the literary work, ideological in nature, challenges and dispels the false 
beliefs th a t ideology strives to project.14
In  order to resolve this dilemma and repudiate the traditional M arxist 
conviction of a neutral reality, the poststructuralist or postmodern Marxists 
launch a  different operation th a t centers on ideology (residual, dominant, and 
emergent) as the real itself. First, the postmodern M arxist pioneer Louis 
Althusser starts off by obscuring the traditional M arxist distinction between 
the m aterial and the conceptual, between the primary independent world and
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secondary illusive ideology, and by asserting the influence of the institutional 
"Ideological State Apparatuses" to constitute individuals as subjects. 
Emphasizing the relative autonomy of the superstructure, Althusser refuses 
to categorize ideology as dependent on the material and claims th a t "ideology 
has a material existence" in itself. Rather than being external to ideology, 
m aterial existence is embodied in ideology, and the two are yoked into 
individuals’ material practice of whatever they believe in. For Althusser, 
"ideology interpellates individuals as subjects," who are always subjected to 
one ideology or another and free to act in accord with their ideology, and "the 
ideas’ of a human subject exist in his actions." First, the interpellation of 
ideology starts even before the human being is bom. Family ideology turns 
the unborn into a subject, for there is an "ideological ritual th a t surrounds 
the expectation of a ‘birth’, th a t ‘happy event.’" The unborn child also carries 
with it an ideological impress in social and gender terms the moment when 
it is expected to be bom: it  is going to bear its father’s name and is going to 
be conceived along the lines of the male/female dichotomy in relation to its 
gender roles in society. Also, ideology does not remain intact in  the cognitive 
sphere. If you believe in God, for example, you do not ju st harbor th a t notion 
in  your mind and keep faith in it  without doing anything; th a t ideological 
notion in  you will materialize itself in your actions and your practice of the 
m aterial rituals of religion. As Althusser says, if  a hum an subject believes in 
God, "he goes to Church to attend Mass, kneels, prays, confesses, does
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penance." In this m aterialist concept, ideology no longer represents false 
consciousness, something to be penetrated through in  order to reach for the 
real. Ideology, in  this poststructuralist Marxist view, opens on to the outside 
world and is, as Jonathan Dollimore puts it, "the very terms in which we 
perceive the world."16
While the material and the conceptual are mixed and blurred in 
Althusser’s theory, Terry Eagleton even rejects the objective real and takes 
it  as non-existent. Ju s t as Eagleton feels there is no exteriority or the 
signified outside language, there is not any "direct, spontaneous relation 
between text and history." The text does not render referential ties to the 
real. Any reading of Balzac by-passing ideology into history "belongs to a 
naive empiricism which is to be discarded." Balzac’s insights, for Eagleton, 
are the effect of "authorial insertion into ideology." The text does not pierce 
holes in ideology as false beliefs and disclose the real but produces an 
ideology th a t is the real itself. Drawing on Engels’s distinction between the 
musical score and the times played by the band and his distinction between 
"dead" drama in script form and drama on stage performed "from the thvmele 
and orchestra [the orchestra and the chorus] through the living mouths of the 
actors," Eagleton introduces the idea of the text as production. The literary 
text is "a certain production of ideology" not the "expression" of it, "nor is 
ideology the ‘expression’ of social class," ju st as a play on stage "produces" the 
script on which i t  is based rather than  expresses or reflects it. Thus, history
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and the real are erased from the traditional M arxist determ inistic history- 
ideology-text formulation.16 W hat rem ains is authorial insertion into ideology 
in  the text.
Besides the author’s production of ideology in  the text instead  of 
reaching for the objective real, the reader, too, is m anipulated by w hat 
S tanley F ish  calls the "interpretive community" or the educational 
institu tions as an  A lthusserian "Ideological S tate  Apparatus" to constitute the 
hum an subject. W ithin the poststructuralist M arxist framework, this 
institu tional approach repudiates the autonomy of the reader and emphasizes 
the determ ining force exerted by the institu tional discourse th a t reproduces 
ideology in  setting  up interpretive norm s to regulate reading strategies and 
orchestrate pa tte rn s of thinking. This institu tional control produces both 
textual m eaning and  authorial intention. Any interaction between the critic 
and  the text, F ish argues, will never occur w ithout reference to "a public and 
stable norm," for "meanings come already calculated, not because of norms 
embedded in the language b u t because language is always perceived, from the 
very first, w ithin a structure of norms" established by the "interpretive 
communities." Following Fish’s argum ent, Edw ard Said studies critical 
consciousness as a product of institu tional influence by distinguishing 
between "filiation" and "affiliation." Filiation, for Said, perta ins to a natu ra l 
in stinct to include certain aspects of culture (involved w ith "birth, nationality, 
and profession") as "us" and exclude others as "them," while affiliation is
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related to institutional influence of the critic by "social and political 
conviction, economic and historical circumstances." Filiation in  preserving 
culture gives rise to affiliation in educating the young, bu t the latter, with its 
relative autonomy, "sometimes reproduces filiation, sometimes makes its own 
forms." Said contends th a t "the narrow circle of w hat is natural, appropriate, 
and valid for ‘us’" is influenced by filiation, which canonizes W estern culture 
within the "narrow circle" and represses and "excludes the non-literary, the 
non-European, and above all the political dimension in  which all literature, 
all texts, can be found." The filiative order lim its literary value within 
boundaries and m arks them as hum anities th a t are to be studied in the 
classroom and to be handed down to the next generation, while leaving out 
w hat is social and political, w hat is non-literary, and w hat is opposite to 
W estern culture. That is, natural filiation with culture demarcates between 
an "us" as the self to be valued and passed on and a "them" as the other to 
be repressed and discredited. However, filiation does not exist without 
affiliation, the affiliative institutional influence of those in the classroom to 
inherit the cultural legacy, "who in  tu rn  become members, by affiliation and 
formation, of the company of educated individuals"—affiliation reproduces 
filiation. Affiliation also "makes its own forms" by adding another interpretive 
param eter th a t reads the non-European, social and political, and the so called 
"non-literary" text as aspects of culture, aspects th a t filiation excludes, and 
by relating them to the critic’s "actual social world." In this sense,
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institutional discourse in  the form of poetics produces an effect on culture. 
Faced w ith filiation and affiliation, the critic cannot escape being 
institutionalized. As Said points out, "the contemporary critical consciousness 
stands between the temptations" represented by these two institution- 
reinforced powers. The critic is free to choose between the two but is 
constituted by either choice and free from neither one.17
While traditional Marxism claims an objective real th a t is obtained 
through radical ideology to demystify dominant ideology as false 
consciousness representing the illusive real, poststructuralist Marxism in 
both its author/ideology and reader/institutions approaches deems ideology, 
both dominant and radical, as the real itself (see Figure 1 below):
(Illusive Real) T ra d itio n a l M arx ism  (Objective Real)
I / \  I
(Dominant Ideology) (Radical Ideology)
\  /
(Ideological Real)
I
P o s ts tru c tu ra l is t  M arx ism
(Figure 1 Notions of the real in traditional and poststructuralist Marxism) 
A critique of traditional and poststructuralist Marxism, w ithin the scope of 
the present study, will focus on the dialectic of the real and ideology.18 More 
specifically, i t  will focus on the dialectic of a spectrum of the two-layer reality 
and the exposing and productive ideology, a dialectic th a t both traditional and 
poststructuralist M arxists ignore. F irst, there is an element of tru th  in  the 
traditional M arxist belief in the real or what we call "history," but the real
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ought to be distinguished from the real constituted by dominant ideology. 
L iterature, in a sense, tries to catch up with reality or historical 
developments in  society. That is why critics can locate connections between 
history and fiction, and Lenin's critical method about a time lapse between 
the real and the reproductive fiction applies here-the  a r t form usually lags 
behind historical events it aims to portray. In Lenin’s view, the relation of a 
literary work to historical reality, as Macherey writes, "cannot be reduced to 
the ‘spontaneous’ or the ‘simultaneous,’" and "the writer is behind the times, 
if  only because he invariably speaks after the event."19 Following Lawrence 
Stone’s historical insight, for example, Dollimore, in his New Historicist 
reading, sees Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure (1606) as reaching for the 
historical real and George Whetstone’s A Mirror for M agistrates (1584) as 
conforming to the ruling class ideology-both are behind the times. By the 
early seventeenth century, the authoritarian family and the authoritarian 
state had become responsible, according to Stone, for m aintaining social order 
as part of "solutions to an intolerable sense of anxiety" on the part of the 
ruling class. Sexuality was heavily under this family social surveillance, 
Dollimore argues, as a result of the upper classes’ "insecurity in the face of 
change." Suppression of sexual licence "was an attem pt to regulate not the 
vice, nor, apparently, even the spread of venereal disease, but the criminal 
underworld" tha t threatened social order and the power structure of the 
upper classes. Threat from the underworld, the anxiety, and insecurity were
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the historical real to the ruling class, but this real was ideologinated by the 
dominant class as a concern about low-life immorality. This ideological 
regulation was in effect what Dollimore calls a "displacement" of blame from 
the ruling class to the ruled. While Whetstone reinforced the dominant 
ideology by blaming the low, Shakespeare lashed across and th rust through 
ideology and presented the real cause for disorder—misrule, unjust law, and 
corruption from above—and the blame was truthfully re-placed from the ruled 
to the rulers.20
We can define the real or historical conditions as whatever the 
dominant ideology attempts to hide, as the ruling class will (and has the 
power to) "naturalize" their class interest as the "common interest." In 
Dollimore’s reading, there could be two layers of the real tha t the literary 
work is related to. One is Whetstone’s work tha t corresponds to the real 
(sexual licence and immorality) constituted by the dominant ideology, the real 
th a t the ruling class wants to make the ruled believe; the other kind of the 
real is the real constituted by another kind of ideology, the ideology of the 
ruled, although the ruled have not realized i t  yet. Paradoxically, social 
existence determines the ruling class’s ideology, but non-dominant ideology 
does not originate as the discourse of the subjugated classes. When you focus 
on the first part of the sentence, historical determinism holds true (dominant 
ideology js  determined by the social existence of the ruling class to maintain 
social formation), but the second part contradicts the same claim. Consider
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this: if  a  w riter brings the illusion of the ruled to light, the illusion of their 
believing in  the  "real" th a t  is constructed by dom inant ideology, and reveals 
or constitutes the real and  even arouses them  to fight for it, th en  (radical or 
em ergent) ideology m akes things happen or even triggers revolution and 
transform ation  of the  infrastructure. In  th is la tte r  case, radical ideology 
determ ines history and revolutionizes society. Although M arx is righ t in 
asserting  th a t radical ideology or elem ents of a new society emerge from the 
old (from the contradictions of social classes), th a t  new ideology is not 
necessarily determ ined by the social existence of the ruled, for they  are not 
aw are of the  ideology until external figures from outside th e ir social class, 
like M arx and  Engels, even Shakespeare, Balzac, or Tolstoy, despite their 
class in te rests , s ta r t to produce and portray th a t  em ergent ideology, an 
ideology th a t  opens on to reality or cuts through the dom inant ideology into 
the  historical real. The conflict between the upper classes and the low-life 
underw orld, the real in  the  sense of the early seventeenth-century English 
ru ling  class’s alarm  for anxiety and  insecurity, did exist. B ut it  would be 
blind fa ith  to amplify, like the critical method of traditional Marxism, the 
determ inistic power of the infrastructure w ithout realizing the reciprocal 
n a tu re  of in frastructu re and superstructure, and i t  would be blind faith  to 
reject th e  fact th a t  one ideology penetrates another in  the process of reaching 
for the  real, in  the way the historical real is conceived by radical ideology in 
Dollimore’s reading of Shakespeare.
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In  fact, M arx and  Engels on m any occasions po in t out th e  reciprocal 
n a tu re  of base and superstructu re and deny any m echanical and passive 
correspondence betw een th e  two. The E nglish free-thinking philosophy 
developed by Locke, for M arx, influenced and activated the F rench Revolution 
of 1789. The reciprocal n a tu re  of base and  superstructu re  is also reflected in 
M arx and Engels’s belief th a t  "circumstances m ake m en ju s t  as m uch as m en 
m ake circumstances" and in  th e  priority  M arx gives to education in  schools, 
which has to  be tak en  over from the  "intervention of society" and the 
"influence of the ru ling  class." This is because "on th e  one hand  a  change of 
circum stances," according to M arx, "was required to establish  a proper system  
of education, on the  other hand a  proper system  of education was required to 
b ring  about a  change of social circumstances." The M arxist theory of base and 
superstructu re , for Engels, too, is a  two-way traffic system . He corrects the 
misconception of passivity  in  it, as  he  w rites "political, jurid ical, philosophical, 
religious, literary , artistic , etc., development is based on economic 
development. B u t all these react upon one ano ther and  also upon the 
economic base."21
To em phasize the  role of ideology based on th e  reciprocal na tu re  of 
in frastructu re  and  superstructure is to study th e  magic of radical or em ergent 
ideology to shape th e  real in  spite of the  determ inistic power of the real. M arx 
and  Engels as Michel Foucault’s "initiators of discursive practices," for 
example, aw aken th e  working class from th e ir  illusions and dispel the m yth
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of the ruling class ideology, in  an attem pt to shape the real. And this real is 
not a neutral objective reality. In this sense, poststructuralist Marxism 
certainly has a point here. Marx and Engels, in  the ir first jo int work The 
Holy Fam ily (1844), emphasize the "self-abolishing" side of the dialectic 
natu re  of property. W ithin the Hegelian antithesis of property, Marx and 
Engels write, the proletarian is the destructive side while the property-owner 
the conservative side; one is to annihilate i t  and the other to preserve it. In 
the ir theory, wage-labor produces "wealth for others and poverty for itself," 
and then, no doubt, the social existence of the working class, their poverty, 
determines their will to annihilate property, thus the "self-abolishing" side of 
the property dialectic.22 However, th is self-destructive side will never 
m aterialize w ithout a link between the social conditions and the awareness 
of them. This is where the role of an  ideology comes in. The working class is 
not conscious of the "self-abolishing" natu re  of property to begin with; th a t 
consciousness does not surface in  "clarity" due to the cover-up of the 
dom inant ideology. As ideology, in  Marx’s views, functions to m aintain the 
infrastructure, i t  smooths things over or "naturalizes" the property/poverty 
antithesis in  order to regulate, justify, and reproduce the social relations 
around it. Not until the "initiators" have developed their revolutionary 
ideology, can the working class realize the ir "spiritual and physical poverty" 
and "dehumanisation." As M arx and Engels have initiated  a radical ideology 
th a t attacks the dominant ideology, "a large p a rt of the English and French
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proletariat is already conscious of its historic task and is constantly working 
to develop th a t consciousness into complete clarity." Social consciousness 
plays a vitally im portant role here in  Marx and Engels’s "historic task" tha t 
is m eant to lead to a new historical epoch. The relationship between 
infrastructure and superstructure here is far from a  "Hegelian expressive 
causality" one (to use Jameson’s term).23 Infrastructural change will never 
guarantee an  automatic transformation of the superstructure. Such a change 
will not even have too much effect on the working class’s consciousness of 
the ir dehumanization, not until "initiators" of ideology shed light on th a t 
social reality and activate the superstructure to change the infrastructure.
I t is safe to say th a t the revolutionary or emergent ideology in the 
superstructure reacts and influences the infrastructure and helps to shape 
the real, bu t the real out of the mold of radical ideology is not a neutral 
reality  or an  objective world. While the real, in  the traditional M arxist sense 
of the term , does not align with the dominant ideology th a t attem pts to 
conceal i t  (and vice versa), the "real" here is tinted with the radical ideology 
(like Marx’s revolutionary ideology) th a t shapes it  and la ter functions to 
promote it. Engels’s comments on realism as "the tru thful reproduction of 
typical characters under typical circumstances" serve as a good example of 
how ideology functions to shape and promote the real. In his review of 
Harkness"s City Girl (1888), Engels argues th a t the essence of "typical 
characters under typical circumstances" should not be the depiction of the
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working class as "a passive mass, incapable of helping itself or even trying to 
help itself." The working class appears passive in  the City Girl, because "all 
attem pts to raise i t  out of its wretched poverty come from the outside, from 
above." Rather, for "the fighting proletariat," Engels suggests, emancipation 
should be "the cause of the working class itself."24 In other words, the 
novelist, in  Engels’s argument, should in the first place depict historical 
reality where the working class is already conscious of its "dehumanisation" 
and is already fighting for its place in Society, and the real here th a t the 
literary work unfolds is the working class’s "typical," embodied in its ideology 
(the cause of emancipation within the class itself). In the second place, the 
novelist should promote and reinforce the working class ideology th a t has 
shaped the real and is "typical" to its  class (leaving out the untypical). 
M arxist radical ideology has shaped the real, and the novelist should function 
to consolidate, promote, and advance th a t real.
I t  is im portant to note th a t Marx and Engels’s definition of ideology in 
The German Ideology means to represent class in terest as the universal 
in terest of all members of society and to project an illusion as the real. 
Ideology, for Marx and Engels, has an across-the-board meaning th a t applies 
to all dominant classes in all historical periods. Even when the working class 
is in power, in  their view, i t  will also "naturalize" its class in terest as "the 
general interest" of all members of society. "Every class which is struggling 
for mastery," Marx and Engels write, "even when its domination, as is the
40
case with the proletariat, postulates the abolition of the old form of society in 
its entirety and of domination itself, m ust first conquer for itself political 
power in  order to represent its interest in tu rn  as the general interest."25 
Here Marx and Engels emphasize the necessity of the working class’s 
overthrowing the dominant political power to ensure its own "mastery" in 
society, but the new society with the new masters in  dominance, in its total 
sum of material existence and social relations, lives in the shadow of another 
ideology, the working class ideology tha t represents its class interest "in tu rn  
as the general interest." The objective real tha t is rescued from a  dominant 
ideology bears in  itself a tendency of covering up another spectrum of the real 
and projecting an illusion in  its place. That is, when the working class is still 
subjugated by the bourgeoisie, it  has to rely on a radical ideology to lift the 
"veil" from the real th a t is submerged by the dominant ideology. When the 
radical ideology finally becomes dominant, it will, like every dominant 
ideology, perpetuate the social place of the new dominant class, promote the 
"real," and justify the new modes of production by imposing the dominant 
class’s interest as the general universal interest. Then, outside this very 
"real" tha t the new dominant ideology functions to represent, there will exist 
another new historical real th a t is filtered out by the network of the new 
dominant ideology, an ideology th a t in  turn, in Marx and Engels’s logic, will 
be false consciousness or illusive representation of the real.
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In  any given historical era, there m ust be two kinds of the  real going 
hand in  hand. One is the "surface" real m anipulated by the dom inant ideology 
and  the other, the filtered-out "underlying" real th a t  is an  antithesis to the 
real rem aining on "surface." And th is "underlying" objective real itself is 
tin ted  w ith ideology and will become another level of the subjective "surface" 
real in  its  projection of class in te rest as universal in terest, a "real" 
intertw ined w ith both objective and subjective elements. The side-by-side 
coexistence of the "illusive" real and the "historical" real only proves the 
dialectic or the relative stability of either real. Traditional M arxism amplifies 
th e  M arxist conviction of historical determ inism  in literary  criticism, and 
poststructuralist Marxism, in  denying the determ inistic passivity in  
traditional Marxism, emphasizes the power of the institu tions and questions 
the  validity of an  independent objective world. They both represent a lim ited 
view of M arxism in  th a t  the firs t proposes the tex t’s penetration  through 
ideology into history (text--ideology—history) and the  second obliterates the 
text’s ties w ith history and establishes an  ideology th a t is the "real" itself 
(text=ideology="history") because the tex t is produced by and perceived 
through ideology. Both are a lim ited view of Marxism because both isolate 
one p a r t from the dialectical on-going cycle of reality  production and 
representation. Traditional M arxism believes in  the real th a t  is underneath  
the ideologination of the dom inant class and rejects the dom inant ideology as 
false consciousness. Poststructuralist M arxism ignores the real filtered
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through the m assive legitim ation of dom inant ideology and regards ideology 
in  general as the  "real." A dialectical relationship between ideology and the 
real is th a t  dom inant ideology produces the "surface" subjective real and 
radical or em ergent ideology picks up the  "underlying" objective real and 
shapes and promotes i t  so th a t it  becomes "surface" and  subjective itself. So 
th e  respective traditional and  poststructuralist M arxist claims about the 
objective historical real and  about the subjective ideological "real" verge on 
radical ideology th a t generates the distinction between the above two kinds 
of the real. Traditional M arxism targets the real th a t only radical ideology 
exposes in  spite of the  workings of dom inant ideology, and poststructuralist 
M arxism (besides its  conviction about the real shaped by dom inant ideology 
as ideological), by contrast, h its on the same real th a t only radical ideology 
shapes and promotes, a real th a t boarders on the objective and the subjective. 
In  th e ir dialectical relation to radical ideology as a m ediation between the two 
variations of M arxism, the traditional M arxist objective real th a t radical 
ideology reveals is w hat I would call "the preceding real" and the 
poststructu ralist M arxist ideological real "the consequential real" as a 
consequence of the promoting radical ideology, ju s t for the purpose of clearing 
up the  objective/subjective confusion. A broad view of M arxist criticism would 
fuse the two aspects of the lim ited view as the  public voice th a t indicates the 
ideological real and the private voice th a t captures the preceding- 
consequential real or the dialectical real, and would suggest an  expanded
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view in  term s of the homeless voice of the self in the text. On this la s t level 
of the voices, the echoes from history and from ideology or from the 
ideological and the dialectical real, in  the case of Defoe, for example, no 
longer resound between the pages and are no longer there for the critic to 
tape-record and to play out again bu t are lost into the abyss of the text. W hat 
lingers in  the open space of the text is a d istan t real connecting the text and 
the reader’s interpretive paradigm s (not necessarily influenced by the 
"interpretive community"), whatever theories and historical insights the 
reader may adhere to or stand up against. The model of such a split self is an 
alternative M arxist approach to literary  criticism, for i t  departs from both 
traditional and poststructuralist M arxism as well as generates its energy 
from it. The alternative M arxist approach carries on with the 
poststructuralist notion of ideology representing the ideological real and 
sympathizes w ith its suspicion about the objective real. The current approach 
also distinguishes between the traditional M arxist illusive real and the 
poststructuralist ideological real and fuses the la tte r with the traditional 
objective real and transform s the two into the dialectical real. A part from a 
partia l over-lapping with the institutional M arxism in  th a t the reader’s 
interpretive strategies are governed by the "interpretive community," the 
present study also suggests a reader w ith a  "homeless" voice resounding 
outside the institutionalized modes of expression and obliterating any contact 
w ith history and ideology.
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2.2. Voices of the Self
The model of the voices of the self in the present alternative M arxist 
approach is first derived from traditional and poststructuralist M arxist views 
of ideology for the public and private voices. The traditional M arxist notion 
of dominant ideology constitutes the dominant class discourse. Here, the real 
represented by dom inant ideology is the illusive real. Radical ideology fights 
a battle  against repression and subjugation by exposing the objective real 
th a t is sifted out by dom inant ideology. The representation of th is radical 
ideology surfaces to stand up against the illusive real and to project and 
shape a poststructuralist M arxist ideological real once i t  gains dominance. As 
radical ideology tu rns the objective real into the ideological real, the real 
becomes an objective/ideological duality (the dialectical real) in  the alternative 
M arxist approach. In  this alternative approach, the public voice represents 
dom inant ideology th a t projects the ideological real. The private voice 
promotes radical ideology th a t shapes a dialectical real. Finally, while the 
public voice and the private voice are guided by the authorial ideology, the 
"homeless" voice of the self originates from the M arxist "particular interest" 
of the self th a t is defined neither by the postmodern M arxist ideological real 
nor by the traditional M arxist objective real; instead, the homeless voice 
constitutes a  d istan t real th a t is materialized not by authorial ideology but
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by the reader’s interpretive paradigms within or outside the institutional 
discourse (see Figure 2 below).
I A lte rn a tiv e  M arxism  1
I / \  I
I Authorial Ideology Reader’s Paradigms I
I / \  I I
I Public Voice— Private Voice--------Homeless Voice I
I I I  I I
I Ideological Real-Dialectical Real—D istant Real I
 1------------------------1---------------------------------------
 1------------------------1---------------------------------------
I Ideological-------------- Ideological------ P o stm o d ern  I
I I I  I
I Dominant Ideology Radical Ideology I
I I I  I
I Illusive Real Objective Real— T ra d itio n a l I
(Figure 2 Alternative Marxism in  relation to traditional Marxism, 
postmodern Marxism, the real, and ideology)
The public voice of the self is closely connected to what Williams calls 
"the political economy of writing" or ideological "alignment.” Writing, 
according to Williams, is a commodity ideologically specified because the 
author has to survive "the pressures and limits of the social relationships on 
which, as a producer, he depends"; otherwise he will find it  difficult to get his 
"commodity" supported or sold. About the "pressures" of dominant ideology 
on individuals, Engels offers a vivid description. In his essay "The Condition 
of England” (1843), Engels writes: "If you should go amongst educated 
Englishmen and say th a t you are Chartists or dem ocrats-the balance of your 
mind will be doubted and your company fled. Or declare you do not believe
46
in  the divinity of Christ, and  you are done for; i f  moreover you confess th a t 
you are atheists, the  next day people will p retend not to know you."26 W riters 
in  th is sense, due to the ideological "pressures," are indeed the "shopkeepers" 
or the  representatives of the ir social class. The writing of W hetstone in 
Dollimore’s reading, for example, belongs to th is  ideological "commodity." He 
is a  "shopkeeper" of the dom inant ideology th a t  finds fau lt w ith  the lower 
classes for social im m orality and  disorder. Booth’s notion of the "official 
scribe" in  Fielding and in  Shakespeare about the ir value systems, too, falls 
in to  the category of the public voice of the self. There is also a resounding 
public voice in Ian W att’s reading of Samuel Richardson in  his resorting to 
P u ritan  values to resolve the class differences between Mr. B. and Pamela. 
My m an in  the  present study is also no t im m une to the influence of dom inant 
ideology and has his share of the public voice. In  fact, Defoe is often conceived 
to be ready to m ain tain  the  sta tus quo, emphasize social order, and 
consolidate the dom inant power structure. For instance, Paula R. 
Backscheider, following J . Paul H unter’s argum ent of the  prodigal son, 
detects "a longing for social stability and  order" in  the  endings of eighteenth- 
century novels, including Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe. Moll F landers, and 
Colonel Jack . J im  S. Borck enhances the reader’s understanding of Moll 
F landers’s self-image in  h er desire for Hobbesian "societal bonding" through 
unions w ith men. For Paul J . deGategno, too, Defoe in  his criminal 
biographies promotes the "preservation of society and the value of the
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culture" and the equilibrium  between God and man. Finally, John Richetti 
focuses on the public voice in Defoe’s works in  term s of the "totalizing" im pact 
of social institu tions to regulate and ideologinate individuals like Moll and 
Jack .27
W hile dom inant ideologies serve the  ru ling  class to efface the 
possibility of opposition and antagonism  and to unify differing ideologies, 
oppositional force is situated w ithin the ideological dominance, rejecting 
absorption and repression, and will find avenues to emerge from subjugation. 
In  forms of nonhegemonic ideologies, the oppositional dissonance will 
challenge the  dom inant ideologies and raise itse lf from latencies to the level 
of consciousness.28 These dissonant em ergent ideologies, in  the ir battle  
against false representation and legitim ation, surface in  the  text as the 
private voice of the self. The private voice personifies w hat Engels calls "the 
independent Englishm an" who ’begins to th ink  and shakes off the fetters of 
prejudice he has absorbed w ith his m other’s milk." In  doing so, Engels 
continues, "he feigns an  opinion before society th a t is a t  least tolerated, and 
is quite content i f  occasionally he can discuss his views w ith  some like- 
m inded person in  private." To pronounce a private voice is to w ater down the 
ideological "milk" or to dilute the strength  of "prejudice" and tradition. I t  is 
private action because the "independent" person has to bear w ith the 
"pressures" of dom inant ideology and because once i t  goes to public i t  will be 
drowned by public opinion th a t is sa tu ra ted  w ith "milk" fa t and full of "milk"
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bubbles. T hat may be one of the reasons why an  eighteenth-century writer 
like Jam es Boswell in  his biography of Dr. Johnson, as Felicity A. Nussbaum 
points out, may hold his ideologically conflicting notions of character within 
the "private domain," bu t they may "disappear when brought to the public 
sphere," due to the impact of the "milk."29 B ut in general, the "private 
domain" as well as the "public sphere" will find their places in  fiction. In fact, 
the fictional world may be perfect fairgrounds where you can peddle for all 
kinds of "dairy products" (good for the ideological body) such as yogurt, cream, 
butter, and cheese. In  the back streets and bizarre comers, "independent" 
unsavory characters hang around "black-markets" where they circulate 
"anesthetic" th a t may numb the ideological spinal nerve-system, "poison" th a t 
m ay paralyze the "milk cows," "germs" th a t may spoil the "dairy products," 
or ju s t nice plain "water" th a t may dilute the "milk" itself.
The private voice does not appear in a vacuum; i t  is usually embodied 
in  radical ideology in  literary  form. Good examples are Cervantes’s negation 
of the fam iliar "horizons of expectations" in  Don Quixote, Shakespeare’s 
reaction to the dominant ideology in M easure for Measure, and Balzac’s 
insertion into the working class ideology in  Comedie Hum aine discussed 
earlier. Self-writing in  spiritual autobiographies and scandalous memories by 
eighteenth-century women writers, Nussbaum  tells us, also moves "outside 
authorized and institutionalized modes of expression" and represents a new 
consciousness, in  resisting male dominance and the public constructs of
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women’s "character." For David Marshall, Defoe’s fiction exemplifies the 
influence of the radical anti-Puritan tradition of the theater on the writer. 
Defoe’s authorial disguises and masks and concealment of identity of his 
characters all suggest the roles actors and actresses play-creating and 
changing identities-in  competing with God, who creates and inscribes fixed 
identity to man. Also, critics like Leo Braudy and Maximillian E. Novak have 
noted Defoe’s two inconsistent voices between his fiction and conduct books, 
the public voice in  nonfiction and "private impersonation" by his first-person 
fictional characters. Although Defoe’s "private impersonation" usually draws 
from the form of criminal biography, i t  departs from the conventional by 
neutralizing the plot and awarding his fictional sinners like Singleton, Moll, 
and  Jack. Sometimes, the private voice of the self is dissonant to the degree 
th a t Defoe even uses the power of legal discourse itself to disrupt the English 
contemporary penal code, as Moll picks up the discourse of natural law, the 
foundation, according to the radical ideology of John Locke, on which any 
legal discourse is based, to disrupt the eighteenth-century English common 
law and justify her crimes.30 The private voice is here to deliver the self from 
the manipulation of dominant ideology tha t functions to regulate the self.
In the ir relations to dominant ideology th a t functions to cover up the 
objective real and to radical ideology th a t picks up th a t left-out real as a 
projected ideological real, both the public voice and the private voice center 
on the ideological real and the dialectical real. The public voice taps into the
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dominant modes of expression while the private voice is embodied in 
emergent ideology th a t shapes and promotes the radical dialectical real. 
There exists yet another voice, hovering in the open space between the text 
and the reader, alien to the historical conditions and the ideologies of the 
author. Unlike Jauss’s "horizon of future aesthetic experience," this open 
space may echo a "homeless" voice tha t none of the historical and ideological 
determiners can account for. I t is a voice without "home" and without origin. 
The voice does not lag "behind the times" and does not speak "after the event" 
but reaches beyond the limits of historical space and time for the distant real. 
I t  abandons the author and communes with the reader whose interpretive 
paradigms replace the author’s ideology and drop the author from the 
historical and ideological boundaries. Not only does the authorial insertion 
into a radical ideology tu rn  historical events into the ideological real (as in 
Eagleton’s insight about Balzac), but there is also a textual (not authorial) 
insertion th a t reaches forward into the reader’s ideology out of which the 
reader constructs an ideological real th a t is free of the historical author and 
the authorial ideology. As the reader, in  the institutional Marxists’ views, is 
institutionalized by the "interpretive community," in this sense, the reader’s 
ideology to replace the author’s may be over-lapped with the institutional 
discourse or may be influenced by the contemporary theoretical developments. 
Apart from this partial over-lapping with the institutional M arxist approach, 
the homeless voice th a t the reader detects in the text may be completely cut
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off from any over-lapping, for the reader’s insight may also be "homeless" and 
freed from the constraints of the institutionalized discourse. Ju s t like fiction 
writers, readers, as authors of their interpretations of the text, too, may 
develop their own "homeless" voice or "particular interest" in  the reading 
process.
The "particular interest" of an  individual, in M arxist theories, is 
"homeless" and is contrary to the "communal interest" of all individuals. In 
The German Ideology. Marx and Engels offer us a full account of this 
homeless "particular interest": "the division of labour implies the 
contradiction between the interest of the separate individual or the individual 
family and the communal interest of all individuals who have intercourse 
with one another." The "cleavage" between the particular and communal 
interest here is not related to radical ideology representing the opposing 
class’s consciousness versus dominant ideology projecting the ruling class 
interest as universal interest. Marx and Engels here break social classes 
down into small units as particular individuals. As long as there is labor 
division, all individuals have to orient themselves toward th a t structure of 
social relations constructed around th a t division. When an individual "is a 
hunter, a fisherman, a  shepherd, or a  critical critic" or is in any other 
profession, Marx and Engels write, "he must remain so if  he does not want 
to lose his means of livelihood." As restricted by the particular material 
existence, individuals cannot develop their "particular interest" or full
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potentiality as to change careers as they wish. This, according to M arx and 
Engels, is  only possible in communist society, a classless society, "where 
nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity b u t each can become accomplished 
in  any branch he wishes," and "society regulates the general production and 
th u s m akes i t  possible for me to do one th ing  today and another tomorrow, 
to h u n t in  the  morning, fish in  the afternoon, rea r  cattle in  the evening, 
criticise after dinner, ju s t  as I have a mind, w ithout ever becoming hunter, 
fisherm an, shepherd or critic."31 This "particular interest" is homeless and 
free of class in terest because no members of society can afford to switch to 
o ther walks of life as they wish. T hat M arx and Engels th ink  the  "particular 
in terest" is only possible in  a classless society also proves its  affiliation with 
no social class nor ideology a t all. Because of its  s ta tu s  of non-affiliation and 
de-ideologination, the "particular interest" or the homeless voice cannot be 
evaluated w ith reference to the biographical author, for i t  is about the d istan t 
real in  the "horizon of future aesthetic experience." So the authorial self m ust 
tu rn  into a tex tual self or consciousness th a t possesses the homeless voice, in 
the  way th a t  the voice, free of the  authorial ideology, leaves its  trace only in 
the text, a  trace only the reader can identify in  the interpretive activity. In 
alignm ent w ith Poulet’s model, the  homeless voice of the self thus denotes not 
the  author’s presence in  the text, nor the Jaussian  jo in t production by the 
au thor and the reader, b u t the reader’s creation of a textual self free of the 
authorial self.
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The tex t m ay be an  emblem of conflicting class society; i t  may become 
a platform  for dom inant ideology to a ir the public voice of the self. I t  may also 
be a battleground for radical ideology, which seeks its  representation as the 
private voice of the self, disguised or openly, in its rebel against dominance. 
The tex t m ay also characterize a "classless society" or a "no-land" for ideology, 
where the  homeless voice of the self or the "private interest" of the  individual, 
which is impossible to realize in the individual’s society, m ay slip into the 
tex t and percolate in parts  of the Actional world. The model of the three 
"vocal" in terpretations of the self incorporates both the th inking  of tradition 
and th a t of postmodernism. J u s t  as the Freudian psychoanalytical framework 
renders "dreams and slips of the tongue readable ra th e r th an  dismissing 
them  as mere nonsense or error," and ju s t as the D erridaen deconstructive 
approach trea ts  the "gaps, m argins, flgures, echoes, digressions, 
discontinuities, contradictions, and ambiguities" as signifying force in  a text, 
B arbara Johnson is able to argue th a t  "when one w rites, one writes more 
th a n  (or less than , or other than) one thinks" w ithout realizing the fact th a t 
those "nonsense" signiflers w ithin the tex t may ju s t as well imbue textual 
m eaning as difference in  the process of signiflcation.32 Here, "one w rites more 
th a n  one thinks" suggests a traditional claim of authorial in tention as well 
as a poststructu ralist proposition of signiflcation th a t suspends the traditional 
in te rest in  history and the authority  of the author. In close resemblance to 
th is pa tte rn  of thinking, the three voices of the self in  the alternative M arxist
54
approach acknowledge both of these claims in  the public voice and in the 
homeless voice respectively. The notion of the totalizing ideology, in the sense 
of the Lukacsian all-sustaining form-giving subject of the text, in  
poststructuralist M arxism tends to encompass the totality of textual meaning- 
-every textual sign is marked within the ideological or institutional 
boundaries. Ideology in  the present study, nevertheless, has its  lim its in th a t 
totalizing power or is designed to discredit or even edit out things according 
to 'b inary  oppositions" of its  own. The edited-out or the filtered-out in the 
process of producing the dialectical real in postmodern Marxism becomes a 
d istan t real th a t emerges in  the sphere where one writes "other than  one 
thinks," while the public voice represents w hat one thinks.
Pronouncing all the three kinds of voices, the self in the present study 
signifies two meanings. The self with its public and private voices represents 
authorial visions of dom inant and radical ideologies in  the text. Out of the 
already divided self between the public and the private, a textual self out of 
contact w ith authorial ideology is created by the reader. However, i t  is 
im portant th a t authorial ideology ought to be distinguished from authorial 
intention. In  h is critique of the New Critical thesis of "the intentional fallacy," 
E. D. Hirsch, Jr. argues th a t there is "no magic land of m eaning outside 
hum an consciousness." Emphasizing authorial intention, H irsch directs 
critical attention to textual m eaning th a t is constructed by searching for the 
author’s consciousness.33 Authorial intention is always in  the author’s
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consciousness, but authorial ideology in the present study may not be. It 
consists of the author’s safeguarding of dominant ideology and authorial 
insertion into and production of emergent ideology. The public voice of the 
self, which taps into dominant ideology or the established ideas, may 
constitute authorial intention. In the private voice of the self, however, there 
may be two possibilities. When authorial insertion into an ideology th a t has 
been articulated on the level of consciousness, the private voice representing 
th a t ideology may be p art of authorial intention. But before the ideology 
emerges from latencies to consciousness, the author’s production of the 
ideology or raising i t  to the level of consciousness may not involve authorial 
intention, b u t the tex t is still part of authorial ideology. Engels’s 
interpretation of realism or the authorial insertion into the working class 
ideology in Balzac is a perfect example of this unconscious private voice. 
Authors may conceal their artistic interface with radical ideology in the text, 
Engels writes, but "the realism I allude to may creep out even in spite of the 
author’s views."34 The first is authorial intention to engage in an assault on 
dominant ideology, in concealment; the second is authorial ideology without 
intention.
In term s of the author/text/reader relationship, the model of the self 
with the three different voices values its dynamism and its interrelationship 
with one another. The public and private voices come out of the authorial 
ideological bugles and retain the role of the author within the sphere of
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criticism. The public voice of the self in  Defoe’s fiction, for example, always 
relates to Defoe’s conduct books and his other nonfiction writings. In reading 
this public voice, authorial intention plays a key role. Defoe’s "second selves" 
or "official scribes" in  his fiction and nonfiction focus the critic’s attention 
back on the author himself, his public value systems being represented by his 
public voice in  the text. Besides the validity of Booth’s author-oriented study, 
Poulet’s model of the reader without the role of the author is also 
incorporated in  the framework of the split self with different voices. The 
homeless voice of the self, as it is separated from the author, situates between 
the text and the reader, leaving the author’s intention and ideology out of the 
enterprise of interpretation. Authorial meaning here may be constituted on 
the one hand by the reader’s ideology as influenced by institutional discourse 
and on the other hand by the reader’s interpretive paradigms free of 
institutional control as in those of the Foucaultian "initiator of discursive 
practices." The conflict between the author-oriented and the reader-oriented 
approaches is also patched up together within the unconscious private voice 
of the self th a t involves a production of the literary tex t by the joint work of 
the author and the reader in th a t the author’s unconscious private voice in 
negation of the familiar "horizons of expectations" is raised to the level of 
consciousness in the text by the reader (e.g. Defoe’s anticipation of 
Schlegelian irony in Moll Flanders th a t reinforces radical ideology in Chapter 
4). Merging the models developed by Booth, Poulet, and Jauss into
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cohabitation under the roof of the framework of the split self, instead of 
including one to the exclusion of another, this alternative Marxist approach 
also departs from those models by assigning relative significance to authorial 
intention, historical determinism in the public voice of the self, the play of the 
private voice, the institutional control of the reader, and also the homeless 
voices of the author and the reader alien to ideology and the institutional 
discourse.
In applying the model of different voices of the self to Defoe’s novels 
such as Robinson Crusoe. Captain Singleton. Moll Flanders, and Roxana, the 
emphasis of the following three chapters is laid upon the private and 
homeless voices of the self and upon theoretical interpretation. Although the 
homeless voice of the self, as the alternative Marxist approach theorizes, 
obliterates its ties with ideology and history toward the end of Roxana, one 
can witness in the next three chapters an interaction between theoretical 
explications and historical studies in  the mode of the private voice. In this 
shared territory of theory and history, the one cannot go without the other. 
In  Chapter 3 on lines of flight or deterritorialization, theory and history go 
hand in hand in the shared territory of interpretation of the private voice. 
The discussion of deterritorialization is impossible without a historical 
background in the seventeenth-century theories on the relationship between 
theology and medicine, Defoe’s notions about dreams as communications with 
the supernatural, and his views on the laws of matrimony. Without a
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historical background, i t  is hard to describe how Robinson Crusoe 
reterritorializes into his public voice after entertaining a deterritorializing 
private voice; without a historical background, it  is also hard to know how 
Captain Singleton and Roxana articulate their private voices in rebelling 
against the laws of God and man without coming to terms with authority in 
the end. The private voice in Moll Flanders in Chapter 4 is Defoe’s ideology 
of radical thought about disorder and chaos in the universe, a  sense of the 
contemporary skepticism about the already disrupted order of the divine 
creation. Incorporating both theoretical and historical insights about the 
chaotic world of becoming indicates a level of the private voice in  the novel. 
Historical studies certainly are valuable here to provide the reader with 
insight into the ideologies about universal disorder. The theme of disorder 
and chaos is implemented in a theoretical application of Schlegelian irony to 
the text, which centers on uncertainty and ironic ambiguities. Critics’ 
historical studies of natural law, the living standards of the contemporary 
working class, and the theories of sympathy developed by Burke and Smith 
all help to determine Moll the character’s growth and process of becoming and 
Moll the narrator’s ambiguous double role in  terms of Schlegelian irony. 
Finally, the feminist study of Roxana in Chapter 5 (except for her homeless 
voice, which is in contact with the distant real and with recent theoretical 
systems) draws on both recent critical discoveries and historical concepts 
about the distinctions of gender roles, including Defoe’s ideas about an ideal
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woman. The Lacanian critical model is m easured aga inst historical insights 
in  ligh t of Roxana’s public voice as a woman visualized in  th e  ideology of the 
"male gaze" an d  her private voice as a "She-Devil” who poses a th re a t to 
patriarchy.
CHAPTER 3
DETERRITORIALIZING CULTURAL BOUNDARIES
Georg Lukacs in  The Theory of the Novel distinguishes between the 
epic and the novel in  term s of a  spatial/tem poral relation in  both of their 
inner and outer forms. Externally, the epic soul "goes out to seek adventure; 
i t  lives through adventures." The novel, however, comprises in  the totality  of 
its  "biographical form" a temporal order in  the lim it w ithin the beginning and 
the end of the  fictional world, which "tends to unfold its full epic totality only 
w ithin th a t span of life which is essential to it.” The spatial/tem poral 
distinction, for Lukacs, also applies to the inner form of the epic and of the 
novel. "For the epic," writes Lukacs, "the world a t  any given moment is an 
ultim ate principle." Any tem poral historical moment is conceived in spatial 
relations to essence or the entire cosmos, which is life itself. Both history and 
the philosophy of history as "a form of life" and as "the form-giving subject" 
of the  epic m ark  "the formative prim e reality  of every individual 
phenomenon." They supply the content and determ ine the form of artistic 
creation th a t ends up as a totality  where "every action is only a  well-fitting 
garm ent for the world." The metaphysical space between fictional characters, 
then, is "at the same distance from the all-sustaining essence..., for all are 
striving in  the sam e way towards the same centre, and all move a t the same
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level of an  existence which is essentially the same." In the novel, by contrast, 
"the extensive totality of life is no longer directly given." Now th a t the all­
determining transcendental "home" or the harmonic parallelism between the 
organic structure (essence and life) as "the form-giving subject" and "the 
world of created forms" has been destroyed, the novel supplies its own content 
and seeks its own form in the process of becoming.36 Following Lukacs’s 
argument, Fredric Jameson revives the distinction between the earlier novel 
and its modem form along the lines of such spatial relations and temporal 
order, a Lukacsian distinction between two types of narration: "the novel of 
abstract idealism" and "the novel of romantic disillusionment." While the 
external world of the earlier world-oriented novel is primarily spatial, where 
the hero wanders through geographical space and experiences adventures, the 
novel of romantic disillusionment is dominated by an  external reality th a t is 
time itself. The hero in  the modem novel as the renewed epic can act and 
express a kind of epic unity of meaning and life, bu t the modem hero acts not 
across geographical space bu t in  time. "It is a unity th rust into the past, a 
unity remembered only. For in the present the world always defeats the 
hero." Internally, Jameson maintains, "each novel is a process in which the 
very possibility of narration m ust begin in  a void, without any acquired 
momentum: its privileged subject m atter will therefore be the search, in a 
world in which neither goals nor paths are established beforehand."36
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The spatial/temporal criterion of the modem novel championed by 
Lukacs and Jameson confronts a re-evaluation in  the Deleuzian lines of flight 
or "deterritorialization." While Lukacs and Jam eson devalue geographical 
space in  favor of temporal order, Gilles Deleuze and Claire P am et reverse the 
two term s and value geographical flight for its "deterritorialization." In  their 
elucidation, the temporal order in  term s of both the past and the future in 
literature fixes man to territorialization or under the supremacy of traditional 
culture. Flight across geographical space per se is not belittled; only th a t 
which does not launch a departure from tradition is. Deleuze and P am et 
argue th a t while the French are "too historical, too concerned with the future 
and the past" and always begin "the search for a  prim ary certainty as a point 
of origin," Anglo-American writers create characters who engage in "a line of 
flight" or "deterritorialization." F irst, the temporal order is no major concern 
for Deleuze and Pam et. Unlike the Lukacsian and Jam esonian hero who lives 
in  the memory of the past because "in the present the world always defeats 
the hero," the Deleuzian flight crew enjoy the here and now and concern 
neither the traditional past nor the future. Second, adventurous journeys 
across geographical space are not discredited. "American literature operates 
according to geographical lines: the flight towards the West, the discovery 
th a t the true E ast is in  the West, the sense of the frontiers as something to 
cross, to push back, to go beyond." Besides being geographical, a line of flight 
for Deleuze and P am et can also "happen on the spot, in  motionless travel.”
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Although characters in French literature may go on a  voyage, "there is always 
a way of reterritorializing" themselves on the voyage; they always return, 
always fall back to an  old track and back into something they are fleeing 
from, or they escape from this world and exit to the next. B ut Anglo- 
American literature is preoccupied with ruptures, with characters who know 
how to become and how to "create a new Earth." Then, fleeing across 
boundaries is developing a private voice against tradition. Deleuze and Pam et 
discuss the opposition between boundaries and flight in  term s of the 
demarcations between trees and grass, gods and demons, tricksters and 
traitors. The term s on the one side of the demarcations serve the functions 
of cultural fixation: in  the imagery of trees, the roots hold the soil in place 
w ithin territorializing boundaries and keep it from eroding; gods have "fixed 
powers which try  to hold us back"; and "the trickster claims to take 
possession of fixed properties, or to conquer a territory." On the other hand, 
"grass has its line of flight, and does not take root"; demons jum p across 
intervals; and traitors betray "the world of dominant significations" and the 
established order. Flight across geographical lines helps us get loose from the 
coils of the tree roots, the fixation of the gods, and the control of the 
tricksters, which hold us back from departures and territorialize us within 
boundaries and walls. To take a Deleuzian flight is to jum p over, plane down, 
or crash through the territorializing walls and is to pick up a  cultural code 
like the laws of God and of man and deterritorialize it. A line of flight is thus
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not striving towards a center of essence bu t is "a sort of delirium" or a 
tendency "to go off the rails." I t is a movement of departure away from the 
traditional, the fixed, and the stable. A line of flight is a betrayal of "the 
established powers of the earth," a betrayal characterized, for example, by a 
"double tuming-away": "Man turns his face away from God, who also turns 
his face away from man. It is in this double tuming-away...that the line of 
flight—th a t is, the deterritorialization of m an-is traced."37
Although critics have rightly argued about the departures of Defoe’s 
fiction from the Spanish picaresque novel based on Defoe’s seriousness about 
morality and religion, the present study of deterritorialization does not align 
Defoe’s novels back to the picaresque tradition, for they show some vital 
differences from their predecessors in their lines of flight. The picaro or the 
picaresque hero, in Lazarillo. Guzman, or El Buscon. for instance, seeks 
adventure in his quest for freedom, but the adventure usually ends up in 
harmony with the imperfect world the picaro lives in. The picaro (Lazarillo) 
may secure a position and an identity in society and reterritorialize himself 
from flight across geographical space and occasional mockery of authority 
(e.g. his prayer to God to let more neighbors die so th a t he can commit his 
"sin" of eating a t more funerals). Or the rogue (Guzman) may experience a 
religious conversion and compromise with authority. Or the delinquent 
(Pablos) may go out to sea and come back to Spain without changing his 
original "nature" and without taking any lines of flight. The self and the other
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may be in  conflict, bu t i t  is only rogues cheating and robbing rogues; their 
energy is barely oriented towards deterritorialization or jum ping over 
boundaries bu t is exhausted in  adapting to situations and begging the mercy 
of society.38 Thus, a  line of flight can serve as a criterion to distinguish 
between those novels th a t break  from the earlier trad ition  and those th a t 
strike a  close resemblance to it.
Defoe’s five m ajor fictional characters, Crusoe, Singleton, Moll, Jack, 
and Roxana, all engage in  some sort of getaways. Geographically, they  all get 
away from England some time in  the ir lives, bu t not all of them  take a 
Deleuzian line of flight. Both Moll and Jack  spend some tim e in  the New 
World, one a transported  th ie f and the other a  deceived robber and sold as a 
slave. Both re tu rn  to England as corrected and rewarded middle class 
personages who can fit into the old society and live happily ever after. Crusoe 
longs to go to sea and to flee from England, where he does not find 
satisfaction in  h is station. After his isolation on the  island, he comes back a 
converted C hristian  and finally accepts Providence into his heart. Although 
they have taken  some lines of flight earlier in  th e ir lives in  committing crime 
against the social and  divine order, these three characters—Crusoe, Moll, and 
Jack—finally reterritorialize themselves and come to term s w ith the authority 
they rebel against. Only Singleton and Roxana have taken  tru ly  Deleuzian 
lines of flight in  their lives, although in  a  different way. Singleton engages in 
a line of flight in  motionless travel after he breaks the laws of God and man,
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for he finally, though reluctantly, comes back to London, and refuses to 
identify w ith the society he flees away from in  the first place. Roxana, too, 
deterritorializes the social and divine order in  breaking the laws of 
m atrim ony and leaves England for good.39 The present chapter will focus on 
all the three kinds of flight involved with three of Defoe’s novels: 
reterritorialization or an  illusory line of flight in  Robinson Crusoe, a line of 
flight in  motionless travel in Captain Singleton, and a line of flight across 
geographical space in  Roxana. Although Crusoe develops a kind of private 
voice in  d isrupting the religious tradition earlier in  the novel, he comes back 
to England in  the end with a public voice and reterritorializes him self to 
authority. By contrast, both Singleton and Roxana, in  deterritorializing the 
laws of God and man, pose a th rea t to authority and tradition with the 
private voice of the self throughout their lives.
3.1. Crusoe and Reterritorialization
Robinson Crusoe (1719) is Defoe’s dram atization of the confrontation 
between two opposing attitudes toward hum an experience: the secular and 
the religious,40 where the la tte r trium phs through to the end of the novel, the 
trium ph even extending to its sequel The F arther Adventures (1719) in 
Crusoe’s religious dissemination th a t prepares for his final celestial "longer 
journey" into the next world. W ith his island solitude for Puritan
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internalization, Crusoe is converted to a Christian, but only after he revisits 
his island in  the sequel is his religious longing finally realized, in the 
successful reformation of his island. The secular is fighting a losing battle in 
the novel, bu t this component of the combat is not without its moments, 
especially earlier in  the novel, which constitutes a line of flight across 
geographical space. Going out to sea for Crusoe against his father’s authority 
is falling into sin and crossing cultural boundaries. B ut Crusoe 
reterritorializes himself a t the end of the novel by returning to w hat he is 
fleeing away from in the first place and by compromising with authority, the 
heavenly Father, thus ending in an  illusory line of flight and delusion of 
deterritorialization.
In spite of fatherly advice to "stay and settle a t Home," the young 
Crusoe sets out to sea to seek wealth and adventures. Defoe prepares the 
protagonist in  the first three journeys for the subsequent island shipwreck, 
and during the three trials Crusoe demystifies the traditional symbol of the 
tem pest by dislocating the meaning of it and reinforces his "Original Sin" by 
acquiring the necessary survival skills on the coast of Africa and in the 
Brazils. On his first journey to sea, his father’s "truly Prophetick" warning 
th a t he will be "the miserablest Wretch" seems to come true for Crusoe, for 
he, being "a fresh W ater Sailor," gets sea-sick. He reflects th a t "how justly I 
was overtaken by the Judgm ent of Heaven for my wicked leaving my Father’s 
House, and abandoning my Duty."41 This religious rude awakening, however,
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is due to the individual’s physical and psychological response to the sea, 
which may differ from person to person, for it  is a "terrible Storm" to Crusoe 
w hat is to his sailor friend "a Cap full of Wind" th a t gives the sailors "a good 
Ship and Sea Room" (9). The religious confession of guilt is stimulated by the 
symbol of the tempest, bu t the symbol itself is problematic and inaccessible 
to meaning. The "storm" as Crusoe understands i t  does not constitute a 
symbol to the rest of the world but a dislocated symbol tha t means something 
only to its bad reader. Witty and piquant, Crusoe and his "Companion" do not 
pierce through the membrane of irony th a t hides a mockery of the religious 
overtone of the symbolic storm. Although they do not share the same notion 
of the "terrible storm," they do go the same "old way of all Sailors" and share 
the punch and make Crusoe drunk with it, so that, in Crusoe’s words, "in 
th a t one Night’s Wickedness I drowned all my Repentance" (9). The sailors’ 
m utual comprehension of the "storm" disarms Crusoe’s unnecessary 
repentance more than  the punch "drowns" it  in the sailors’ old-fashion way.
Not only does Crusoe dislocate the symbol of the tempest, but he also 
refuses to read any significance into it on this first journey, an  attem pt to 
(over)correct his bad symbol reading. When a real storm hits the ship, 
anchored a t Yarmouth Roads, the narrator changes from the mode of 
reflecting to th a t of describing and focuses more on the crew’s physical 
activity to save the ship from "foundering" and la ter to escape for life from 
the sinking ship. The realistic details, cutting away the foremast and the
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mainmast, pumping up water out of the flooded hold, and Crusoe’s being 
scared to a swoon by the shot of the SOS signal, all draw the reader’s 
attention more to the physical situations of the event than  its religious 
signification. The narrator is caught up in the victims’ desperate efforts to 
fight the storm and the other ship’s difficult but successful rescue operation 
while forgetting, together with everyone of the crew, all about the traditional 
warning on Crusoe’s sin.42 I t crosses no one’s mind to pray to God for 
deliverance; i t  occurs to no one th a t the storm may be a visible sign of divine 
wrath. Only after knowing it is Crusoe’s trial journey against his father’s will 
does the captain of the ship warn Crusoe th a t "perhaps this is all befallen us 
on vour Account, like Jonah in the Ship of Tarshish" and swear th a t "I would 
not set my Foot in the same Ship with thee again for a Thousand Pounds." 
In response to it, Crusoe lightheartedly comments in  a comical tone, "This 
indeed was, as I said, an Excursion of his Spirits which were yet agitated by 
the Sense of his Loss [of the ship]" (15). Crusoe has taken a failed symbol 
seriously and treated a possible divine sign lightly on this first journey, not 
because he is either ignorant of religious hermeneutics or blind to divine 
visible signs. I t is because Crusoe has taken a flight across the interpretive 
boundaries and blurred the hermeneutic territories of the tempest symbol. 
The symbol first means something for Crusoe but nothing to everyone else, 
and he la ter overcorrects his bad reading by ignoring any monitory 
implications of the storm. This hypercorrection seems to work for Crusoe,
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because no one a t  the moment of distress reads anything into the symbol. 
Then, i t  is no wonder he does not take the captain’s afterm ath  comments 
seriously.
C ontrary to fatherly  warning, the next two journeys consolidate 
Crusoe’s restlessness to go to sea, for they answ er the  purpose of acquiring 
survival skills Crusoe will la te r find in  handy a t seafaring. F ar from being 
punished for harboring a disobedient w andering soul, Crusoe comes back from 
a  successful second trip  abroad, to the coast of Africa. Besides the 300 pounds 
he has m ade from the voyage, Crusoe h as  also acquired, among other things, 
"a com petent Knowledge of the M athem aticks and the  Rides of navigation, 
learned how to keep an  Account of the Ship’s Course, and take an  
Observation" (17). The next journey proves less fortunate because Crusoe is 
captured by the Moorish p irates a t Sallee. B ut there is also a b righ t side to 
it: physical endurance during the  two years of captivity, in trigue involved in 
his escape from the  Moors, and m ost im portantly h is short career as a p lanter 
in  the  Brazils. Crusoe does not elaborate on the survival essentials he has 
learned from these experiences in  th is short preparation section of the novel, 
b u t he does give credit to them  la te r when he is stranded on the island. For 
example, two im portant tools essential for survival on the  island, responsible 
for shelter and food respectively, are  m ade w ith the skills and knowledge 
Crusoe has learned  from the Brazils: "the Iron Tree" w ith  which he m akes a 
shovel for digging his cave (73) and the technique to m ake the grinder
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hollowed out from a big log of wood for pounding "Com into Meal to m ake my 
Bread" (122). Besides the  tools for subsistence, Crusoe has also learned  from 
the Brazilians to use tobacco to cure his illness on th e  island (93). Having 
thus allowed Crusoe to demystify the  symbol of the tem pest and  procure the 
essential survival skills in  the  beginning pages of the novel, Defoe is ready 
to p u t Crusoe to te s t in  the battle  between the secular and the religious on 
h is island.
The confrontation between the  secular and the religious is best shown 
in the firs t few m onths before Crusoe settles down on th e  island. After 
Crusoe’s breathless struggle out of the foaming waves of the sea and landing 
on the island, the firs t thought th a t  crosses his mind is "I had  a dreadful 
Deliverance" (47) instead  of reading the  shipwreck as a sign of divine 
punishm ent. There is  no room in  Crusoe’s perspectives for religious 
herm eneutics for a proper reading of the sign of the  tem pest. A t th is moment, 
he is occupied with the  task  of survival ra th e r th an  spiritual meditation, for 
he is worried about clothes, hunger, shelter, and the  danger of being devoured 
by wild beasts. Sleeping in  a bushy and thorny tree  to hide from wild 
creatures, tying up logs of wood to make a ra f t in  order to unload the  wrecked 
ship, balancing the weight of the load on the raft, and seeking an ideal place 
for his hab itat, every physical activity is described to the m inute detail. When 
he th inks about God, i t  is H is deliverance th a t he feels thankful for b u t not 
the divine punishm ent of him  th a t is supposed to be ju s t to h is "Original Sin"
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to leave his father’s house. So far for Crusoe, God seems to have mercy on 
him  for his disobedience while he, like a true Christian, should have heeded 
God’s visible signs as punishm ent.43 Crusoe does not even realize the meaning 
of the sign when he dream s about nine months la te r of a m an saying “Seeing 
all these Things have not brought thee to Repentance, now thou shalt die." 
which should have made him  think of the shipwreck as "a ju s t Punishm ent 
of my Sin" (87-8). The misreading of God’s Providence before this realization 
in the first nine months surely constitutes a line of flight in  th a t Crusoe has 
deconstructed the traditional symbol of the tempest. Not only has he rebelled 
against authority bu t has also chosen to ignore the signification of the 
shipwreck.
Crusoe’s misreading of Providence also resides in his reading of signs 
in  the barley and the tobacco episodes, where (mis)reading of the signs of the 
divine providence is only the difference of his (feigned) faith. As soon as 
Crusoe spots some barley stalks growing by the side of his cave, "in a Climate 
which I know was not proper for Corn," he, understandably, praises 
Providence for the miracle: "God had miraculously caus’d this Grain to grow 
without any Help of Seed sown" (78). Miraculous as it  seems, the barley 
grows on the scorching island in the summer w ithout a seed! Crusoe has no 
choice bu t to believe i t  is the wonder work of Providence. However, Crusoe 
the sign reader disrupts the miracle and tu rns i t  into something natu ra l and 
common, piece by piece. As he la ter finds out th a t the barley has grown from
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the rem ainder of the grain in a  bag, Crusoe is aware he has made a mistake 
and adm its th a t "the Wonder began to cease” and "my religious Thankfulness 
to God’s Providence began to abate too upon the Discovering th a t all th is was 
nothing bu t w hat was common" C78).44 P art of the miracle has been explained 
away; the barley does not grow without seeds. The next part of the myth 
about its growing condition is also demystified, for Crusoe has thrown the 
grain "in the Shade of a  high Rock" so th a t i t  has not been "burnt up and 
destroy’d" (79). I t  is  ironic then  th a t faced with the failed sign of Providence, 
Crusoe still justifies his mistake by reinforcing his misreading: "it was really 
the Work of Providence as to me (italics added], th a t should order or appoint, 
th a t 10 or 12 Grains of Com should rem ain unspoil’d" (79). As he says ten 
pages later, "the growing up of the Corn...began to affect me with 
Seriousness, as long as I thought i t  had something miraculous in it" (89). 
Crusoe can praise God for the things to which His power is not attributed, as 
long as he lets his faith hang in  there and not fall with the miracle, although 
the praise-worthy miracle itself has already collapsed.
This blind faith in  the divine providence is illustrated in the tobacco 
episode as well. When Crusoe is ill, he says "Conscience th a t had slept so 
long, begun to awake, and I began to reproach my self with my past Life" 
(90). He then thinks about his "Original Sin" and about his father’s advice 
and cries out "Lord be mv Help, for I am in great Distress" (91). The next 
morning Crusoe feels "the F it being entirely off," but he does not owe it to his
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prayers for divine deliverance bu t to being "refresh’d with the Sleep" and 
expects the return  of the illness the next day. There is no connection between 
yesterday’s prayers and today’s slight recovery. He does not wait for 
Providence but prepares a mixture of w ater and rum  and puts i t  along with 
a piece of boiled m eat on his table "in Reach of my Bed." Repentance and 
prayers do not help much until Crusoe uses tobacco th a t he remembers the 
Brazilians used to cure all kinds of illnesses. In the tobacco chest, Crusoe also 
finds the Holy Bible, which he thinks is "a Cure, both for Soul and Body" (93). 
Crusoe tries several experiments on the tobacco for five days and cures "the 
F it for good and all" (95). He then attributes the cure solely to the Bible and 
thanks God for delivering him  from the illness.
I t  is clear th a t this traditional separation of theology and medicine 
runs counter to the practice of the Paracelsian new medicine th a t posed a 
th rea t to m ainstream  Puritanism  in  the seventeenth century. Crusoe’s final 
attribution of the cure to the realm  of the supernatural ra ther than  the 
tobacco indicates this Puritan  orthodoxy.46 Defoe in  his Review, it  is true, 
notes the glory and omnipotence of God in nature, as he says, "Heaven having 
plac’d Medicinal healing Vertue, in the Plants, Drugs, and other Produce of 
the E arth , is a full and authentick Testimony of his Will." The supernatural 
may permeate the natural life, but the practice of medicine, Defoe continues, 
is mainly of a hum an endeavor, for "the Skill of rightly applying proper 
Medicines to every Evil, and of rightly judging of the Disease, is obtain’d by
Study, Application and Experience." In A Journal of the Plague Year (1722). 
where Defoe displays both the traditional and contemporary views on the 
Plague as a divine visitation and as a natural calamity, H. F., the narrator, 
even ambivalently endorses human efforts in preventing the spreading of the 
infection in  spite of the divine power. On the one hand, while he explains the 
Plague as "a Distemper arising from natural Causes" and as a result of "the 
Conduct of human Causes and Effects," H. F. categorizes both under the 
traditional theory th a t "the divine Power has form’d the whole Scheme of 
Nature" (194). Since it  is "the Hand of God" th a t is behind the epidemic, 
"there was nothing to be hoped for, but an universal Desolation" (171). On the 
other hand, flight across geographical space away from London 
deterritorializes the universal divine boundaries. The observant H. F. 
prescribes "the best Phvsick against the Plague is to run  away." For those 
who believe "God is able to keep us in  the midst of Danger, and able to 
overtake us when we think our selves out of Danger," they end up in "the 
great Pits" with the other carcasses, "who, if  they had fled from the Danger, 
had, I believe, been safe from the Disaster" (197-8). Apart from fleeing from 
the divine vengeance, H. F. also suggests saving people from the infection by 
opposing "shutting Houses up" (159). H. F. himself is immune to the 
contagion not because of God’s mercy but because of the anti-pestilential 
drugs called "Venice Treacle" (240) he takes under the recommendation of his 
doctor. The human empirical part of medicine, for Defoe, sometimes is even
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more important than  the divine "healing Vertue" and even more important 
than  Providence itself. In the sequel of Robinson Crusoe. The Farther 
Adventures. Crusoe rescues a hurricane wrecked ship bound home to Bristol 
from Barbados. All people on board are starving to death, and the doctor’s 
role here is vital to saving them. First, Crusoe’s ship being present as divine 
deliverance to the victims is not enough, for if  the starved eat a t once as 
much as they want to, they will all perish. Second, Crusoe’s surgeon does not 
use any medicine of "healing Vertue" to cure the patients but judges on the 
nature of the illness and prescribes moderation "to give every man but a very 
little a t a time; and by this caution he preserved the men, who would 
otherwise have killed themselves with th a t very food tha t was given them on 
purpose to save their lives."46
The tobacco having the healing power in itself may be a sign of glory 
in  divine creation. However, there is a private voice or an anti-orthodox deep 
layer th a t underlies the episode. Found in the same container with the Bible, 
the tobacco is not excluded from the marked boundaries of the power of 
healing while its role in the healing process apparently is ruled out. Crusoe 
only says, in his feigned faith, tha t he has been relieved from the illness by 
Providence, but the details about how he experiments with the medicine 
suggest the real cure results from a natural cause, the tobacco, and Crusoe’s 
human ingenuity. To use the tobacco correctly to cure a particular disease is 
a question of human knowledge and may be more important than the
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"healing Vertue" of the medicine itself. Defoe’s obsession w ith the details 
about Crusoe’s experim ents w ith the tobacco implies Crusoe’s role in curing 
his own illness, where his empirical studies, of a  n a tu ra l science natu re , w ith 
the  tobacco overshadow his pure faith  in  Providence: drinking the tobacco 
steeped in rum , chewing tobacco leaves, and holding his head over the tobacco 
smoke. Crusoe has cured the illness only after he experim ents w ith the 
tobacco all the th ree ways w ithin five days and tries them  all a t one tim e and 
doubles the am ount of the tobacco rum  th a t he has taken  the day before. 
Therefore, i t  is  ironic th a t Crusoe, after all the descriptions of the 
experim ents, discredits the realm  of the m aterial and a ttribu tes his recovery 
to th a t of the  supernatural.
As a m atte r of fact, Crusoe shows some ambivalence toward Providence 
or the  invisible world in  the novel. Although he does not fail to acknowledge 
Providence when i t  comes to deliverance from crises, he does not hesitate to 
give credit to hum an wisdom or ingenuity. After seeing the footprint on the 
shore, for example, Crusoe imagines all sorts of dangers w aiting for him  and 
adm its th a t  "God, who was not only Righteous b u t Omnipotent...; ’twas my 
unquestion’d Duty to resign my self absolutely and entirely to his Will" (157). 
God’s will i t  m ay be to punish him  by giving the sign of the footprint, bu t 
Crusoe does not adopt a sit-and-wait a ttitude toward w hat m ay be the hand 
of Providence b u t takes "all the M easures hum ane Prudence could suggest for 
my own Preservation" (162). One of the things he does to protect him self is
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to p lant a  thick layer of bushes to conceal the wall in  front of his cave. Due 
to his protective precautions, no one haB ever discovered Crusoe’s re trea t on 
the island, except when he, to show off his talents, deliberately introduces the 
place to his island subjects. Even the English captain Crusoe has saved on 
the island from the m utineers la te r gives high m arks to Crusoe’s ingenuity: 
"the C aptain adm ir’d my Fortification, and how perfectly I had  conceal’d my 
R etreat w ith a Grove of Trees" because the wall of the bushes is so thick th a t 
"it was im passable in  any P art of it, b u t a t  th a t one Side, where I had 
reserv’d my little winding Passage into it" (258). Moreover, the hum an mind 
can even alter the contents of a supernatural prophecy. Crusoe’s dream  about 
taking a  savage as his slave rem inds him  of m a n -la b o r  to assist him in his 
escape from the island, and thus he says, "1 made this Conclusion, th a t my 
only Way to go about an  A ttem pt for an Escape, was, if  possible, to get a 
Savage into my Possession" (199). Note th a t Crusoe no longer expects any 
ships to come to shore as a sign of divine deliverance bu t begins to scheme 
up  a  plan to escape w ith the help of a savage. His high hopes of Providence 
for deliverance are transform ed down to those of the sub-human. W hat is 
more im portant is th a t Crusoe deliberately changes the plot of the dream  
story in  the process of the real-life h u n t for Friday, the savage Crusoe has 
rescued and taken as his servant. Having asked Friday to bury the two dead 
savages, Crusoe leads him  to his cave "on the farther P a r t of the Island; so 
I did not le t my Dream  come to pass in  th a t Part, viz. T hat he came into my
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Grove for shelter" (205). The reader fam iliar w ith Defoe’s notion about 
dream s as a form of communication w ith the supernatural47 can easily see 
th a t Crusoe has altered the direction of the prophecy in  th a t p a rt of the 
dream  he feels m ight be a potential th rea t to his "Castle" while allowing the 
rest to come true  in  the process.
Crusoe in  The F arther Adventures shows more of th is ambivalence and 
even complains about Providence. Early in  the book, Crusoe’s ship rescues a 
French m erchant ship on fire and picks up "two boats full of people." The 
rescued people s ta r t to give thanks to God for the ir deliverance, bu t Crusoe 
is having a problem. "To carry this whole company to the E ast Indies," 
Crusoe thinks, "would be ruining our whole voyage by devouring all our 
provisions." Being p a rt of the deliverance th a t may jeopardize his mission, 
Crusoe seems to th ink  God is to hold responsible for th is "unforeseen 
accident" because he has no choice but to save the miserable people according 
to his religious principles. About this inconvenience, "no one could say we 
were to blame: for the laws of God and N ature would have forbid th a t we 
should refuse to take up two boats full of people in  such a distressed 
condition" (23). Crusoe is unhappy th a t Providence has pu t him in this 
deliverance operation th a t gets him, the rescuer, into trouble. This frame of 
mind runs a sharp contrast to "the variety of postures which these poor 
delivered people ran  into to express the joy of the ir souls a t  so unexpected a 
deliverance" (17), about which he is not too excited to see because he has to
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worry about his own mission. W hat Crusoe is getting a t is th a t the rescued 
have all the reasons to express their joy and gratitude by owing their 
deliverance to Providence, bu t they are only doing th a t a t the expense of the 
rescuer—Crusoe, i t  seems, would not have rescued the ship had it not been 
"the laws of God and Nature" and had he foreseen the trouble.48 This different 
point of view, from the perspective of the rescuer, certainly indicates Crusoe’s 
ambivalent instinct about Providence.
Crusoe has taken lines of flight by crossing hermeneutic boundaries 
and m isreading the signs of the tempest, by ironically pricking the phantom 
of Providence and dism antling the traditional dichotomy between religion and 
medicine, and by showing his ambivalence toward divine deliverance and 
giving credit to hum an ingenuity. All these lines of flight are embedded in his 
flight across geographical space tha t characterizes his private voice or 
"Original Sin" against fatherly and divine authority. Also, the confrontation 
between the power of the spiritual world and the power of the hum an world 
in the tobacco and the dream of the savages episodes deterritorializes the 
boundaries of the first (divine) causes and the second (human) causes. The 
realm  of the hum an forces occupies its place in w hat should be traditionally 
assigned to th a t of the supernatural, for hum an knowledge and ingenuity in 
the medical experiments have actually cured Crusoe’s illness, and the hum an 
will actually intervenes with the supernatural prophecy of Crusoe’s dream. 
Fleeing across geographical space, thus, merges with crossing cultural
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boundaries or deterritorialization in Crusoe's restlessness to go to sea. 
Seeking adventures a t sea is nothing like driving toward a center of 
established principles as in  the ancient Greek genres but is fleeing away from 
the center, creating a slippage, and leaving behind nothing but 
deterritorialized boundaries.
However, Crusoe reterritorializes himself in  his religious conversion on 
the island and goes back to where he was when he started  the flight. So his 
journey back home to England is a trip  back to the center with 
reterritorialized boundaries, a trip  characterized by his return  from his 
"fortunate fall.1'49 Being a converted Christian, Crusoe returns to England 
after thirty-five years. The success of his plantation in the Brazils, which has 
made him 5000 pounds and an estate of above 1000 pounds a year, lands 
Crusoe in "the middle station," the very state with which his father used to 
advise him to be content. Crusoe also reterritorializes himself and 
compromises with a higher authority. Determined to stay a t home, Crusoe 
sells his Brazil plantation for "33000 Pieces of Eight" and enjoys his riches in 
England. The only reason for his pick for England, instead of the Brazils, as 
his home is his newly found authority-P rotestant Christianity. "As I had 
entertain 'd some Doubts about the Roman Religion, even while I was abroad, 
especially in my State of Solitude; so I knew there was no going to the Brasils 
for me...; so I resolv’d to stay a t Home" (303). Even his mission to revisit his 
island in  The F arther Adventures is to "establish them there," to disseminate
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the Word of God and to imbue his island subjects with the laws of God and 
man in  his arrangements of the marriages of the converted prisoners and the 
savages. Bringing all the material necessities to the island on his revisit is 
not sufficient; only after the religious conversion of his subjects has Crusoe 
"brought the affair of the island to a narrow compass" (161), and only after 
the dissemination of the Word of God has Crusoe colonized a new world and 
invented, or duplicated, the human civilization all over again on his island. 
His father already dead after he comes back, Crusoe, a t his best, becomes a 
seventeenth-century "masterless man," who finds a new m aster in God.50 The 
world Crusoe has created on his island, after all, is a representation of the 
ultimate principle of divine glory, and now a true Christian, he has 
territorialized his subjects and subjugated them, following his own example, 
to the laws of God and of man. Finally, the life-long journeys of adventures 
and the adaptation to the religious principles have qualified him as a 
candidate for the after-life in heaven, his last words of the book being: "I am 
preparing for a  longer journey than all these, having lived seventy-two years 
a  life of infinite variety, and learnt sufficiently to know the value of 
retirem ent, and the blessing of ending our days in peace" (319).
3.2. Captain Singleton’s Flight in  "Motionless Travel"
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C aptain Singleton (1720) consists of two flights its  hero takes during 
his life-time and is divided into two halves of equal length devoted to both 
flights. Singleton s ta rts  out as an  orphan, and his first flight takes off on 
board the Portuguese ship, which is a symbol of social authority. Singleton’s 
private voice originates on th a t ship. U nruly and rebellious, the young 
Singleton cannot stand his m aster’s cruelty from the outset and cooks up a 
plan, w ithout execution, to kill the m aster and escape from the ship or to flee 
across the social boundaries. Added to his resistance to authority  is the 
motivation of a m utiny worked up among the crew, when the ship comes to 
an  anchor on the coast of M adagascar: "They th rea ten ’d the C aptain to set 
him  on Shore.... I wish’d they would, w ith all my H eart, for I  was full of 
M ischief in  my Head, and ready enough to do any." As Singleton "embarked 
in  i t  so openly" th a t he and the others "were seized, and  p u t into Irons."61 A 
slave’s conspiracy of a  m utiny is rebelling against the hierarchical system 
m aintained on the ship, w ith both civil and religious authorities represented 
by the C aptain and the Chaplain of the ship. The structu ra l and social 
hierarchy in  the upper/lower consciousness runs through the social order on 
board the ship. Singleton’s m aster refers to the C aptain as "in the Office 
above" (7). The upper/lower social structure also reflects the relationship 
between Singleton and h is m aster. Before being se t on shore because of his 
involvement in  the m utiny, Singleton requests if  he can ta lk  w ith his m aster, 
and  "they told me I might, if  my M aster would come down to me, bu t I could
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be not allowed to come up to him" (12). The act of "coming down" is the 
m aster’s gesture of benevolence or patronizing, bu t the slave cannot be 
granted the right to go up to his m aster or to cross social boundaries in  th a t 
hierarchy and place conscious territory. Then, i t  is not surprising th a t the 
Captain, the supreme authority of the ship, thinks "Mutiny on board a Ship 
was the same thing as Treason in  the King’s Palace" (16). Singleton and the 
other criminals are then set on shore to fight for their own survival. Rather 
th an  a  form of punishm ent, i t  is assistance to Singleton’s escape from 
authority  he has planned so long. Twenty-three of the crew members even 
volunteer and beg the Captain to allow them  to join the flight in  the name of 
protecting the criminals (17). The group establish a  democratic society of 
the ir own, trade with the natives, p irate on the seas, find a gold mine on the 
way, fight the ir way out of Africa against lions and savages in  the jungle, and 
finally Singleton comes back to England with over three pounds of gold in his 
pocket. B u t this flight against authority reterritorializes itself, for the whole 
flight is characterized by Singleton’s desire to come home, to come back to 
where the center is, and i t  takes Singleton exactly a t the middle point of the 
novel back to the things he has been fleeing away from. He is broke in  two 
years’ time. The lesson he has learned is he should not have tried to fit in  a 
society th a t  does not belong to him, and "it was Time to think of farther 
Adventures" (138), which will make him  change his notions about "home."
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Singleton’s second line of flight means much more to him. Captain of 
h is p irate ship in  his flight across geographical space, Singleton breaks the 
laws of God and m an and never becomes a converted Christian like Crusoe. 
He goes through a process of identifying w ith William the Quaker, a God- 
figure and an external ideological influence on Singleton, acquiring his own 
identity  as the real commander of his ship, and dragging the almighty God- 
figure down to his own hum an level. Although he finally comes back to 
London a t the end of the novel, he throws away his newly acquired identity 
and refuses to be p a rt of the society th a t offers him  no place a t all from the 
outset. He does not reterritorialize cultural boundaries bu t completes a 
Deleuzian line of flight in motionless travel and reveals the private voice of 
the self. F irst, Singleton’s line of flight consists in  his mockery of the divine 
providence. In the "Blast of Lightning" episode, for example, Singleton’s ship 
is "Thunder-struck." Conscious of the conventional tem pest symbol, Singleton 
thinks th a t he is "doom’d by Heaven to sink th a t Moment into eternal 
Destruction" and is "afflicted a t the Punishm ent, bu t not a t  the Crime." The 
persona of the narrative suggests Singleton should have felt "the moving, 
softening Tokens of a sincere Penitent" in  face of the sign (195). I t  is 
in teresting th a t the narra to r does not finalize on th is  one interpretation of 
the storm  b u t soon points out another one: "But perhaps m any th a t read this 
will be sensible of the Thunder and Lightning, th a t may th ink  nothing of the 
rest, or ra th e r may make a  Je s t of it  all" (195). The narra to r here is aware
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of the natu ra l cause/divine providence debate th a t caught the attention of 
Defoe’s contemporaries.62 The narrative draws the reader’s attention to the 
irony th a t no divine punishm ent actually falls on Singleton, neither a t this 
m om ent nor any tim e in  his life-time; nor does Singleton regard the storm as 
a  w arning on his piracy. As a m atter of fact, Singleton and his crew, the 
narra to r says, are ju s t like the ship, whose "Part of the Head was gone, but 
not so as to endanger the Boltsprit; so we hoisted our Topsails again, haul’d 
aft the Fore-sheet, brac’d the Yards, and went our Course as before" (196). 
Singleton and his crew do make a je s t of the storm incident, although the 
serious reader m ay not.
Although Singleton does not in terp ret signs so readily as Crusoe, who 
in  the Serious Reflections thinks "it is easy to know when th a t hand of 
Providence opens the door for, or shuts it  against, our measures" (188), the 
tendency in  the young Crusoe to resort to the second causes or hum an 
knowledge of natu ra l phenomena, ra th e r than  supernatural signification, also 
applies to Singleton. For example, the knowledge of the monsoons affecting 
the coast of M adagascar earlier in  the novel helps Singleton ignore what 
Crusoe would call "the hand of Providence" and explain the course and the 
difficulty of th a t voyage in  term s of natural causes instead of any symbolic 
divine meaning. F irst, "as the Monsoones. or Trade-Winds, generally affect 
th a t Country, blowing in  most P arts  of this Island one six Months of a Year 
one Way, and the other six Months another Way, we concluded we m ight be
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able to bear the Sea well enough" (28). Crusoe or any optimistic Christian 
would think "the hand of providence opens the door" for Singleton and would 
jum p a t  the opportunity of sailing with the monsoons and thank  the 
benevolent signs of Providence. The thought about its  supernatural meaning 
never occurs to Singleton. He has to quit the idea of sailing with the 
monsoons to the Cape of Good Hope because they lack fresh water. They have 
to go the opposite direction for the m ainland of AfHca and sail along the coast 
toward the Red Sea, and "venture we did, madly enough," for the winds "blew 
righ t in  our Teeth" (36). In  this case, Singleton does not resort to the idea of 
Providence shutting the door against him, either. He reads neither of these 
situations as assistance to their voyage when they could have sailed w ith the 
monsoons, or divine w arning on their piracy when they choose the opposite 
way and sail against the winds, because all is explained as natu ra l causes 
w ith Singleton’s knowledge of the monsoons.
H um an knowledge m akes the difference. W hat if  Singleton had no 
knowledge whatsoever about the monsoons? The consequence is obvious. 
Singleton further illustrates his point on his second flight to sea in the Ceylon 
episode, where Singleton and his crew would fall into evil hands, which may 
be the resu lt of divine punishm ent, i f  i t  was not for William’s knowledge of 
the Knox tale. Here in  th is episode, hum an efforts, as in the case of Crusoe, 
play an  im portant role in  deterritorializing signs of Providence or even 
combatting divine punishm ent. Having being attacked by "a violent Storm of
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Wind" th a t "blew in  a  m ost desperate and furious M anner," Singleton’s ship 
is driven ashore and lands in the sand by the Island of Ceylon, where Mr. 
Knox used to be decoyed on shore and kept in  captivity for over nineteen 
years. The barbarians entice Singleton and  his crew to come to shore, bu t 
W illiam the Q uaker ta lk s Singleton out of i t  and  proposes caution th a t 
prevents the Knox tragedy from falling on Singleton and the whole crew. So 
Singleton acknowledges th a t William is "here again the  Saving of all our 
Lives" (222). While the Knox family, a friend la te r  tells Singleton, "thankfully 
ador’d God’s wonderful providence" for the ir escape from the captivity on the 
island  (249), Singleton shows his gratitude to William, the second causes, for 
h is deliverance, and rightly so. Singleton’s digression into the  Knox tale 
serves to show "what i t  was I avoided" (238), b u t the juxtaposition of the two 
incidents is tin ted  w ith irony and strikes the reader as a mockery of faith  in 
Providence. The "violent Storm" th a t m aim s Singleton’s ship, the  "mighty 
Storm" th a t  disables Knox’s vessel, and the Knox family’s thankfulness to 
Providence for th e ir deliverance, the reader is fam iliar w ith all these religious 
conventions. I t seems the  reader ought to congratulate Singleton for being 
delivered by Providence from setting his foot on th a t same island. B ut 
Singleton does not th ink  i t  is any business of Providence th a t  saves him  and 
his crew. I t  is William, or m ay be any other person who has heard  of the 
Knox tale before (like Singleton’s friend who la te r tells him  the story), who 
delivers the whole crew from possible captivity w ith his little  knowledge of
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the history of Ceylon. (Had Mr. Knox known something about the barbarians 
of the island, even he would not have been taken in and his fa ther would not 
have died in  captivity; then his family would not have been grateful to 
Providence for deliverance from a non-existent captivity). If Providence does 
impinge on m an in  th is incident, i t  may be the storm th a t drives Singleton’s 
ship ashore as a sign of punishm ent for his piracy, ju s t like the thunder 
storm  th a t sets fire on Singleton’s ship earlier or any of Crusoe’s storms as 
punishm ent for his "Original Sin." A sign of divine punishm ent it  may be, bu t 
William’s precautions have turned i t  around. Providence has been placed in 
m an’s own hand after all.
Besides mockeries of the divine providence, Singleton’s line of flight is 
also involved with a  journey from identifying with an  all-powerful God-figure 
to bringing the heavenly idol down to earth. All of Defoe’s reterritorializing 
characters depend heavily on an external cause for internal transform ation 
of the self. Crusoe needs the Bible for his P uritan  internalization on his 
island in  order to become a converted Christian; even The F arther 
Adventures relies on the French priest to remind Crusoe of reforming his 
island in  accord w ith the laws of God and man. Only after going through 
ideologination by the social institutions like Newgate and by the prison 
priest, has Moll Flanders started  to become penitent. And Jack will not be 
transform ed into a Christian without his m entor on the Virginia plantation. 
They all need a form of external ideological influence, usually social
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institutions or a God-figure, for their character development. The self needs 
to be vitalized with the energy provided by the other, and th is interaction 
between the self and the other accounts for the issue of morality in Defoe’s 
fiction. That is why Crusoe, Moll, and Jack all reterritorialize themselves, 
guided by dominant ideology. Singleton, and la ter Roxana, however, will take 
a  line of flight across the boundaries in such ideologination, push back this 
interaction between the self and the other, and deterritorialize or jum p over 
the cultural territory of a  pilgrimage from earth  to heaven--in becoming a 
Christian who will be accepted by the Holy Ghost.53 Singleton desires only to 
be a man, even without any identity or place in society or in th a t future 
blissful paradise.
First, Singleton starts  out on his second voyage overseas, like most 
other Defoenian characters, to identify with a religious person in his search 
for identity. This identity figure of Singleton’s is his "never-failing Friend" 
and "Ghostly Father," William the Quaker. Captain Bob always lives in 
William’s shadow ever since the Quaker gets on board. W hatever the captain 
does in  the earlier p a rt of his pirate voyages, he feels the need to consult with 
William. The Quaker is the captain of the ship in disguise because he is 
always righ t when i t  comes to pirate strategies and trading, the two most 
im portant aspects on board the ship. T hat leaves Singleton the captain of the 
ship only in name. For instance, one time when Singleton becomes captain of 
a  Portuguese man of war they have taken on the sea, William advises
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Singleton not to fight against the other m an of war, the Portuguese ship’s 
partner, for he reasons "thou wouldst have had twice the Booty in a M erchant 
Ship, w ith not one Q uarter of the Fighting" (154). Another time when 
Singleton, being captain of his pirate ship and having enemies all over the 
place, has no idea where and how to sell a ship full of black slaves they have 
taken as prisoners, "our old never-failing Friend William help’d us out again, 
as he had often done, a t a Dead-lift." In this hopeless situation, William 
proposes he lead a group of twenty men and "attempt to trade privately upon 
the Coast of Brasil, with the Planters, not a t the principal Ports" (164). 
William is even more than  a qualified captain. To Singleton, he is also a 
prophet. He foresees trouble on the Island of Ceylon and therefore saves 
Singleton’s life (222); the supernatural also communicates with him in his 
dreams, for his dream prophecizes a fortune on the Island of Madagascar 
(177). As a surgeon, William also excels in  medicine. In spite of the other 
surgeons’ opinions, "William went to Work his own Way," saving a black 
slave’s mortified leg (159). And initially when William is on his way to 
Barbados "to get a Birth" (143), Singleton fatefully takes him as a prisoner, 
who is supposed to give him a spiritual birth  in  the end. In short, William is 
Singleton’s perfect God-figure to identify with to lead Singleton out of his 
pirate life.
However, towards the end of the book, the God-figure’s perfection 
begins to fade. Singleton now begins to slip out of William’s shadow, and his
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identity as the captain-in-name-only gradually wears off, and replaced in it 
is his own identity, the real commander of the ship. This identity switching 
process starts with the failed military operation, with the "never-failing" 
Quaker in charge, to seize a  tree-cave the savages use as their defense system 
on an island in the Indian Ocean. Singleton tells the reader, "Never was a 
Fortification so well defended, or Assailants so many ways defeated" (212). 
William, the religious man who serves as Singleton’s spiritual guide in the 
novel, may be powerful in mind, bu t he is only a man. Ever since th a t defeat 
by the savages, William finds himself in a position where Singleton can argue 
with him. The first time Captain Bob ever disagrees with William is in the 
Ceylon episode. As William advises him not to set foot on the island, 
Singleton says, "I opposed him a great while, and told him, I thought he used 
to be always right, but th a t now I thought he was not" (222). This time proves 
William right again, but it  is the first rebellious sign against the God-figure. 
Later, when Singleton and William decide whether to sell their goods to the 
English merchants nearby in Surat or they should risk going all the way to 
the Persian Gulf themselves where they can make as much money as the 
English merchants do, Singleton wins the debate and proposes play-it-safe in 
Surat (253). Now, Singleton is on his way to overruling William and becoming 
the real captain of the ship. The identity switching process is not complete 
until a final trading trip  to Surat. "My Apprehensions prevailed with William. 
whether my Reasons did or no, and he submitted; and we resolved to try
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another Ship's Loading to the  same M erchants" (253). Singleton sends his 
m en to S u ra t w ith the sloop and the crew in  disguise: while the sloop is "a 
perfect Cheat, disguised in  every Thing th a t a  S tranger could be supposed to 
take any Notice of," William acts as one of "the Super-Cargoes, by a formal 
Procuration from one C aptain  Singleton" (254). C aptain Singleton’s real 
iden tity  emerges from a play of disguise, where everything else is a  fake, 
except W illiam and the other crew are tru ly  acting "by a formal Procuration" 
from the  real C aptain  Singleton. To obtain an  identity  of a "Captain 
Singleton" is to get even w ith William, who has been actually in charge all 
along. Unlike any of the reterritorializing characters in  Defoe’s other novels, 
C aptain  Singleton has surpassed h is God-figure and his external ideological 
influence. He has become a personification of the  private voice of the self th a t 
resists dom inant ideologination.
The play of disguise goes on to the  end of the novel; only th is time 
Singleton throws away his acquired identity  and  even abandons h is identity 
of an  Englishm an in  his native country where he has been "cheated and 
imposed upon, and used so ill" (257). If  acquiring an  identity  as the real 
commander of the ship is Singleton’s cry for staying out of William’s shadow 
and influence, abandoning his tru e  identity  as an  Englishm an is his will 
against convention and further ideologination. William, the God-figure, 
encourages Singleton to wipe the  slate clean and tries to convert him into a 
pen iten t C hristian  who will repen t and  will as  well th ink  about the after-life
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a t  the end of his p irate career, bu t Singleton replies "to th ink  of Death, is to 
dye; and to be always th inking of it, is to be all one’s Life-long a  dying" (257- 
8). Repentance is the farthest thing on Singleton’s mind, b u t he does not like 
to disappoint the Q uaker and says "Say any Thing to me, William, said I. I 
will take i t  kindly" (258). How kindly will he take it? He pays lip service to 
W illiam’s spiritual advice. F irst, after he wakes up from his dream  of the 
devil, Singleton seems to repent a little  the next morning and confesses to 
W illiam he has talked aloud in  the dream  th a t  "I am  a Thief, a Rogue, by my 
Calling; I  am  a P irate, and a M urtherer, and ought to be hanged" (269). He 
then  says to William he hates him self and everything he has earned, and 
points a  pistol to his head. N ot to be so fast to believe Singleton is going to 
pull the trigger; neither does he th ink  William will do the shooting for him 
as he says he will—Singleton has p u t on a fraudulent show. He does not really 
w ant to p u t an  end to his life yet, and  he tells the reader "if any Body had 
been near m e to understand English. I had been undone, and the Thought of 
shooting my self forsook me from th a t Time" (269). I t is a relief to Singleton 
no by-standers, who may have heard  him, speak English, and therefore no 
one is going to tu rn  him  in  to the gallows.
Second, Singleton knows "Repentance could not be sincere w ithout 
Restitution" (267), b u t since he can hardly find the victims, restitu tion  is 
impossible. So he th inks his money "was due to the Community, and I ought 
to d istribute i t  for the general Good" (276). Ironically, Singleton never tu rns
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out to be a community person as he claims he w ants to be; money distribution 
is only w ithin the family: Singleton, William, and his sister who finally gets 
m arried to Singleton. He even refuses to accept the society he lives in. Only 
when William agrees to his term s to w ear foreign vests, not to "shave off our 
M ustaches or Beards" in  order to pass for Grecians, and not to speak English 
in  public, will Singleton come home to England w ith him. Thus, Singleton 
comes back home not to repent or to reterritorialize b u t to become a 
Deleuzian tra ito r to society; he is going to lose his identity, "to disappear, to 
become unknown."54 Singleton and William’s disguise and social apartness 
have more meaning than  a simple m atter of escaping punishm ent, for the 
Q uaker does not have to agree to the term s since he is a respectful Christian 
and has nothing to be afraid of. Even though he may be accused of accomplice 
to piracy on Singleton’s ship, he can easily shake off th a t accusation: when 
he was first brought onto the ship, he made Singleton sign a peculiar bu t a 
life-saving statem ent th a t proved William was robbed and forced on board the 
ship. W hatever the reasons, William, the God-figure and external ideological 
influence in  the novel, has compromised with the insincerely penitent 
Singleton, not the other way around, to refuse to accept society and be part 
of its  system. Although Singleton refers to William as the "Ghostly Father," 
he does not take him as his spiritual inspiration to raise him self up to a 
religious altitude. If  William’s role in  the novel is to be an  identity  figure and 
a spiritual guide to Singleton, he is a t  the end of the novel brought down to
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Singleton's own level. Singleton is not ideologinated, converted, or endowed 
with a public voice b u t remains a traitor with a private voice who engages in 
a line of flight, th a t is, in  motionless travel a t the end of the novel.
3.3. Deterritorialization in  Roxana
Defoe's major fictional characters from Crusoe to Roxana commit crime 
against the laws of God and man. But their crime differs slightly from person 
to person. Crusoe commits his "Original Sin" against fatherly and divine 
authority. Singleton, Moll, and Jack all have brushes mainly with the English 
common law in piracy and robbery. Besides robbery, Moll is also engaged in 
whoring, bu t her goal in life is family oriented, because she believes in 
m atrimony and longs to find a husband and to settle down. Roxana, however, 
first treads on the laws of God and m an by blaspheming matrimony and 
worshiping whoredom.56 Second, unlike the other characters, who 
reterritorialize themselves by coming to term s with social order and authority 
in  the end, Roxana, along with Singleton, flees across boundaries without 
reterritorialization. Roxana’s flight is even more dynamic and more complete 
than  Singleton’s, for her final line of flight cuts both ways, both geographical 
space and motionless travel in deterritorializing cultural codes. Her later 
romantic affairs with foreign personalities and her passions for royal titles do 
not reterritorialize her along the lines of social order or reconciliation. They
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simply conceal her hostility toward the men’s world in w hat she deems as her 
native country, toward the English "FOOLS" who tailor the laws of 
matrimony ordained by God to their own social and financial interests, a 
tragedy to a woman as Roxana has experienced with the Brewer, her fist 
husband.
Roxana’s private voice starts with her first brush with the laws of 
matrimony in her affair with the Jeweller, her landlord. Roxana lives under 
necessity in  the beginning of the novel after her "Fool" husband the Brewer 
goes bankruptcy and abandons her. Activated by her maid, Amy, for self- 
preservation, Roxana encourages the Jeweller’s advances and "marries" the 
suitor: "We were to call one another Man and Wife, who, in the Sense of the 
Laws, both of God and our Country, were no more than two Adulterers, in 
short, a Whore and a Rogue,"56 for both of them separate but are not divorced 
from their spouses. The sham marriage certainly goes beyond self- 
preservation on Roxana’s side of the story. She does i t  for the enjoyment of 
adultery. In  order to show she is nothing but a whore, Roxana insists on Amy 
sleeping with the "bridegroom." After initial modesty and resistance, "at last, 
when she see I was in earnest," Roxana says, "she le t me do what I wou’d; so 
I fairly strip t her, and then I threw open the Bed, and th ru st her in" (46). 
Roxana’s intention is obvious here as she looks on and comments, "Had I 
look’d upon my myself as a Wife, you cannot suppose I would have been 
willing to have let my Husband lye with my Maid, much less, before my Face,
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for I  stood-by all the while" (47). In fact, Roxana never once calls the Jeweller 
"husband," not even after he is murdered in Paris and leaves her a wealthy 
"widow." On the other hand, the patriarchal ideology may secure a less-picky 
attitude toward the Jeweller’s part in the adultery. The Jeweller is ju st like 
Roxana in his marital status, but his earlier advances to her may be in the 
eyes of a woman all his own goodness and a sign from heaven. Roxana tells 
the reader, "I shou’d have look’d upon all the Good this Man had done for me, 
to have been the particular Work of the Goodness of Heaven; and that 
Goodness shou’d have mov’d me to a Return of Duty and humble Obedience" 
(38). But Roxana does not return to her former duty and obedience, and this 
remark turns out to be an ironical mockery of "the Goodness of Heaven" and 
those who may not think less of the Jeweller for his adultery, for as soon as 
Roxana thrusts the naked Amy into his arms, the Jeweller "held her fast," 
and has more of this farce several times after that.
The laws of matrimony, for Roxana, certainly side with man rather 
than woman because they are invented by man. When Roxana refuses to 
marry the Dutch Merchant after sleeping with him, she condemns the laws 
of matrimony and reasons to him that "the very Nature of the Marriage- 
Contract was, in short, nothing but giving up Liberty, Estate, Authority, and 
every-thing, to the Man" (148) and tha t "the Laws of Matrimony puts the 
Power into your Hands" (151). The deterritorializing aspect of Roxana’s 
arguments against matrimony lies in its radical departure from "what the
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receiv’d Custom had  given us of it" in  th a t  she regards a woman as "a free 
Agent, as well as a Man" (147). W hat she w ants to do is  to take a line of 
flight and  carve up the custom ary territory  of power and freedom th a t belongs 
to m en by staking her claim in  i t  and by m aintaining her s ta tu s  as a  whore 
to ensure it. U nder the traditional laws of m atrim ony, argues Roxana, while 
"a Wife is look’d upon as b u t an  Upper-Servant, a M istress is a Sovereign" 
(132). H er preoccupation w ith her liberty is so strong th a t  she cannot sacrifice 
h e r personal desire for moral principles. She even says she cannot "reconcile 
m y Judgm ent to M arriage" after the  M erchant appeals to the authority  of 
God and  asserts th a t "M arriage was decreed by Heaven; th a t  i t  was the fix’d 
S ta te  of Life, which God had appointed for M an's Felicity" (151).57
Even though she finally ties the knot w ith the  M erchant, after she is 
over fifty and p as t her prim e tim e as a  whore, Roxana does not 
reterritorialize herself in  reconciliation w ith the laws of m atrim ony she has 
fought against so vehemently. Instead, she uses h er feigned obedience to 
m anipulate h er husband and secure her liberty as well as h e r estate, which 
could have been given up to the m an decreed by matrim ony. F irst, as the 
M erchant has prom ised in  his agreem ent w ith Roxana, he gives up his righ t 
to control h er estate  and yields "the M anagem ent wholly your own." To 
Roxana, of course, th is is nothing unexpected, and as he "gave back all my 
W ritings into my own H ands again," Roxana secures the  righ t to her own 
esta te  and says "seeing you will have i t  kept apart, i t  shall be so" (259).
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Getting to m anage her own estate is a vital aspect of a m arried woman’s 
freedom, b u t Roxana will not forget to pu t up her image as a virtuous wife to 
be envisioned by her husband, for her "Duty and Obedience" will never leave 
h er lips. As they are getting m arried, Roxana tries to sweet-talk the 
M erchant w ith a  tongue-in-cheek flattery and says, "I hop’d he shou’d see I 
knew how to act the Servant’s P art, and do every-thing to oblige my M aster; 
th a t if  I did not resolve to go w ith him wherever he desir’d to go, he m ight 
depend I wou’d never have him" (233). "To oblige my Master"? "To go with 
him  wherever he desir’d to go"? Never. There is no way Roxana wants to 
oblige the M erchant. M anipulation is her true colors, and she has to call all 
the shots when the couple decides to do anything. Their first decision soon 
after the ir wedding week, for example, is to give the Quaker, the ir hostess 
and friend, a  present to show their appreciation of all the help she has offered 
for the wedding. The M erchant proposes "to settle a thousand Pounds upon 
her, for h er Life, th a t is to say, sixty Pounds a Year." B ut Roxana thinks th a t 
is too much and w ants to be in  charge. She is for "a Purse w ith a Hundred 
Guineas as a  P resen t first, and then  made her a Compliment of 40 1. per 
Annum for her Life" (250). Another tim e when she does not w ant the 
M erchant to m eet the Captain and her daughter Susan again, Roxana is 
determ ined to m ake the M erchant go out of town w ith her for a  few days. She 
first "fix’d upon North-Hall." and "he, who did every-thing upon the 
Foundation of obliging me, readily came into it." Then, the very next morning
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before they set out, she changes her mind a t the last minute and wants to go 
to Tunbridge instead; and again "he, being entirely passive in  the thing, 
agreed to i t  w ith the greatest willingness" (209-301). Even their final decision 
to settle down in Holland is in  Roxana’s hands: "My Spouse, who was 
perfectly easie, whether in  going or staying, left it  all entirely to me" (318).
Not only has Roxana taken a line of flight in  deterritorializing the laws 
of matrimony in conventional marriages and safeguarding her independence 
and estate, she has also launched a flight across geographical space to leave 
England a t the end of the novel, unlike Crusoe, Moll, or Jack, who will come 
back in  the end to make peace with authority. There is no reterritorializing 
for Roxana. Although bom  in France and fluent in French, Roxana grows up 
in  England and regards i t  as her native country. England is the center of the 
novel, and action springs from and withdraws back to th a t center. When her 
first romantic affair ends in Paris after the death of the Jeweller, Roxana 
finds herself in  "a strange Country" (54) and no longer thinks of French as 
her own nationality. After the French Prince leaves her, "the first th ing that 
X resolv’d to do, was to go directly to England" and to be "among my 
Countryfolks," for she says "I esteem’d myself an English-Woman" (111). 
Then, her move to Holland in  the end is a line of flight across geographical 
space away from home, away from the center, and she never comes back. 
Roxana may have some reterritorializing motives for the flight, as she herself 
adm its-to  avoid the shame if  exposed by Susan and by her old acquaintances
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and to repent for her past by escaping from the place of her "old Station," etc. 
However, those apparent motives are only disguises, for Roxana’s narrative 
does not provide solid foundations for her fears of exposure and repentance. 
And even when she moves to Holland only for the title of a countess, she can 
always move back to England again afterwards, but she does not. Her real 
motive for staying in a foreign country is her desire to flee from the English 
"FOOLS" under the laws of matrimony and live with her foreign husband, 
"the best Husband in the World" who can guarantee her absolute 
independence. She is insistently against a woman marrying a fool, for if so, 
she will be stuck in "the Ditch" and starve and die in it  (96).“  Roxana has 
also developed an aversion to the Englishmen she is related to. Her first 
husband, the English brewer, proves to be a  fool, and a  crook later in France; 
she has an affair with her English jeweller only for his money and for the 
sake of evil; she is sick and tired of the old English lord she meets a t court; 
even the king may be an  object for her to conquer. Also, what cannot be 
offered by her own country, she gets it and protects it  from matrimony 
through her own individual efforts in a foreign land, the title of "the Countess
d e  " besides her liberty and estate. Roxana is a book about ingenuous
disguises: Roxana is disguised under many circumstances, such as at court 
and in the Quaker’s house; her motives for her final flight are disguises; her 
repentance is a fake; the murder of Susan is a deception; so is Roxana’s 
punishment by God a t the end of the novel. Her final title of "the Countess
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d e  ," then, is a  double disguise w ithout a nam e, a disguise u n d e r  another
disguise th a t  she is punished by divine w rath  in  Holland while she continues 
to succeed in  spite of Providence. Yet to her English "Countryfolks," Roxana 
has no identity. She is simply a  Deleuzian tra ito r to the laws of matrim ony 
and, out of the  grips of them , disappears into the sunset, leaving behind the 
private voice of the  self echoing over a decentered territory.
F irst, her reason for escaping from England for fear of exposure is ju s t 
a  disguise. I t  is true  Roxana cannot sleep well when her daughter, Susan, 
fumbles into h er life. As Susan  w ants to recognize her and claim her as her 
m other even i f  she has to "ramble in  Search" for her over the whole country, 
Roxana knows she is "safe no-where, no, not in  Holland itse lf ' (310). She does 
no t feel safe i f  Susan does no t qu it looking for her, not in  England, not even 
in  Holland. Even i f  i t  was the fear of the daughter’s search for her th a t  
m akes the  m other long for a  hide-out in  a foreign country, Roxana would not 
have to leave England any more after she says Amy has taken  care of the 
haunting  wench. Susan is not the cause for her flight to Holland; neither are 
Roxana’s old acquaintances who m ight expose her, if  they have a chance. 
Roxana is an  expert in  disguises. W hen she indulges herse lf a t  court with the 
English royalties, she passes for a French lady. Although the guests w ear 
m asks a t  spectacular balls, leaving Roxana, the hostess, w ithout anything to 
conceal h e r identity, Roxana handles th is m asquerade w ith skill too, for she 
is in  a  different way disguised, ju s t like her m asked royal guests, in her
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"French Behaviour under the M ahometan Dress" (99). Her French behavior 
and Turkish apparel make it  impossible for anyone to realize she is an 
English woman, so she can say "I appear’d, leaving the World to guess who 
or w hat I  was, w ithout offering to pu t m yself forward" (165). Even the 
insisten t Susan, once a  m aid-servant a t  Roxana’s house for two years, can 
hardly recognize her. "I never saw my M istress in  my Life," says Susan, 
"except i t  was th a t publick Night when she danc’d in  the fine Turkish Habit, 
and then  she was so disguis’d, th a t I knew nothing of her afterwards" (206). 
H er disguise as a Q uaker is even more impeccable. "I had  not only leam ’d to 
dress like a QUAKER, but so us’d myself to THEE and THOU, th a t I ta lk ’d 
like a  QUAKER too, as readily and naturally  as if  I had been bom  among 
them" (213). A part from her disguises, the difference in  Roxana’s looks after 
her stay  in the Quaker’s house may further protect her from being recognized 
by her old acquaintances. While Roxana is active a t court, she says, "any-one 
who look’d in  my Face, m ight see I was above twenty Years old, and yet, 
w ithout flattering my self, I carried my Age, which was above Fifty, very well 
too" (187). In  about two years, Roxana still does not look like her age, but the 
Q uaker compliments her th a t she cannot be "above Forty" (245), a twenty- 
year difference. H er false identity and her age difference can surely 
discourage any attem pts to expose her by her old relations in  London.
Fleeing to Holland does not m ean Roxana has developed a sense of 
repentance for her rebellion against the laws of matrimony, either. She is
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incapable of penitence. For instance, having escaped from the danger of the 
Jew ’s blackmail with help from the Dutch M erchant in Paris and protected 
all her money, Roxana does not regard her deliverance as due to Providence. 
She says, "had I any Religion, or any Sense of a Supreme Power managing, 
directing, and governing in  both Causes and Events in the World, such a 
Case as this wou’d have given any-body room to have been very thankful to 
the Power who had not only put such a Treasure into my Hand, but given me 
such an Escape from the Ruin th a t threaten’d me" (121). She is not religious 
and will not read anything into her deliverance accordingly. Even if  Roxana 
was religious, she would consider it, she says, as the power of Providence th a t 
puts the vast am ount of money into her hand after her evil enterprise. It 
would have been repentance in the wrong way. All the money Roxana has 
made in  Paris is through her affairs with the Jeweller and with the Prince, 
the pay-off of her whoredom. God should punish her for her gain bu t a t least 
not pu t "such a Treasure" into her hand. Paying gratitude to Providence for 
w hat is good to oneself in spite of the nature of the thing itself is contrary to 
Defoe’s idea of the function of Providence th a t "opens the door, or shuts it 
against, our measures." Such an act of self-interested thankfulness for 
Providence, in  Roxana’s logic, is destroying the power of Providence, for what 
deems to be divine power is turned into something she plays a t her own 
discretion, regardless of God’s will to approve or disapprove. Second, about 
her lucky deliverance, Roxana also says "I had indeed, a grateful Sense upon
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my Mind of the generous Friendship of my Deliverer, the Dutch Merchant; 
by whom I was so faithfully serv’d, and by whom, as far as relates to second 
Causes, I was preserv’d from Destruction" (121). In taking the Merchant as 
her deliverer, Boxana equates the efforts of a hum an being to the "Supreme 
Power." She is even more radical than  the young Crusoe, who initiates the 
blurring of the difference between the first and second causes, and more 
radical than Singleton, who, like the young Crusoe, gives proper credit to 
hum an prudence. Roxana simply ignores "the Hand of Providence" and 
worships a human being as the Deity, for whose service she repays by giving 
him her own body.
Roxana may also seem to fear divine punishment for hiding from the 
M erchant her secret relation with Susan when she suspects he m ust have 
known the tru th  from the Captain. While repeating the Captain’s 
miscomprehended story to Roxana, the M erchant is interrupted by the 
candles Roxana deliberately throws off the table to cover her uneasiness. At 
this juncture, she seems to realize how powerful the divine providence is and 
says "what a glorious Testimony it  is to the Justice of Providence..., tha t the 
most secret Crimes are, by the most unforeseen Accidents, brought to light, 
and discover’d" (297). The irony is tha t after hearing the Captain’s half-told 
story about Roxana getting a daughter more than  she expects, the Merchant 
does not see the tru th  of it but thinks it is about Roxana’s pregnancy that he 
knows is not true. The big secret is not discovered after all. Why repent if
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Providence does not govern the affairs of the world the way Roxana says it 
does? Also, whenever Roxana claims she is repenting, her repentance is only 
a  fake on all occasions, when she is a whore, when she is married, or when 
she is in Holland a t the end of the novel. After Roxana finally goes to Holland 
with her husband, she seems to have been penitent for her past wicked life, 
including having Susan killed. The pleasures of material riches and the honor 
of royal titles do not have any more attraction for her. "Not all the Affluence 
of a  plentiful Fortune," Roxana says, "not a hundred Thousand Pounds 
Estate; (for between us we had little less) not Honour and Titles, Attendants 
and Equipages; in  a word, not all the things we call Pleasure, cou’d give me 
any relish, or sweeten the Taste of things to me" (264). Here, she seems to 
have renounced w hat she has been striving for all her life. Repentance is the 
key note here in Holland. However, Roxana also tells the reader th a t her 
repentance is "rather mov’d by my Fears of Vengeance." Ju s t as a sense of 
repentance moved by the fears of punishment and vengeance flashes through 
Singleton’s mind when his ship is thunder struck, Roxana is experiencing the 
same kind of repentance, which will vanish as the fears wear off. W hat is 
different is Roxana’s realization of its being a "lower kind of Repentance" 
than "a Sense of being spar’d from being punish’d, and landed safe after a 
Storm" (261).
Even a realization of a higher kind of repentance is ironic. Roxana does 
show a sense of being saved from a storm as she goes on a voyage with Amy
from P aris to Holland to settle her bills earlier in  the  novel. B ut th a t 
supposedly higher kind of repentance tu rn s  out to be ju s t a derision of 
Providence and "Heaven’s Goodness." D uring the terrib le storm, Roxana cries 
out "Lord have Mercy upon me" and vows to "live a  single and a virtuous 
Life" if  God can spare her life th is  one tim e (126-7). As the ship is finally 
driven to the  coast of Suffolk in  England, to th e ir "great Joy," both Roxana 
and Amy feel the mercy of God, and Amy even "fell fla t upon the Ground, and 
kiss’d it, and gave God thanks for her Deliverance from the Sea" (128). This 
scene can be an  illustration  of w hat Roxana calls a  more sincere sense of 
repentance, b u t i t  is no t necessarily so. "For the Danger being over," Roxana 
tells the reader, "the Fears of D eath vanish’d w ith it; ay, and  our F ear of 
w hat was beyond D eath also; ...and w ith our re tu rn  to Life, our wicked Taste 
of Life re tu rn ’d, and  we were both the same as before, if  not worse"; thus, 
Roxana says "Death-bed Repentance, or Storm-Repentance, which is much 
the  same, is seldom true" (128). As Roxana la te r  implies, she even should not 
have repented a t  all, pu tting  aside the insincerity of repentance. The religious 
symbol of the  tem pest is problematic again ju s t like i t  is w ith the  young 
Crusoe. L ater, the D utch M erchant m akes Roxana’s "womanish Fears" of the 
storm  a laughing stock, for he tells Roxana, "it was nothing b u t w hat was 
very ordinary in  those Seas; b u t th a t they had H arbours on every Coast, so 
near, th a t they  were seldom in  D anger of being lost indeed" (136). "Womanish 
Fears" m ay be one cause for false alarm , and  the Crusoe-like "fresh W ater"
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sailor experience may be another. Back in the storm scene, Roxana stares out 
of her cabin into the steerage room and sees "two Seamen on their Knees, a t 
Prayers," who obviously behave like the "fresh Water" Crusoe numbed by the 
first big-waves he confronts on the sea. The more experienced sailor may also 
look to the frightened Roxana like doing his p a rt in  praying, which is 
definitely something else, for Roxana also sees "only one Man who steer’d, 
and he made a groaning Noise too, which I took to be saying his Prayers, but 
it  seems i t  was answering to those above, when they call’d to him, to tell him 
which Way to steer" (125). The praying act exists only in  the eyes of the 
beholder. Roxana takes i t  to be divine punishm ent w hat i t  is to the 
experienced sailors to be something ordinary. She has learned from her own 
experience th a t she has prayed to God for nothing. Even th a t more sincere 
repentance is a  b itter mockery; how can the 'lower kind of Repentance" a t  the 
end of the novel be sincere?
The m urder of Susan as the interpolated ending of the novel is also a 
disguise. The controversial ending has been problematic for m any critics. In 
Paula R. Backscheider’s view, on the one hand, lack of conclusions and of 
poetic justice "reduced Roxana’s chance for popularity and imitation." 
M aximillian E. Novak also argues th a t "what prevents Roxana from being 
Defoe’s m asterpiece is the truncated ending." On the other hand, Robert D. 
Hum e posits th a t "Roxana may well have been left as Defoe conceived and 
w anted it" w ithout the actual exposure of Roxana’s ruin. For Everett
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Zimmerman, "the book’s ending is consistent w ith its  heroine’s development 
and w ith the development of Defoe’s fiction." Zimmerman contends th a t "sin 
and repentance, the conceptions th a t he used to order his works, gradually 
diverged from their traditional religious meanings."69 F irst, Zimmerman and 
Hume are righ t about Defoe’s intention to end the novel the way i t  is. About 
th is point, textual evidence in  this first edition is clear. Before Roxana starts 
to give a flash-back on the episode about Susan, it  is m eant to be the last one 
in  the book. She says "I m ust now go back to another Scene, and join it  to 
th is End of my Story" (265). Second, Zimmerman’s reading is most convincing 
in  its  argum ent about the novel’s deviation from traditional religious 
meanings. Divine w rath  apparently works in  the end, for Roxana tells us, 
"the B last of Heaven seem’d to follow the Injury done the poor Girl, by us 
both" (330). B ut i t  is not w hat is really going on. For one thing, the reader is 
never sure w hether Susan is murdered. Roxana speculates the m urder from 
the kind Quaker, who reports th a t "she suppos’d Amy had m anag’d i t  so well, 
as to p u t an  End to it" (323). M urder is never on the Quaker’s mind, and 
neither Roxana nor the reader has the satisfaction of confirming the news as 
Roxana chooses to see it. At the end of the novel, Roxana tells the Quaker 
th a t Amy cannot join her in  Holland unless the suspected m urderer "gave full 
Satisfaction to my Friend the QUAKER, th a t she had not m urther’d my 
Child." B ut w hat happens la ter is th a t Amy "came over afterwards, w ithout
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giving my Friend any of th a t Satisfaction or any Account th a t she intended 
to come over" (329).
Roxana never tells the reader in explicit term s w hat Amy has "put an 
End to it" means perhaps because Susan is never murdered. There might be 
two possibilities. F irst, Roxana m ay have mistaken Amy’s half-told story for 
a different story (or we as readers have done the same if  we take the 
Quaker’s report of Amy’s story the way Roxana does), ju st as the Merchant 
has m istaken the ladies’ half-told story for something about Roxana’s 
pregnancy a little earlier in  this same episode. The reader can see a perfect 
symmetry and parallel between these two incidents. In the earlier incident, 
after meeting with Susan, Roxana decides to make excuses to the Captain for 
cancelling the plan to go to Holland with his family. She says vaguely to the 
Quaker th a t she is "very much out of Order" and sends her to "insinuate to 
them , th a t she was afraid I  shou’d not be able to get ready to go the Voyage" 
(280). The Captain hears the half-told story from his wife and Susan. He tells 
the M erchant he hears the ladies say th a t "your Lady has got a Daughter 
more than  she expected" (296). The reader knows whom the ladies may be 
referring to after the Susan scene. But the Captain not knowingly tw ists this 
half-told story into a completely different one and tells the M erchant th a t he 
knows "a Daughter" here refers to Roxana’s pregnancy. So Roxana la ter says, 
"My Husband told me w hat the Captain had said; bu t very happily took it, 
th a t the Captain had brought a Tale by-halves, and having heard i t  one way,
112
had told it  another; and th a t neither cou’d he understand the Captain, 
neither did the Captain understand h im self (297). The beauty of this parallel 
of misinterpretation is tha t the Quaker plays a crucial role in both of the 
incidents. In the first, she delivers Roxana’s message that has caused 
misinterpretation. In the second, she delivers Amy’s message that may ju st 
as well have caused misinterpretation on Roxana’s part. Actually, Defoe has 
reminded the reader of other interpretations concerning Susan’s 
disappearance. The "innocent well-meaning" Quaker "thought nothing of any 
Evil herself, so she suspected none in any-body else." To her, it is "good 
News" tha t "the Impertinent Visitor" stops bothering Roxana again because 
"she thought Amy had found some Way to perswade her to be quiet and 
easie" (323). The disappearance of Susan is quite another story for Roxana’s 
relatives in Spittle-Fields, for "they believ’d Amv had carry*d her to pay her 
a Slim of Money, and tha t somebody had watch’d her after her having receiv’d 
it, and had Robb’d and M urther’d her" (325). Everyone chooses to believe 
what he or she is willing to believe, ju s t like the Merchant wishes Roxana is 
with child in tha t "Tale by-halves" incident, "which he wish’d might be true" 
(299), and the choice of what to believe is based on the believer’s personal 
traits. The Quaker does not suspect anyone because she is kind and 
benevolent and will not think of anything rotten like murder. Roxana’s 
relatives project on Susan’s disappearance what is ordinary the case on the 
street, robbery and murder. In the same manner, Roxana herself interprets
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the story according to w hat she (or the reader) has suspected Amy would do 
to Susan. The only assurance Roxana (together w ith the reader) can get about 
i t  is "Amy had m ade her away; and I  believ’d i t  the more, because Amy came 
no more near me, b u t confirm’d her G uilt by h e r Absence" (325). Actually the 
reader is not sure about Susan’s death  or the cause of i t  i f  she is dead; 
neither is Roxana. I f  she is, i t  is only her illusory projection. Amy m ay have 
persuaded the girl into giving up following Roxana, as  the Q uaker figures; 
Susan  may also have been robbed and m urdered by highwaymen, as Roxana’s 
relatives th ink  so; of course she m ay also have been m urdered by Amy, as 
Roxana sees it. W hatever happens to Susan, Roxana will not know exactly 
un til the end of the novel when Amy comes over to join her in  Holland.
The second possibility m ay be even more surprising—Roxana has 
known everything all along. She has pretended to take the Q uaker’s half-told 
story the way the  reader may take it. If  the reader believes Amy has 
m urdered Susan, i t  is  only the reader’s projection. Then the reader m ay have 
been completely fooled by Roxana’s (or Defoe’s) a r t  of concealment, through 
the  m ysterious web of fabrication she has weaved into h er narrative, about 
w hat has exactly happened to the  trouble-m aker Susan.60 Thus, the m urder 
of Susan is only projection in  the firs t case and fabrication in  the second. 
Then in  both cases, "the B last of Heaven" as punishm ent for the m urder is 
only fiction. The reader would no t expect the w rath  of the  divine power to fall 
on Roxana for something she has not made happen much less has done by
114
herself in  person. "The F ortunate Mistress" may finally m aintain  h er sta tus 
under disguise in  Holland w ithout any Divine Justice troubling her 
conscience, since the retribution, as Roxana sta tes in  the la s t  sentence of the 
novel, is for the alleged m urder only, not for her p as t whoring career she lets 
the reader believe she is  worried about all the tim e towards the end of the 
novel.
CHAPTER 4
SCHLEGELIAN IRONY AND THE CHAOTIC WORLD 
OF BECOMING IN  MOLL FLANDERS
Discussions of the use of irony in  Defoe’s Moll Flanders (1722) have 
often been focused on authorial intentions. For example, Moll moralizes her 
necklace theft about its  instructive implication, ju s t as Defoe him self points 
out in  the preface, as a  lesson to teach the reader for the sake of social good. 
If  the reader takes th is intention seriously, no artis try  of irony can be 
identified. W hat one may infer from this incident is Defoe’s blindness to the 
immoral natu re of his heroine’s crime. On the other hand, if  one takes neither 
Defoe’s rem arks in the preface nor Moll’s preaching a t  face value, one can 
locate Defoe’s intention for irony to indicate the heroine’s moral confusion, 
thus exonerating the author from blame.61 Perhaps Robert Alan Donovan’s is 
the m ost provocative study of Defoe’s use of irony in  Moll F landers in  term s 
of the "double function" of Moll, who serves as both "subject and object" or 
"the Moll who perceives and narrates" and "the Moll who acts and suffers." 
The irony of the book, for Donovan, lies in  the disparity between Moll’s two 
voices, one pertaining to the erring character and the other to the moralizing 
narrator. Donovan aims to identify Defoe’s "potentially fruitful organizing 
principle” in  the novel th a t "seems to say one thing and actually says
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another."62 One obvious weakness of these suggestions of authorial intention, 
no m atter for irony or for moral preaching, is th a t they all assume a 
traditional bond of certainty between the author and the reader, who knows 
w hat the author m eans and knows how to in terp ret w hat the character or the 
narra to r says in the text, while such relationships in  the novel sometimes 
render Schlegelian ironic ambiguities, which depart from the traditional claim 
about the certainty of authorial intention.
R ather th an  asserting a faith  in  a universal hierarchical order, the 
private voice in  Moll F landers about chaotic becoming indicates Defoe’s 
insertion into radical historical outlooks of the disrupted universal order. The 
present study will indicate th is private voice about a broken link of certainty 
and account for ironic ambiguities, a practical model th a t anticipates 
Schlegelian irony. I t  will focus on the chaotic world of becoming th a t 
perplexes Moll the character’s finite perceptions and involves them  in growth 
and dialectic tensions. I t will also examine Moll the narra to r’s ambiguous role 
th a t draws the reader into the chaotic textuality of the novel. The ambiguous 
relationships under discussion have something to do w ith a paradoxical 
bifocal vision, with multi-level roles of the character, the narrator, and the 
reader interm ingled in  the reading process. Caught up in  this terrain  of 
uncertainty or even chaotic confusion, the reader is experiencing Schlegel’s 
aesthetics of romantic irony instead of having a  clear picture of authorial 
intentions. Schlegelian irony also challenges the Iserian shared autonomy of
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the author and the reader in  his theory of reader response. Paradoxically, the 
Schlegelian fictional world in  an  ideal work of a rt th a t the finite artis t creates 
is infinite and chaotic. The reader’s participation in the literary text m ust 
likewise fluctuate between the waves of the chaotic textuality of the fictional 
world. While Iser bases his notions of reader response on the grounds th a t 
are slanted for the interaction between the author’s artistic "guidelines" or 
"controls" in the tex t and the reader’s imagination, Schlegel’s theory of 
romantic irony tilts  toward the chaotic textuality of a work of art, which 
defies the certainty of authorial intention. The uncertainty of authorial 
intention cuts both ways. First, the ironic ambiguities in Moll Flanders 
indicate an unconscious anticipation of Schlegel’s romantic irony and Defoe’s 
insertion into radical ideology about disorder and chaos. This reading of 
romantic irony is then  made possible with the joint production by authorial 
ideology as the unconscious private voice and the reader who makes the 
connections in  the text between romantic irony and th a t radical ideology. 
Second, authorial intention about the narrator’s role to moralize her actions 
is jeopardized by Moll’s double role as the character and the narrator and by 
the reader’s dual perspectives as a result of the narrator’s ironic ambiguities.
4.1. Schlegelian Irony
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Friedrich Schlegel’s notions ofirony developed in his literary fragments 
(1797-80) m ark a striking departure from the traditional mode. In classical 
irony, ironists, assured with the security of knowledge in saying the opposite 
of what they mean, know what they mean and hope the reader will know 
what they want to attain. For Schlegel, the difference between traditional 
irony and his philosophical irony lies in the demarcation between sophist 
polemics and poetry. He states th a t there is "a rhetorical species of irony 
which, sparingly used, has an excellent effect, especially in polemics." But it 
is nowhere to be compared to "the sublime urbanity of the Socratic muse." 
Hans Eichner holds tha t in Schlegel’s view "when Socrates asserted tha t he 
knew nothing, he not only knew more than  his interlocutor, but knew enough 
to know th a t he did not really know anything properly." Socratic irony, 
Schlegel writes, "contains and arouses a feeling of indissoluble antagonism 
between the absolute and the relative, between the impossibility and the 
necessity of complete communication." This form of irony in the romantic 
mode Lilian R. Furst calls "an irony of uncertainty, bent primarily on the 
perplexities of searching."63
Schlegel’s poetic world corresponds to his ontological view of the 
universe, which he deems as "infinite and inexhaustible." Schlegel contends 
th a t poetry "alone can become, like the epic, a mirror of the whole 
circumambient world, an image of the age," but it  can also be "free of all real 
and ideal self-interest, on the wings of poetic reflection, and can raise th a t
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reflection again and again to a higher power, can m ultiply i t  in  an  endless 
succession of mirrors." In other words, infinity is captured in  rom antic poetry 
which, Schlegel w rites, "is still in  the s ta te  of becoming."64 The universe is 
chaotic and infinite, bu t the hum an being’s conceptions, in  contrast, are finite. 
While the task  of the a r tis t is "to transform  the  finite into the infinite," yet 
Schlegel also sta tes th a t "never will the  m ind th a t  knows the orgies of the 
true  M use journey on th is  road to the  very end, nor will he presum e to have 
reached it." A rtists are sandwiched between the im m ediate finite and the 
potential infinite and  encounter the Schlegelian paradox of "the impossibility 
and  the necessity of complete communication" w ith the infinite in the ir 
work.66 O ut of th is system  of the infinite, Schlegel defines irony as "the clear 
consciousness of eternal agility, of an  infinitely teem ing chaos" and as 
"continuously fluctuating between self-creation and self-destruction." Such an  
execution of creation and de-creation, for Schlegel, resides in  a rtis ts ’ 
paradoxical mission of both attachm ent to and detachm ent from the  work of 
a r t  they  create. As Schlegel asserts, "in order to w rite well about something, 
one shouldn’t  be in terested  in  i t  any longer."66 T hat is, in  rom antic irony, one 
is perfectly aw are of one’s own lim itations in  the  infinite chaos and a t the 
sam e time is exposed to ever-new experiences in  the reality  of becoming and 
growth, experiences in  which one overcomes one’s lim itations and  transcends 
oneself and produces "an endless succession of mirrors." In so doing, the 
iron ist is able to create w hat Schlegel calls "transcendental buffoonery." By
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"transcendental," Anne K. Mellor points out, "Schlegel refers to a poetry th a t 
hovers between the real and ideal, between the chaos of becoming and the 
order of being," while the Italian  buffo in Schlegel is "a dram atic character 
who both controls the plot and mocks the play" w ithout impeding the plot 
from moving forward. Thus, "transcendental buffoonery" is an  ironic tw ist 
generated by a dram atic character who "is simultaneously affirming and 
mocking its  own creation" or is creating and de-creating the play. In short, 
ironists possess a  paradoxical dual perspective of attachm ent to and 
detachm ent from their creations.67
Moreover, the continuous oscillation between self-creation and self- 
destruction is a  paradox th a t can be specified as a  dialectic fusion of 
opposites. Even Hegel owes his indebtedness to Schlegel’s dialectic thought.68 
The alternation between creation (the thesis) and de-creation (the antithesis) 
is a  dialectic fusion th a t consists of sim ultaneous attachm ent and detachm ent 
(the Hegelian synthesis th a t incorporates both the thesis and the antithesis). 
Then the dialectic process moves on to the th ird  stage, re-creation of a new 
conception of the self, as Schlegel m aintains th a t "confusion is chaotic only 
when i t  can give rise to a new world."69 As the present chapter will la ter 
show, Moll the character is immersed in a chaotic world of becoming, where 
her finite conceptions are ironically involved in  growth through a dialectic 
process of creation, de-creation, and re-creation. Moll the character may 
transcend the dialectic tensions between creation and de-creation and
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trium ph through to re-creation, but due to Moll the narrator’s paradoxical 
attachm ent to and detachment from parts of her narrative, the character- 
narrator-reader relationships are thrown into ironic bifocal ambiguities tha t 
resist any clear and stabilized categorization.
One may find the juxtaposition of romantic irony and Moll Flanders 
chronologically problematic. Critics have identified ”a glaring area of 
ambiguity with regard to establishing reliable chronological parameters" in 
romantic irony. In his survey of this ambiguous time frame, John Francis 
Fetzer holds th a t Schlegelian irony, for some critics, is exemplified after the 
advent of German romanticism starting from the 1790’s onwards, and for 
others, it  reaches back as early as Cervantes’ Don Quixote (1605).70 In fact, 
chronology of the theories of romantic irony would never have been a problem 
w ith Schlegel, for he intended to universalize them. In Schlegel’s view, 
romantic irony can be present, to use Eichner’s words, "in any product of the 
hum an mind th a t displayed adequate awareness of the paradoxical position 
of m ankind itself." For instance, Schlegel points out in the Lyceum (the 
Critical Fragments) (1797) th a t "there are ancient and modem poems that 
are pervaded by the divine breath of irony throughout and informed by a 
tru ly  transcendental buffoonery." In the Athenaeum Fragm ents (1798), 
Schlegel also finds in the epic of Homer full of the ironic combination of 
"intention and instinct," a tendency of "continuously fluctuating between self­
creation and self-destruction." Furthermore, F urst regards Schlegelian irony
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as being derived from "the practical models he acknowledged in Socrates, 
Petrarch, Dante, Cervantes, Shakespeare, Sterne and Diderot." Schlegel’s 
achievement, F u rst argues, "lies in his insights into the significance of their 
irony and his ability to crystallize those insights into a palpable, albeit 
complex theory."71
Besides the universal and trans-historical crystallization of Schlegel’s 
theory to justify Defoe’s practice, not necessarily conscious practice, of 
romantic irony in Moll Flanders, socio-historical considerations about a 
radical ideology against the established order may also render parallel 
conditions th a t may make Defoe’s private voice possible in the novel. As 
Schlegel states in  the Athenaeum Fragments, "the French Revolution, 
Fichte’s philosophy, and Goethe’s M eister are the greatest tendencies of the 
age." Critics have established this trio as three sources of potential influence 
on Schlegel. Fetzer contends th a t the French Revolution "undermined the 
sanctity of an  established order"; Fichte’s Theory of Knowledge modified 
K ant’s "analysis of man's fervent but futile attem pt to atta in  absolute truth" 
by challenging the very existence of the "thing-in-itself' and postulating that 
"the ego, and not some mysterious transcendent force, is responsible for our 
perceptions of the empirical world"; and Goethe’s novel Wilhelm Meister’s 
Apprenticeship proved the "discrepancy between conception and execution," 
for "man’s highest aims were forever to be frustrated by his innate 
shortcomings."72 One can also find similar background conditions in Defoe’s
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time. Mellor argues th a t "romantic irony is a way of thinking about the world 
th a t embraces change and process for their own sake" and th a t several 
background factors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries contributed 
to the formulation of romantic irony. Chief among them  were socio-political 
revolutions, loss of faith in the hierarchical order in the universe, and John 
Locke’s denial of any necessary connection between objects in  An Essay 
Concerning Hum an Understanding (1690).73 These factors approximate the 
Schlegelian famous trio mentioned in the Athenaeum Fragm ents.
Kevin L. Cope’s recent insightful study of the English Enlightenment 
sheds more light on the seventeenth-century paradoxical outlook on the 
infinite chaotic world. Cope argues th a t Halifax, for example, is preoccupied 
with a zest for a moral certainty th a t "is itself a stabilizing psychological 
response to instabilities in evidence." Stability and instability are a 
paradoxical formation in  Halifax. Rules may capture and encompass the 
undercurrent of the unstable and the uncertain, but when one focuses on "the 
variable, unstable character of evidence," instability and incoherence loom so 
large th a t they reject any dictates of totalizing rules. Although Halifax is 
ardent about his use of the maxim to account for instabilities, the Halifaxian 
explanatory system, Cope argues, "stabilizes the boat not in order to sail 
toward a single tru th , but in order to provide a  platform for the free-floating 
clash of m any drifting interests." Hence, Halifax’s notion about a  nation as 
"a Mass of Dough" to be molded into one systematic form is only, writes Cope,
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"the nourishing bread of a but not the stable state." Halifax’s thinking of the 
flexible and unfixed state and of the paradoxical natu re of stability and 
instability anticipates the K antian denial of absolute tru th  and the 
Schlegelian notion about one’s view of poetry as only one true but limited 
view of the infinite nature of poetry.74 Finally, critics have also examined and 
evaluated Defoe’s view of man as a short-sighted creature, his visions of the 
uncertain hum an lot and disorder of life, and the context of Defoe’s age in 
term s of its  doubt about the existence and nature of Providence in the 
universe.76 The chaotic world of change, process, and becoming in  the 
Schlegelian sense of the word may likewise be reflected in  Moll Flanders, as 
the private voice th a t strikes a dissonant tone about the m ainstream  belief 
in  a universal order.
4.2. Chaotic Becoming and Uncertainty of Authorial Intention
T hat Moll as a finite hum an being drifts along toward growth in  the 
chaotic world of becoming is not surprising to the reader. At the end of her 
m arriage career, Moll expresses a sense of limitation in the infinite chaotic 
world, but she also indicates an enthusiasm  for discovering her power to 
transcend herself and overcome her limitations in the process of becoming 
and growth. F irst, Moll knows her own inadequacies and is not certain about 
w hat exactly she can do to face the dilemma of a forty-eight-year-old widow,
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who has lost her allure to recommend for any m arriage proposals. Her 
descriptions about the dreadful state prior to her career as a thief indicate 
her self-awareness. "I sa t and cried and tormented my self Night and Day; 
wringing my Hands, and sometimes raving like a  distracted Woman; ... my 
Understanding was sometimes quite lost in Fancies and Imaginations.”76 
Reduced to a state of distress, Moll has no capacity to do anything but to cry 
and to bury herself in her own fancies as if  she has lost contact with reality. 
Perhaps Moll is so much in her own finite subjective world th a t she does not 
know she has to do something about her predicament or to design a way-out. 
I t  is no wonder she "LIV'D Two Years in this dismal Condition" (190). Then, 
as soon as Moll reveals her self-consciousness, she moves beyond i t  by 
conquering her stasis and getting into action. "For a little Relief I had put off 
my House and took Lodgings, and I was reducing my Living so I sold off most 
of my Goods, which pu t a little Money in  my Pocket" (190), an ironic touch 
about Moll’s self-awareness of her limitations and her power to transcend 
them. Such a  tendency sets the tempo for another cycle of the process. After 
she realizes the present crisis, Moll has to face another reality, still unable 
to have the slightest idea about w hat to do. Again acknowledging her 
limitations, she tells the reader, ”1 am very sure I had no m anner of Design 
in my Head, when I went out, I neither knew or considered where to go, or 
on w hat Business" (191). In  this fashion, Moll is depicting herself as 
wandering in  the chaotic world where she knows nothing about how to
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respond to the ever-changing reality. H aving accepted h er inadequacies once 
again, Moll sets out on the move to search for open possibilities, and the act 
of Btealing in  the chaotic outside world is ironically a  m eans of overcoming 
the inadequacies in the  process of becoming.
Such a  process of becoming also takes form in  a dialectic of creation, 
de-creation, and  re-creation, which bears a  resemblance to Hegel’s dialectic 
method. John  J . Richetti, in  his stim ulating book Defoe’s N arratives, has 
studied the  Hegelian dialectic in  Moll F landers. For instance, Richetti 
considers the Colchester elder brother’s seduction as one such process. The 
young, naive, and  spontaneous Moll is regarded as the  thesis or the self, the 
elder brother as the antithesis or the other, while the  narra ting  Moll is the 
th ird  te rm  or the  synthesis " tha t resu lts from the collision of self and other, 
the  calculating self able to operate w ithin the other, seeing the old 
spontaneous p a rt of itself as merely obeying the  determ ination of the other." 
This dialectic process perfectly supports Richetti’s thesis about the movement 
of Defoe’s novels "towards the depiction of a  dialectic between self and other 
which has as its  end a covert b u t trium phant assertion of the self,"77 a strong 
argum ent against the se lf  s dependence on the other or the external world for 
definition. However, i t  is precisely th is  external negating other th a t 
differentiates from de-creation in  the dialectic process of rom antic irony. The 
negating other or de-creation in  rom antic irony takes place in  the world 
w ithin  not w ithout, for residence of the other in  external circumstances will
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not be p a r t of the a rtis t’s self-destruction, thus short of the paradox of the 
iron ist’s sim ultaneous a ttachm ent and detachm ent.
M arriage to the Virginia p lan ter is an emblem of Moll’s attachm ent to 
and  detachm ent from h er own creation of the self th a t  is involved in a 
dialectic process. F irst, the m arriage is one of the fruits of Moll’s creation of 
a  m asterful a rtis t. Moll is equally a t  home in  cheating and putting  up a moral 
image of the  self and tricks a m an into m arriage w ithout, paradoxically, 
losing h e r in tegrity  in  the eyes of the victim. From the outset, Moll is fully 
aw are of the  disadvantage a woman has to face, th a t  is, the  small num ber of 
m en available "for a woman to venture upon." They have been occupied with 
overseas businesses and carried away by w ar, so th a t  "there is no Proportion 
between the Num bers of the Sexes; and therefore the Women have the 
D isadvantage" (74). B ut Moll, having a small fortune of about 500 pounds, 
passes for a lady w ith an  estate of over 1500 to a ttra c t potential adm irers, 
w ith  the help of the C aptain’s Wife, who comes up w ith the plan and helps 
spread the  word around. Moll does indeed succeed in  singling out h e r m an 
among a sw arm  of suitors. Moll’s a rtis try  in  cheating w ithout losing integrity 
lies in  h er preparing the groom-to-be for unpleasant surprises. W ith her 
m an’s diamond ring, Moll w rites on the  window pane in  h er chamber th a t 
"Fm Poor: Let’s see how kind you’ll prove." A nticipating the  possibility of her 
te sting  him, the  Virginia p lan ter engraves a promise on the glass, "Be mine, 
w ith all vour Poverty" (79). This is the promise Moll has expected of him, ju s t
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in  case he is disappointed in discovering the  tru th  la ter about Moll’s 
fraudulence, and he will find it hard to ea t h is own words. Having thus not 
been pretentious herself or lying to him about the figure of her estate from 
her own mouth, Moll m arries her desirable Virginia husband, who has a 
steady income of 1200 pounds a year from his plantations. The dowry he 
gains is Moll’s 500 pounds, much more th an  Moll has prepared him for but 
much less th an  w hat the rum or has made him expect. The beauty of this 
m arriage is th a t the groom has to adm it to the bride, "I may perhaps tell the 
Captain he has cheated me, bu t I can never say you have cheated me" (83).
However, the a rtis t’s creation of a moral self in  the handsome marriage 
bears the seed of de-creation in itself, as Moll’s husband tu rns out to be her 
own brother. The Hegelian assertive thesis (the moral self) is confronted with 
the negating antithesis (the incestuous self) a t  the very moment of creating 
the image of a m asterful a rtis t in  the marriage arrangem ent. Moll the artis t 
is  sim ultaneously attached to and detached from her own creation. The 
assertive self has artfully gained a husband suitable to her without losing 
integrity  in his eyes, bu t a t  the same tim e the idea of incest means to de- 
create the bright side of the marriage, to mock Moll’s moral self, and to 
negate self-creation, thus becoming a fusion of opposites or the Hegelian 
synthesis. The moral self has been proved to her brother/husband, bu t the 
negating incestuous self m ust not be exposed to him. So the dialectic fusion 
of creation and de-creation w ithin the domain of m arriage does not stagnate
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here but moves further into her plan to cover up the incest, where both the 
thesis and the antithesis are also paradoxically incorporated. As "a good 
Husband" is "the most necessary Thing in the World" to Moll (76), she decides 
to save her marriage, in spite of the incest. After hearing her mother(-in- 
law)’s name and story, Moll cannot recognize her right away due to mixed 
motives, partly because "it m ight be difficult to convince her of the 
Particulars" and partly because she thinks the suggestion of incest "would 
have immediately separated me from my Husband" (89). Moll is so desperate 
to protect the marriage, a  part of her artful creation, th a t she wishes she had 
not known the sibling relationship with her husband, for she says, "O had the 
Story never been told me, all had been well" (88). Knowing while hoping for 
not knowing her true identity itself is an ambiguous fusion of opposites-- 
bound within the incestuous shame bu t wishing to rem ain outside with 
conscience. Then, knowing but refusing to confirm, Moll "liv’d with the 
greatest Pressure imaginable for three Year more, but had no more Children" 
(89). "The greatest Pressure" and "no more Children" in  the three-year cover- 
up suggest her ambiguous dispositions and indicate a paradoxical mixture of 
moral confusion and a troubled conscience. Thus, the continuation of incest, 
a synthesis of both the thesis and the antithesis, is another indication of 
Moll’s ironic instinct of simultaneous attachm ent to and detachm ent from her 
own creation of a moral self.
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Finally, the dialectic tension between creation and de-creation dissolves 
in  re-creation, a higher level of creation and a new conception of the self. This 
stage of re-creation is different from the first stage of creation, where Moll 
creates her moral self in the eyes of the man on whom she has played a trick. 
In re-creation, she not only convinces her brother-husband and her mother(- 
in-law) of her moral self but also shows to the reader the finite human being’s 
moral awakening and growth. Tormented by her conscience, Moll says, "I 
loathed the Thoughts of Bedding with him, and used a thousand Pretences 
of Illness and Humour to prevent his touching me" (90). She also proposes to 
go back to England, knowing he would not go with her, because "it would be 
ruinous to his Affairs, would Unhinge his whole Family, and be next to an 
Undoing him in the World" (91), thus hoping to end "the worst sort of 
Whoredom" and "Misery and Destruction." Since Moll has eventually "refus’d 
to Bed with him," the husband thinks she is insane and threatens to confine 
her to a mad-house, which, Moll says, "would a t  once have destroy’d all the 
possibility of breaking the Truth out, whatever the occasion might be; for tha t 
then, no one would have given Credit to a  word of it" (92). All these details 
suggest to the reader th a t Moll has gained some moral conscience after three 
years of hesitation to reveal the tru th  because of her mixed motives—initial 
uncertainty about her convincing power and her love for her brother-husband. 
She wants to pu t an end to the incestuous marriage before i t  is too late. 
Having convinced her mother of all "the Particulars," she alleviates her
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brother-husband’s terrible shock by preparing him for the news of incest, 
which demonstrates her concern and love for him  as a brother. After all, Moll 
says, "I might love him well enough for a Brother, tho’ I could not for a 
Husband" (99). Any "Mystery yet unfolded" about Moll th a t is in the brother- 
husband’s suspicion, it goes without saying, is demystified in the end, for the 
real cause for her recent aversion to sleeping with him and her desire to 
retu rn  to England is not lack of passion nor evil craving; it is but the tragedy 
of incest. This re-creation of the self or the awakening of moral conscience in 
th is last stage of the ironic process corresponds to what Richetti calls Moll’s 
"dialectical transformation of disastrous social circumstances into personal 
affirmation and freedom" and her "new consciousness and a refined skill in 
the a r t of survival."78
Moll also acts as an ironic artist who creates, de-creates, and re-creates 
her image as a moralist in the necklace robbery, her second theft. In such an 
ironic procedure of Moll’s maturation, one can employ John Locke’s natural 
law to measure the stages of growth. Three of the Lockean principles of 
natural law m ust be considered: (1) man’s right to self-preservation, (2) 
leaving enough for the preservation of others, and (3) not appropriating more 
than  needed. N atural law for Locke governs not only the state of nature, an 
imaginary pre-historical state, but also society and political governments, 
because it  is used to indicate "what is and w hat is not" and because "without 
natural law there would be neither virtue nor vice, neither the reward of
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goodness nor the punishm ent of evil." Political power for Locke is justified 
only in  so far as i t  preserves m an’s n a tu ra l rights, and  Locke indeed insists, 
"the binding force of civil law  is dependent on n a tu ra l law."79
The ironic process of growth to re-creation through creation and self- 
destruction is  clearly in  Moll’s reflections on th is  second theft. F irst, Moll is 
perform ing a  self-creation task  when she rem arks, "my own Necessities made 
m e regardless of any thing: The la s t Affair left no great Concern upon me, for 
as  I did the poor Child no harm " (194). Moll is here creating a self-image of 
a widow who, w ith  a m oral conscience, steals only when driven by necessity. 
Any reader who is  fam iliar w ith n a tu ra l law can see m orality in  Moll’s act 
and  will accept her justification. Yet, the key words here are  "I did the poor 
Child no harm ." On the  one hand, they serve to reinforce Moll’s denial of the 
im m orality of the theft, for she has done no harm  to the child physically. On 
the  other hand, such a sta tem ent requires a rational clarification, which Moll 
is going to offer to the reader, a clarification th a t embraces the  danger of self- 
destruction. I f  her justification for her crime on the basis of necessity is to 
create a  m orally acceptable image of the self, Moll’s follow-up reflections only 
de-create th is  very image, and this self-destruction is  embodied w ithin her 
a ttem p t to moralize and  to create the self image. The a r tis t is sim ultaneously 
bound to and distanced from h er own creation: "I only said to my self, 1 had 
given the  P aren ts a ju s t  Reproof for the ir Negligence in  leaving the poor little 
Lam b to come home by it  self, and i t  would teach them  to take more Care of
i t  another time" (194). However w itty and rational, th is self-creating 
com m entary no doubt contradicts Moll’s moral self, as though she is mocking 
h e r m oral conscience or de-creating the self. I t  is d e a r  th a t the reader will 
no t judge, a t  least not in  ligh t of na tu ra l law, Moll's robbery of the child as 
morally acceptable under the  pretext of acting for the  good of the victim or in 
Moll’s excuse th a t her stealing will prevent fu ture crimes of the kind. T hat 
is why critics insist upon h e r ironic confusion w ith  a  moral vision.80 I t is 
w orth noting th a t  when critics regard Moll’s preaching as ironic in  the 
traditional sense, they are tak ing  i t  as a  product of Moll’s (or Defoe’s) 
intentions and are isolating th is self-destruction stage from the  whole ironic 
dialectic process, functioning to underm ine Moll’s creation of a moral self. For 
Schlegelian irony, self-deBtruction stem s from the ironist’s finite perceptions 
in  the chaotic world of becoming, and irony grows ou t of th is  disparity 
between the finite and the  chaotic ra th e r th an  the  intentions of the finite. 
Finally, the fusion of self-creation and self-destruction gives way to a  new 
conception of the  self. Moll then  m akes an  endeavor to re-establish her image 
as a th ie f w ith a  m oral conscience. By focusing on the needs of the victim, 
Moll is im plying an  argum ent for the  acceptability of h e r robbery since she, 
having been throw n back to the sta te  of na tu re  under necessity, has taken 
only w hat is more th an  the  child needs, leaving enough for her preservation. 
About th e  necklace she h as robbed, Moll says i t  "might have been formerly 
the  M other’s, for i t  was too big for the Child’s wear" (195). Moll is justifying
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the theft by appealing to her natural rights since she steals for self- 
preservation, takes w hat is more than  the child needs, and leaves enough to 
the preservation of the victim.81
The character’s finite perceptions can hardly capture the fictional world 
of becoming in  Moll Flanders, bu t so far the reader is watching the heroine 
suffer and is certain about her shortcomings as a  finite being. A part from 
this, the novel may also draw the reader into the fictional chaotic world of 
uncertainty, where the reader is whirled into it  to join the character and the 
narra to r on a ride through the "perplexities of searching" in  the text. T hat is, 
the ironic ambiguities in  the novel not only repudiate the certainty of 
authorial in tention bu t also challenge Wolfgang Iser’s phenomenological 
theory of reader response. Iser’s theory of a r t "lays full stress on the idea 
tha t, in considering a literary  work, one m ust take into account not only the 
actual text b u t also, and in  equal m easure, the actions involved in  responding 
to th a t text." Iser stresses an  "author-reader dialogue," which is an  interplay 
between the authorial "pre-intentions" or "schematised views" in the text and 
the reader’s imagination or participation. In other words, neither the author 
nor the reader has total autonomy. W ithin the scheme of the dialogue, the 
author invents certain controls to prevent the reader’s subjectivity from 
"playing too dom inant a part" and "gives him guidelines as to how he is to 
view the proceedings." Here, the author’s guidelines, "pre-intentions," or 
"expectations" are intended for the implied reader, the reader who is
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constituted by the text. Such a reader, having the authorial guidelines a t his 
disposal, enjoys some degree of autonomy and makes his own choice, and 
"then he will fill in  the picture accordingly" to the extent th a t he never has 
"the feeling th a t the author wants to lead him by the nose." In this light, Iser 
argueB th a t in Fielding’s Joseph Andrews, for example, the author’s 
guidelines about the differences between his novel and the repertoire of the 
established genres disappear as the novel moves along, "so th a t the reader is 
left to discover the differences for himself." The Iserian reader shares 
autonomy with the author, and "the distance between the story and the 
reader m ust a t tim es be made to disappear, so th a t the privileged spectator 
can be made into an  actor."82
However, Schlegelian irony disrupts such Iserian shared autonomy of 
the author and the reader in  Moll Flanders, and the narrator, who performs 
part of the author’s artistic guidelines, distances the reader from herself. In 
fact, the narrator’s role is undermined by her Schlegelian ambiguous dual 
perspective, and the reader is thrown into the chaotic textuality of the 
narrative. First, i t  is im portant to note Defoe the editor’s intention behind the 
narrator’s voices in  the novel, intention th a t never falls into clear boundaries. 
One can find various degrees of moral preaching of the first-person narrators 
in Defoe’s major novels, but Moll Flanders is specially designed for this 
purpose. Unlike the prefaces to Defoe’s other novels in which Defoe intends 
to le t "a ju s t History of Fact" speak for itself,83 the preface to Moll Flanders
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states in explicit terms tha t the famous lady "is made to tell her own Tale in 
modester Words than she told it  a t first" and th a t "the Copy which came first 
to Hand, having been written in Language, more like one still in Newgate. 
than  one grown Penitent and Humble, as she afterwards pretends to be" (1). 
So behind the narrator’s persona, there masked the editor's (Defoe’s) 
intention. To reflect the "Penitent and Humble" side of Moll, Defoe makes her 
pose as a narrator in  the book and, approaching seventy years of age, 
moralize her actions while delineating the history of her bumpy earlier years. 
CriticB have noted Defoe’s narrative method involves two techniques th a t are 
derived from the major writing techniques of the seventeen-century Royal 
Society scientists Robert Boyle and Robert Hooke: precise description of 
details with brief emotional response. The function of emotional responses or 
reflections or preaching is to show the narrator’s sincerity in repentance or 
her endeavors for the effect of sympathy.84
The ambiguous double role of the narrator in Schlegelian irony can be 
discerned in the bundle episode, where Moll, driven by necessity, commits her 
first theft. Reality for Moll a t this juncture of her career is no longer a 
prewritten text with a fixed pattern but an infinite flux of uncertainties. One 
way of identifying romantic irony in this episode is through the narrator’s 
reflections on the theft. As a finite human being, her perceptions can never 
completely capture the chaotic world. Moll, as an ironic memoir narrator, 
shows such a disparity in  her narrative and performs an ambiguous double
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role of the character and the narra to r w ith both h er involvement in  and 
disengagem ent from the  story she is telling. W ith fear and  remorse in the 
wake of the incident, Moll rem arks, "Perhaps, said I. i t  m ay be some poor 
Widow like me, th a t had  pack’d up these Goods to go and sell them  for a little 
Bread for herself and a poor Child, and are now starving and breaking their 
H earts" (193). H ere Moll the character tells herself th a t  she m ay have robbed 
a poor widow who is in  desperate need for food.
Nevertheless, the reader cannot take Moll’s words too seriously. In  the 
beginning of the theft scene, Moll describes th a t beyond the bundle "stood a 
M aid Servant w ith her Back to it" (191), implying th e  m aid is sen t by the 
"poor Widow" to sell the goods. The widow then  cannot possibly be starving 
a t  the tim e, for she still has the financial capacity to h ire  a maid. If  the maid 
is the  "poor Widow" herself, Moll finds more th an  eighteen shillings together 
w ith the silverware and linen in  the parcel, which suggests th a t the "poor 
Widow” would be foolish to have packed those goods in  the bundle for sale 
w ith the  hard-earned money in  it. Also, when the  widow has th a t  much 
money on hand, she would not sell the bundle only to alleviate her family’s 
starvation  in  the firs t place. The reader has been told in  the midwife’s first 
charging table th a t ten  shillings can cover Moll’s m eals and lodging for a 
week in  the midwife's house (164). I t  is also in teresting  th a t even ju s t before 
h e r reflections on this theft, Moll rem inds the reader th a t  a  loaf of bread 
costs six pence (190). According to the calculations of Gregory King, an
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economist of Defoe’s tim e, the  average yearly income and  expenses o f servants 
and  common laboring people in  England in  the year of 1688 (two years after 
Moll’s 1686 dated memoir) were about fifteen pounds in  a  family of four.85 
T h a t comes down to roughly 6 shillings a  week. E ighteen shillings and sex 
pence in a family of two, then, could la s t six weeks to support both the widow 
and  h er child in  the  standard  of living of the  working-class family. Although 
Moll feels th a t  she h as  robbed a starving poor widow ju s t  like her, her 
discovery of the money in  the  bundle proves her perceptions false.
Such a discrepancy indicates Moll’s ambiguous double role as both a 
character and a  narra to r in  the novel, who is engaged in  a  paradox of 
sim ultaneous attachm ent to and detachm ent from h er narrative. The 
character’s voice and the narra to r’s reflections often have distinctive 
boundaries in  narrative point of view. One example will suffice. After Moll 
gives her V irginia husband her estate th a t  am ounts to less th an  h a lf  of his 
expectations, "he accepted i t  very thankfully." Moll then  says, "And thus I got 
over the F raud  of passing for a Fortune w ithout Money, and cheating a Man 
in to  M arrying me on pretence of a Fortune; which, bv the  wav. I take to be 
one of the  m ost dangerous Steps a Woman can take" (84). Here, the first "I" 
is  Moll the character’s persona, and the second the preaching narra to r’s. But 
th e  boundaries are  not always so clear-cut. The narra to r's  voice m ay even be 
im plicit in  the character’s actions. For instance, in  the fire robbery episode, 
Moll pretends to rescue the lady of the house b u t comes w ith a  m ind to her
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valuables. A t the very m om ent of securing the booty, Moll m eets w ith another 
woman who offers help to Moll and who, Moll says, "was one of the same 
Business w ith me, and wanted nothing bu t the Bundle" (205). No one doubts 
th a t  Moll is breaking the ethical code here robbing the desperate lady, bu t 
the narra tive  cunningly suggests th a t had  Moll not taken advantage of the 
fire and committed crime, people like the o ther woman would have done the 
sam e any way—she is only seconds behind Moll. This is not a  justification for 
crime b u t is a  plausible excuse to alleviate Moll’s guilt. So when Moll 
w hispers "go Child" into the new-comer’s ear, the  reader can sense the 
n a rra to r’s voice hovering over the scene, a forgiving voice hidden in  the 
narra tive  of the robbery itself, although the n arra to r has never said a word 
about th a t excuse.
In  sim ilar fashion, Moll the n arra to r carries over h er role in re ­
presenting  the  story and th ru sts  through the mode of narra tion  and 
participates in  the plot of actions herself in  th is bundle episode. Moll the 
character, having discovered w hat is wrapped up inside the bundle, is "under 
such dreadful Im pressions of Fear" when she says, "W hat am  I now? A Thief!” 
(192). A fter a  long n ight w ith a troubled conscience, Moll is "im patient to hear 
some News of the  Loss; and would fain know how i t  was, w hether they were 
a  Poor Bodies Goods, or a Rich" (193). She then  th inks she m ay have robbed 
a  poor widow like her, who was going to sell the bundle. The "I" in  "perhaps, 
said I. i t  m ay be some poor Widow like me" is clearly m eant to be the
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character’s voice. B ut one can hardly a ttribu te  the voice of "some poor Widow 
like me, th a t had pack’d up these Goods to go and sell them" to the same 
Moll. Speculating on the polarity between "a Poor Bodies Goods" and "a Rich," 
the suffering Moll surely has a motive to imagine a robbery of "a Rich" in 
order to bleed some of her guilt and to soothe her troubled conscience. As she 
has already discovered the money in  the package, the logical progression of 
her expectations in  this context ought to be developed in the direction th a t 
Moll the character, w ith th a t motive in  mind, rules out the possibility of 
having robbed a  poor widow with a starving child. So Moll’s rem arks about 
the "poor Widow" do not fall into the character’s reflecting space bu t into a 
space preserved for the narrator, the artist, who has stepped in and 
speculates the opposite, in  spite of the character’s worries. The narra to r does 
not do this for nothing. On the one hand, she is showing her moral awareness 
in  accord w ith her "Penitent and Humble" nature. On the other hand, by 
having Moll the  character identify herself with her victim, the narra to r is 
able to imagine a figure to sim ulate the very predicam ent the heroine is 
reduced to, so th a t the narra to r can gain the reader’s sympathy for the 
character and for herself as if  she were this im aginary poor widow whose 
"bundle" or social security has been robbed.86
Only a narra to r w ith an  ambiguous double role can attem pt this 
sympathizing accomplishment. Sympathy, one of the passions for Edmund 
Burke th a t can be a  source of the sublime, is "a sort of substitution, by which
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we are pu t into the place of another man, and affected in  many respects as 
he is affected." Following this Burkean idea of the "imaginary change of 
situation," Adam Sm ith develops his theory of w hat he calls "moral 
sentiments." For Smith, when one is suffering, "there m ay be some 
correspondence of sentim ents between the spectator and the person 
principally concerned." Burke’s idea is still valid here, in  the sense th a t for 
Sm ith the spectator m ust endeavor "to p u t him self in  the situation of the 
other, and to bring home to him self every little circumstance of distress which 
can possibly occur to the sufferer." But Sm ith doubts a complete consolation 
from spectators because of "the thought th a t they themselves are not really 
the sufferers." The sufferer is aware of th is possibility and "passionately 
desires a  more complete sympathy."87 Moll the narra to r picks up a  similar 
scheme. After describing the character’s melancholy frame of mind on the 
brink of starving to death and pleading for the reader’s sympathy on the 
grounds of necessity, the narra to r knows she needs to win more of the 
reader’s compassion for the character. She sympathizes w ith Moll the 
character and places her in  a position to sympathize w ith the "poor Widow" 
and to obtain a correspondence of sentim ents between w hat she calls "the 
prospect of my own Starving" and th a t of the poor widow’s. The role of the 
spectator or the sympathizer, on the narra to r’s part, then tu rns into th a t of 
the sympathizee who desires a more complete consolation from the reader, 
the ultim ate spectator. In other words, by pitying the victim for her desperate
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circumstances in which the character is lodged, the narrator’s voice, under 
the persona of the character, is permeating into the emotions of the victim, 
as an imaginary insertion into the sufferer’s situation, in  order to secure 
sympathy for the character’s desperate action and ultimately for the narrator 
herself. So far, the narrator’s design may be clear to the reader. However, the 
artis t’s involvement in her own creation a t this stage is balanced 
simultaneously by detachment from it. With the narrator’s reflections, under 
the disguise of the character, on the possibility of having robbed a desperate 
poor widow, she also disrupts her task of sympathizing and de-creates the 
character, for the narrator can hardly justify harm ing someone in an 
outrageous situation like the alleged poor widow.88
Furtherm ore, believing in the alleged identity of the poor widow and 
la ter discovering her fictitious status, the reader, too, is imposed upon him self 
an ironic two-fold role of the Active reader (attached to the narrator) and the 
actual reader (detached from the narrator), as a result of the ambiguous 
ironies of the narrator’s double vision. From the outset, the narrator expects 
the Active reader, the contrived reader her narrative intends to guide and 
influence, to be attached to her tale. She actually reaches out to such a reader 
before she presents the bundle episode: "O let none read this p a rt without 
seriously reflecting on the Circumstances of a desolate State...; it  will 
certainly make them think not of sparing what they have only, but of looking 
up to Heaven for support, and of the wise Man’s Prayer, Give me not Poverty
least I Steal" (191). The fictive reader may sympathize with the heroine, 
considering her desperate circumstances, and may also show further 
compassion for the starving thief when she is identified with a poor heart­
broken widow with a devastated child crying for food a t home. But when the 
actual reader, whose response is not always w hat the narrator expects, 
recognizes the injustice of one desperate widow robbing another, the reader 
is then detached from the narrator’s mission of sympathizing and may argue 
against her immorality. Another layer of ironic ambiguity also resides in the 
fact th a t this detached reader then turns attached again and becomes a 
victim of the ironic ambiguity when taking the widow’s identity as authentic. 
From this attached reader, by the time the reader discovers the fabricated 
identity of the alleged "poor Widow," then emerges a reader who is once again 
detached from the sentimentality of the narrator, a narrator who herself is 
disoriented by the chaotic world of the literary text. The narrator distances 
and drives the reader away from herself, and the only thing tha t draws the 
reader’s attention is the chaotic textuality of the narrative.89 Such free- 
floating and indefinite movements of involvement and disengagement defy 
any conviction of certainty on the reader’s part about authorial intention 
masked behind the narrator’s persona: to show Moll’s repentance or to 
disorient the reader?
CHAPTER 5
DEFOE’S "MAN-WOMAN" ROXANA:
A STUDY OF GENDER, REVERSAL, AND ANDROGYNY
A feminist reading of eighteenth-century fiction can take one (or a 
combination) of the following popular approaches: exposing the male ideology 
in its oppression of women,90 transcending ideology and delineating female 
true experiences,91 engaging a power struggle and moving inside the male 
dominance,92 or resisting patriarchy and moving outside the male order.93 
Critics have provided us with insight by demonstrating these methods in 
eighteenth-century studies, but the emphasis characterizes a disruption of the 
male order by highlighting female power. This tendency marks a pattern of 
the distinctive either/or thinking in gender studies; i t  is what K. K. Ruthven 
calls an attempt, in  saving the Kristevan system in feminist criticism, to take 
the m aternal Semiotic as an alternative to the paternal Symbolic instead of 
concentrating on the Kristevan interplay between the two. For instance, such 
an emphasis can be seen in Laurie Langbauer’s reading of romance as a move 
to the maternal chora and of the female body as discourse in the subject’s 
struggle for power, and in Patricia Meyer Spacks’ discussion about the female 
usurp of the male oppressors’ power from the supreme power.94 Drawing on 
the Lacanian and Kristevan insights of feminist theory, the present chapter
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takes a som ewhat different direction and departs from the popular 
approaches to fem inist criticism after incorporating them . I t  will examine 
Defoe’s Roxana (1724) in  term s of female power, which may be a force th a t 
d isrupts the male monopoly and th rea tens patriarchy w hen perceived as the 
K ristevan m aternal chora. This fem inist force, however, is not totally 
destructive as to perpetuate the dominance of the m aternal. Instead, not 
conceiving feminism as oppositional practice for its u ltim ate goal as shown 
in  the other approaches, th is study will indicate Defoe’s "Man-Woman" 
Roxana as the epitome of the  reversal of the Lacanian Androgyny-Imaginary- 
Symbolic triad . This is a fem inist mission th a t moves beyond the Im aginary 
or the Semiotic m aternal chora into the primordial and degenderizing 
androgyny before the hum an being ever experiences the Lacanian sexual split 
or "lack." Defoe’s novel m arks a departure from m ale ideologies and stirs a 
ripple of dissonance from his traditional ideas in  nonfiction, b u t i t  never 
perpetuates the dominance of female power. Roxana is, tow ards the end of 
the novel, a paradoxical figure w ith a homeless voice who rejects the 
distinctive either/or th inking  in  gender and is both subjected to m an’s laws 
of m atrim ony and a t the sam e tim e capable of d raining his power th a t is 
m andated by those laws.
Roxana invites different readings for fem inist studies and provides the 
reader w ith an  example of the Lacanian three-com ponent model in reverse. 
To focus on only one p a r t of Roxana’s three-stage m aturing  process will not
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do justice to the im port of the whole novel. F irst, the ideologies of the male 
self can be exposed in  the ir function to hold Roxana, the female other, in 
place as an  ideal woman and a caring m other in  the beginning of the novel; 
so can the b ru ta l reality  of her experiences as a whore be delineated by 
focusing on h er m aterial existence as a dependent commodity reified by m en 
w ith the ir financial and social superiority in  the  patriarchal system. The 
reader can then  locate a fem inist m aternal chora where Roxana reverses her 
traditional feminine role and engages in  a  power struggle against the male 
monopoly. More im portantly, if  the Lacanian model involves the progression 
of a  triad  from the prim ordial sexual Androgyny to the (m aternal) Im aginary 
and  then  to the  (paternal) Symbolic, Roxana launches a reversal of such a 
progression. W hat m akes the present study different from other approaches 
is th a t  Roxana's dynamic m aternal force after the in terplay between the 
Symbolic and the Im aginary does not rem ain inside the m aternal chora nor 
moves back into the paternal order from which she is fleeing in  the first 
place. I t instead  progresses into the prim ordial sexual androgyny, towards the 
end of the novel, where the degenderization of the hum an being and the 
deconstruction of cultural gender codes are  achieved.
The th ree kinds of the voices of the self in  the public, private, and 
homeless components correspond to the Lacanian triad  in  reverse and to the 
th ree p a rts  of the novel w ith Roxana’s relationship with the Dutch M erchant 
in  the middle. Before her liaison w ith the M erchant in  the firs t p a rt of the
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novel, Roxana is fixed in  the traditional feminine role prescribed by culture 
in  its paternal Symbolic (her youth, her first m arriage to the Brewer, and her 
early career as a courtesan to the Jeweller and to the Prince), which 
constitutes Roxana’s public voice about the female other dependent on the 
male ideology for definition.95 Following this is the second phase, the 
Imaginary, in  which the self envisions a terrifying bu t blurring other in the 
"mirror" as symbolized in  the moment when the Jew  fixes his horrible gaze 
upon Roxana’s face, which renders the other as an opaque reflection of the 
self. Here Roxana has her private voice by establishing a  period of the 
m aternal chora and reversing the cultural gender codes in her affair with the 
Merchant. Finally, the "Man-Woman" Roxana in  her m arriage to the 
M erchant pushes back into the sexual unity with the missing p a rt of the 
primordial whole and degenderizes the hum an being in sexual androgyny, 
where she defies and deterritorializes a distinctive cultural gender orientation 
and orchestration. As Roxana disappears from the fictional world in  the end, 
she disappears from both her "public domain" and "private sphere" and 
rem ains alien to the distinctive dichotomy between male ideology and 
fem inist politics. The "Man-Woman" Roxana does not epitomize Defoe’s notion 
of an  ideal woman bu t a homeless androgynous figure who vanishes from the 
ideological arena.
5.1. Lacanian "Symbolic" and Roxana’s Cultural Gender Roles
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According to Jacques Lacan, the hum an being experiences two "lacks" 
in the process of becoming a subject. The first is conceived to be a t the 
moment of birth in the mother’s womb, which is "situated a t  the advent of the 
living being, th a t is to say, a t sexed reproduction." This is the moment, Kaja 
Silverman explains, "of sexual differentiation within the womb, bu t it  is not 
realized until the separation of the child from the mother a t  birth." Silverman 
also m aintains, "the subject is defined as lacking because i t  is believed to be 
a fragm ent of something larger and more primordial," a sexual androgyny or 
the original whole from which the hum an subject is derived. The subject’s 
existence is "dominated by the desire to recover its missing complement." The 
second lack "suffered by the Lacanian subject," Silverman continues, "occurs 
after birth, but prior to the acquisition of language." This is a loss "inflicted 
by w hat m ight be called the *pre-Oedipal territorialization’ of the subject’s 
body," the "orchestration" or cultivation (by the mother or nurse) of the 
infant’s regulated "drives around sexual difference" in culture’s genital 
economy. This second "lack" takes place between w hat Lacan calls the "mirror 
stage" or the "imaginary state" and the language-acquisition "symbolic order" 
in the process of hum an subject’s psychological development. I t takes place, 
according to Lacan, before the subject is "objectified in  the dialectic of 
identification with the other, and before language restores to it, in the 
universal, its function as subject." "The child," according to Lacan, "at an age
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when he is for a time, however short, outdone by the chimpanzee in 
instrum ental intelligence, can nevertheless already recognize as such his own 
image in a mirror." In this pre-Oedipal or the Imaginary "mirror stage," the 
self, for the first time, perceives the other and thus forms the blurring notion 
of "the specular I," which is part of the other (usually the mother). For Lacan, 
the Symbolic is the "moment in  which the mirror-stage comes to an end" and 
which inaugurates "the deflection of the specular I  into the social I" with a 
distinctive sense of the self and the other. "It is this moment," writes Lacan, 
"that decisively tips the whole of human knowledge into mediatization 
through the desire of the other."96 The second "lack" or the Imaginary also 
corresponds to Julia Kristeva’s feminist notion of the semiotic chora or the 
m aternal rhythm of "uncertain and indeterminate articulation." where the 
infant’s sexual "drives involve pre-Oedipal semiotic functions and energy 
discharges th a t connect and orient the body to the mother." I t is the opposite 
of Symbolic meaning, a period where the bond between the child and the 
mother is experienced through infantile babbling and jabbering and non-sense 
baby talk before the regulation of the paternal Symbolic through the child’s 
acquisition of language. Kristeva associates her "semiotic" to Lacan’s 
Imaginary, the stage prior to the Symbolic. For Kristeva, the Lacanian 
"phallus," the supreme signifier in the Symbolic, "totalizes the effects of 
signifieds" and dominates human society in language. But the Semiotic, for 
Kristeva, precedes the Symbolic, and the mother’s body, associated with the
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Semiotic or the Imaginary, is "what mediates the symbolic law organizing 
social relations and becomes the ordering principle of the semiotic chora."97
As the hum an subject participates in  language, the Symbolic apparatus 
disorients it  from its flows of instinctual or libidinal drives and shoves them 
into repression. This way, the Symbolic functions to hold the "social I" or the 
subject in  perpetuation, and the subject’s alignment to appropriate gender 
roles is one of the aspects of subjection and fits right into traditional gender 
stereotypes. From now on, the child, through language acquisition, 
differentiates in  its sexual roles and acquires a gender identity designed and 
imposed upon i t  by cultural codes. "A cultural code," Silverman states, "is a 
conceptual system which is organized around key oppositions and equations, 
in  which each term is aligned with a cluster of symbolic attributes." For 
example, in the case of "men" and "women," those symbolic attributes are 
most likely to be dispersed around the dichotomy between "rational," "firm," 
"strong" and "emotional," "pliant," "weak."98 The eighteenth century sees an 
abundant manifestation of the public voice about such gender distinctions in 
its literature. Nussbaum notes John Hill’s acknowledgement of the cultural 
gender codes in  On the Management and Education of Children (1754): "Boys 
run , girls walk; boys swim in  the pond, girls wash in their chamber. Much 
attention is directed toward the protection of girl’s pale and delicate 
complexions, and natural and symmetrical shape." Nussbaum points out tha t 
eighteenth-century male ideologies also work to m aintain the status quo, for
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women "were encouraged to accept public perceptions as the ir ‘character,’" 
and  "discouraged from ‘knowing’ th e ir own character or recognizing the ir 
intelligence" because to "know" one’s character is to th rea ten  "the possibility 
of m aintaining the  heterosexual gender system." Besides m ale w riters, women 
novelists in the eighteenth century too, according to Spacks, "define a  heroine 
by h er w eakness, showing how weakness and passivity become social 
resources," and she has identified the  gender differentiation of the period 
along the lines of Edm und Burke’s distinction between the beautiful and the 
sublime. The beautiful is associated w ith the  fair sex ("smallness, delicacy, 
curving lines") while the sublime w ith the authority  of a  fa ther and of God 
("fortitude, justice, wisdom"). N ot only is personality gendered b u t formal 
features such as fictional endings are  supposed to be male/female distinctive. 
Following Nancy K. Miller’s argum ent about gendered plots and stories in 
fiction, Schofield sorts out those two kinds of endings in  eighteenth-century 
fiction. She contends th a t  "male w riters tend  to favor ‘happy,’ whitewashed, 
patriarchally  approved endings, w hereas female w riters subvert happy, 
satisfying closures and instead  present unfulfilling, nagging, worrisome, 
tragic endings th a t  underscore the sense of separateness in  which women 
exist and  write."99
Similarly, Roxana’s role in  the first p a r t of the novel is gender 
distinctive, pertain ing  to the public voice of the self defined by male ideology. 
Before tu rn ing  into an  independent she-devil, Roxana is fixed in the grips of
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the cultural gender codes as th e  (female) other of the (male) self:100 an ideal 
woman in  her youth, a  caring m other in  her first m arriage, and m en’s 
dependent commodity in  her in itial career as a whore. F irst, Roxana starts  
out to be w hat Defoe and his contemporaries would call an  ideal woman. 
"Sharp as a H aw k in  M atters of com m on  Knowledge; quick and sm art in 
Discourse..., BOLD, tho* perfectly Modest" in  deportm ent, Roxana sings 
beautifully and dances "naturally" and "wanted neither Wit, Beauty, nor 
Money..., having all the Advantages th a t any Young Woman cou’d desire."101 
This description of Roxana when she is fourteen covers alm ost everything 
Defoe said about an  ideal woman nearly th irty  years earlier in  his 1697 
proposal for "an Academy for Women." One m ust not m istake Defoe’s idea of 
an  ideal woman in  th a t pam phlet, however, as fem inist in  natu re . Although 
Defoe is an  advocate for a women’s college and believes th a t  "the Capacities 
of Women are  suppos’d to be greater, and th e ir  Senses quicker than  those of 
the Men," he does perceive women from a  "male gaze" and proposes th a t "the 
Ladies m ight have all the Freedom in the World w ithin the ir own Walls and 
yet no Intriguing, no Indecencies, nor Scandalous Affairs happen; and in 
order to th is, the following Customs and Laws shou’d be observ’d  in  the 
colleges...." We know w hat women’s "Freedom" m eans w ithin  the ir own walls 
and  under customs and law s. Besides, the purpose of educating women for 
Defoe in  th a t  proposal is  "to breed them  up to be suitable and serviceable." 
for he argues "not th a t I am  for exalting the Female Government in  the least:
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But, in  short, I  wou’d have Men take Women for Companions, and educate 
them  to be fit for i t ." Defoe even satirizes women for the ir inability to govern 
in  a  fictional female take-over of the government depicted in  his Review.102
Roxana’s gender distinctions also m anifest in her role as a caring 
m other early in  the novel. After the Brewer, her first husband, abandons her 
and her five children, Roxana, driven by necessity, has to give up the children 
to her relatives, but she shows a  good image as a caring mother and says "if 
I had bu t one Child, or two Children, I  would have done my Endeavour to 
have work’d for them  w ith my Needle" (15). No luck with the relatives and 
when she is told to take her children into "the Parish keeping," her response 
fu rther reinforces the caring mother figure. "A hundred terrible things came 
into Thoughts; viz. of Parish-Children being S tarv’d a t  Nurse; of their being 
ru in ’d, le t grow crooked, lam ’d, and the like, for w ant of being taken care of; 
and  this sank my very H eart within me" (19). The la s t thing she would do at 
th is moment, she makes us believe, is to part with her children. B ut she tells 
the reader th a t she is definitely in  a difficult situation with them. "When I 
consider’d they m ust inevitably be Starv’d, and I too, if  I continued to keep 
them  about me, I began to be reconcil’d to parting  with them  all, any how and 
any where, th a t I m ight be freed from the dreadful Necessity of seeing them 
all perish, and perishing with them  m yself' (19). She is desperate and ready 
to grasp anything for a  life-saver. But she makes i t  perfectly clear th a t she 
does not w ant to harm  her own "Flesh and Blood."
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Besides being an ideal woman and a caring m other from the outset, 
being held in  place by male ideologies, Roxana is also a  dependent commodity 
in  men’s possession in  the early p art of her career as a mistress. The notion 
of women as commodities is not a new one. For Marx and Engels, "the 
bourgeois sees in his wife a mere instrum ent of production." This is the fate 
not only for women; in  fact, everyone in  capitalist societies, for Marx, 
confronts this same dehumanizing dilemma. Georg Lukacs extends M arx’s 
idea of objectifying the social character of m en’s labor into a concept of 
"reification" (or "thingification"), a process in  which a  person is transformed 
into a thing. For Lukacs, the capitalist society, through its ideologies, conceals 
the social relations of men w ith each other, which "appear as things and the 
relations of things with each other."103 Also interesting are Langbauer’s 
comments on critical readings of the female body or prostitution as a 
m etaphor for the conditions of women’s reality. Langbauer m aintains th a t 
sexuality in  whoring, which is "relocated in  term s of brute m aterialism  and 
economics—the violence done to the body of the prostitute, the money paid 
her," becomes in  some critics* readings "a crucial m etaphor for the treatm ent 
of women in  general."104
The alignm ent of the m ateriality of the female body with her 
dehum anizing m aterial conditions is relevant here for Roxana, who, through 
her self-commodification as a whore, participates in  m an’s desire a t  the price 
of her own and "solidifies her bondage to the patriarchal system."105 The
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power to reify is first retained in the hands of a male in this p a rt of the novel. 
Reification of woman's body as a commodity by men finds its way into 
Roxana’s liaisons with the Jeweller and the Prince th a t all s ta rt out as 
financial transactions to the male’s advantage, unlike her la ter romance with 
the M erchant. Ju s t as Moll Flanders, who gets five guineas from the elder 
brother of the Colchester family for his initial "assault" on her, Roxana 
receives somewhat the same treatm ent from the Jeweller, her landlord. "After 
kissing me twenty times, or thereabouts, [the Jeweller] put a  Guinea into my 
Hand; which, he said, was for my present Supply, and told me, th a t he would 
see me again, before 'twas out" (31). Reification lies in  Roxana’s body as a 
commodity th a t the Jeweller can purchase. He can win her over with money 
and la te r with the house (rent-free) and the furniture in  it. Roxana’s body is 
reified in  the form of a "product" and is ju s t another thing th a t the Jeweller 
can buy w ith money. The money th a t he pays her is deceitfully m eant to be 
a token of love or kindness while the relationship is not so sacred and pure 
a t all, for Roxana throws Amy, her maid, into the Jeweller’s bed, which is a 
confession of whoredom th a t the Jeweller accepts by complying. The female 
body, money, love, and kindness are objects th a t all depend on the male 
dominated society for identification and realization. Roxana is certainly aware 
of herself as such a reified object having been made by a  man, for she tells 
us: "he had made me w hat I was, and p u t me into a Way to be even more 
than  I ever was, namely, to live happy and pleas’d, and on his Bounty I
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depended” (35). Roxana, the person both in  her present and in her perceivable 
future, and her gratitude for his love and kindness are all peripheral around 
the center of "his Bounty," around the center of reification of herself.
The French Prince’s money also turns Roxana’s body into an object of 
reification, consolidating the relationship between the male self and the 
female other, but this relationship deteriorates as Roxana draws close to her 
next phase, to the maternal chora. Her affair with the Prince begins with "a 
Black Box ty d  with a Scarlet Ribband, and seal’d with a noble Coat of Arms" 
delivered by the Prince’s gentleman. "There was in it a Grant from his 
Highness...with a W arrant to his Banker to pay me two Thousand Livres a 
Year, during my Stay in Paris" (60). Of course, Roxana, as the inferior other 
should, receives the royal gift "with great Submission, and Expressions of 
being infinitely oblig’d to his Master, and of my showing myself on all 
Occasions, his Highness’s most obedient Servant" (60). Roxana at this stage 
as a reified object of the male is not as passive as when she is with the 
Jeweller. I t turns out tha t she somehow has managed to tu rn  the Prince’s 
process of reifying her into an act of her own artful control. After she grants 
the Prince the ultimate favor, Roxana tells us, "he gave me Leave to use as 
much Freedom with him, another Way, and tha t was, to have every thing of 
him I thought fit to command" (66). Money, love, and sex are still changing 
hands in favor of the male as the agent who desires the female body. 
Although she cannot yet reverse the process of reification and thus disrupt
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the gender codes by purchasing a man’s labor, as she will la ter try to do to 
her Merchant, Roxana can now objectify herself as a commodity in the male 
gaze a t her own artful command. She does not m ature as a more skillful and 
more demanding whore aiming a t greater material gain; she simply 
progresses onto the road of becoming a character of the maternal chora and 
later an epitome of the degenderization of man in the novel.
5.2. Lacanian "Imaginary" and the Reversal of Gender
The Lacanian Imaginary "mirror stage" or the Kristevan Semiotic 
maternal chora as a reversal of the paternal order in subverting the paternal 
Symbolic meaning characterizes Roxana’s second phase in the novel- 
disruptions of the paternal cultural codes. Defoe’s fictional characters suffer 
immensely from fear, real or imaginary, a t some stage in their lives. The fear 
th a t Robinson Crusoe and Roxana suffer in his surprising discovery of the 
footprint and in her excruciating confrontation with the Jew has striking 
similarities in  relation to the Lacanian Imaginary. Crusoe tells the reader 
about a "new Scene" of his island life: "I was exceedingly surpriz’d with the 
Print of a Man’s naked Foot on the Shore, which was very plain to be seen in 
the Sand." While a rational human being would, in David Hume’s view, 
logically conclude tha t the other print may have been "effaced by the rolling 
of the sands or inundation of the waters," the sight of this single footprint
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takes Crusoe’s reason away. "I stood like one Thunder-struck, or as if  I had 
seen an  Apparition."106 Homer O. Brown’s reading of th is scene illum inates 
the possibility of linking Crusoe’s discovery to the Lacanian "mirror stage." 
About the  possible causes of the  m ysterious footprint, Brown argues, Crusoe’s 
"speculations-the chimera, his own foot, his own shadow, an  evil conscience, 
the curious ability to see him self as another would see him —am ount to a 
confusion between the self and the other." For Brown, fear of the other 
determ ines "the need for concealment" of the iden tity  of Defoe’s narra to rs in 
relation to the ir play of names. He also contends th a t "unable to accept the 
given definition of himself, the will and legacy of h is father, the world of law, 
Robinson experiences him self as incomplete and searches m istakenly for 
completion in  the world outside."107 However, Brown never explicitly connects 
the confusion of the self and the other to the Lacanian "mirror stage"; he 
never looks a t the footprint as the Lacanian "mirror" im age of the self as an 
incomplete subject after the sexual division. The other p a rt (the other 
footprint) is perm anently missing. F irst, Brown’s idea of "allurem ent of the 
world offering some form of completion to the self' can never happen in 
Lacan’s notion of the hum an subject after the  "lack." The self rem ains 
incomplete since i t  cannot find completeness or unity  w ith the missing 
component of the  sexual androgyny or the original whole of the primordial 
being from which the gendered subject is derived. Even heterosexual union 
and procreation, which Silverman considers to be the "only resolution to the
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loss Buffered by the subject as the consequence of sexual division," are far 
from possible for Crusoe on his island because there is no sex whatsoever 
involved in  his wandering life in  the outside world, for women, W att points 
out, have only the economic, not the sexual, role to play in  the novel.108 
Second, i t  can be argued th a t the footprint symbolizes the "mirror" image or 
Crusoe’s own "Shadow" and thus reflects the self in  the Imaginary. The 
obscure difference between the self and the other also applies. Crusoe can 
hardly distinguish the self and the other, which, as he speculates, can be the 
"Shadow" of him self or the other things th a t he thinks may be the work of his 
own imagination.
In sim ilar fashion, Roxana and the Jew  confront each other w ith the
same sort of fear th a t highlights Crusoe’s scene of m ystery and horror. This
confrontation in  Roxana indicates the beginning of the heroine’s private voice
and her reversal of the Lacanian model from the Symbolic in the first p a rt of
the novel to the Im aginary in  the second part. When the M erchant decides to
help Roxana w ith the transferral of her estate to a London bank and asks the
Jew  to appraise her jewels, the scene goes as follows:
As soon as the Jew  saw the Jewels, he falls a  jabbering in 
Dutch, or Portuguese, to the M erchant, and I could presently 
perceive th a t they were in  some great Surprize, both of them; 
the Jew  held up his Hands, look’d a t me w ith some Horror, then 
ta lk ’d Dutch again, and pu t him self into a  thousand Shapes, 
tw isting his Body, and wringing up  his Face th is way, and th a t 
Way, in  his Discourse; stam ping with his Feet, and throwing 
abroad his Hands, as if  he was not in a Rage only, b u t in a meer 
Fury; then  he wou’d turn , and give a Look a t me, like the Devil; 
I thought I never saw anything so frightful in my life. (112-3)
160
Note th a t the Jew’s body gesture and jabbering in a language 
incomprehensible to Roxana approximate the semiotic rhythm  between the 
in fan t and its  m other in  the m aternal chora. Here the self confronts the other 
for the first time. The self and the other in  this scene work both ways and 
reflect each other as the devil, ju s t as Crusoe thinks th a t he has seen "an 
Apparition" in  his other, the footprint. The self can first be the Jew, for he 
looks a t  Roxana "with some Horror" as though he envisioned the devil, while 
th is devil may ju s t be a "mirror" image (Roxana’s face) or the other th a t 
reflects the self (the Jew) who is looking into the "mirror." The self can also 
be Roxana, who tells us th a t "I thought I never saw anything so frightful in 
my life." She may have ju s t seen, in  the Jew ’s face, in  the "mirror" image, or 
in  the other, a  reflection of herself who is ju s t as terrifying to the Jew as he 
is to her. This blurring and horrible self in  the Semiotic or the Imaginary 
makes the reversal of the Lacanian model possible in  the novel w ith one 
differentiation: Roxana fears and abhors the other and refuses to identify 
w ith it, while the other in  the Lacanian "mirror" is always "a pleasing unity" 
th a t the narcissistic self finds and something w ith which the ego can 
identify.109 Lacan’s self moves from the Im aginary to the Symbolic in  the 
sense th a t the self is held as the gendered subject in  language or the male 
symbolic order. Accordingly, Crusoe finally tu rns into the symbolic order 
"through the desire of the other" by recognizing the authority of the F ather 
and accepting the divine power after his isolation and alienation on the
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island. Roxana, however, establishes a  reversal of the Lacanian model by 
inverting the gender codes and defying the (male) divine power, which can be 
characterized as the initiation of the m aternal chora or the disruption of the 
m eaning of the (male) Symbolic. Roxana, a t  this point, is like a true feminist 
w ith a  private voice hailed by Helene Cixous, who calls for a  re tu rn  of the 
repressed of the paternal culture by "breaking the codes th a t negate her."110
The disruption of cultural codes begins with the reversed role th a t a 
diabolical m istress plays in the male-dominated society. In  th is m aternal 
chora, the gender stereotypes have their opposite boundaries, and Roxana is 
no longer weak, dependent, and sentim ental. In  a word, she is not fixed in  a 
space in which the male would like to visualize her. R ather than  being a 
feminine prey to men in  the paternal order, Roxana undergoes a 
metamorphosis and occupies a power zone th a t is generally reserved for men. 
She becomes an  evil woman, a victimizer who is empowered w ith masculine 
qualities such as reason and the ability to govern and is able to pose a th rea t 
to patriarchy by w hat Backscheider would say "feminizing" and weakening 
the male and robbing him of his reason and will.111 First, Roxana is no longer 
depicted in th is second phase as an  affectionate m other when she is fixed in 
the Symbolic. For one thing, the M erchant rightly accuses her of having no 
"common Affection of a Mother" because she decides to "ruin" her baby she 
has from the M erchant and to bear i t  out of wedlock. Also, Roxana herself 
tells the reader, "I wou’d willingly have given ten  Thousand Pounds of my
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Money, to have been rid of the Burthen I had in  my Belly" (163). One can see 
no trace of a  caring m other figure left in  her.
Second, in  contrast to her early career, Roxana’s position with a man 
in  th is m aternal chora has been reversed. While the Jeweller and the Prince 
reify her body with the money they pay for her sexual services, Roxana is in 
a position to reify the M erchant’s labor, when she m akes a financial offer to 
the M erchant, for rescuing her out of the disaster with the Jew  in Paris: "If 
he w anted Money, I would le t him have any Sum for his Occasion, as far as 
five or six thousand Pistoles" (141). Of course the M erchant refuses the 
money because he has something else in  mind. Thus, the focus is once again 
switched to the issue of sex. I t tu rn s  out to be no less dehumanizing for the 
M erchant. The reversed roles of both sexes are clear here in this love affair. 
The M erchant succumbs to Roxana’s charm  and is feminized and weakened. 
Toppling from male power, he is actually begging her to throw him a bone 
and pleading "since you have been so kind as to take me to your Bed, why 
will you not make me your Own, and take me for good-and-all?" (145), 
whereas Roxana reasons to herself th a t "to resist a Man, is to act with 
Courage and Vigour" (152). Roxana has thw arted the M erchant’s plan to 
m arry her through sleeping w ith her first. Although Roxana used to be 
dehumanized by the Jew eller and the Prince, righ t now she tu rns the table 
around and is dehumanizing the M erchant and reifying his labor. Sex, though 
still a  reifying act here, is no longer a game in  which the male calls the shots,
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no longer a game played to the male’s advantage. Roxana designs the sexual 
encounter to "balance accounts," which is more than  the money Roxana has 
proposed to repay the M erchant in reifying his labor. "The Favour of Lying 
with a Whore," says Roxana, is equal to "all the Debt I ow’d him for saving 
my Life, and all my Effects" (144). Dehumanization on the M erchant’s p a rt 
lies in  Roxana’s question: "Where is the Man th a t cares to m arry a Whore, 
tho’ of his own making?" (145) and in her upsetting his plan: "his Project of 
coming to-Bed to me, was a Bite upon himself, while he intended it for a Bite 
upon me" (144). For the M erchant, to plot such a scheme in order to 
consummate a m arriage is dehumanizing enough, and to fail in the scheme 
is even more shameful.112
Moreover, apart from the fact th a t Roxana is endowed with such male 
strength as "subtle reasoning" and reasoning strongly on her argument about 
matrimony as the M erchant has more than  once acknowledged, she is also an 
antithesis to the idea of women’s inability to govern. The Dutch Merchant, in 
his public voice, is perhaps referring to th a t gender stereotype depicted in 
Defoe’s Review, for he warns Roxana th a t women are not capable of 
m anaging estates; "their Heads were not tu rn ’d for it, and they had better 
choose a Person capable, and honest, th a t knew how to do them Justice...; 
then the Trouble was all taken off their Hands" (153). However, Roxana’s 
private voice disapproves him immediately. "It was a dear Way of purchasing 
their Ease;" says she, "for very often when the Trouble was taken off their
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Hands, so was their Money too; and th a t I thought it was far safer for the 
Sex not to be afraid of the Trouble, but to be really afraid of their Money" 
(153), and she has proved her point. Roxana rebels against traditional female 
financial disabilities by "her shrewd investment and financial management 
as a ‘she-merchant.’"113 Having left Paris, Roxana bids a farewell to her old 
days as "a Lady of Pleasure" and welcomes the advent of "a Woman of 
Business" (131). With her experience of having successfully handled bills and 
dealt w ith jewelers and bankers, Roxana is confident to say th a t "by 
managing my Business thus myself, and having large Sums to do with, I 
became as expert in  it, as any She-Merchant of them  all" (131). Besides her 
lengthy descriptions about how she has secured her transferred estate in 
Holland, Roxana’s business with Sir Robert Clayton in London gives the 
reader a picture of a woman who is in control of her own estate while keeping 
her eyes open to advice. Sir Robert advises Roxana to stow away 1000 pounds 
as a long-term C.D. so th a t the am ount will double in  ten years (167). About 
this handsome financial proposal, Roxana first tells him th a t she has not 
been completely sold to the idea of long-term banking. She complains to him, 
"you are contriving how to make me a rich Old Woman, but th a t won’t  
answer my End; I had ra ther have 20,000 1. now than  60,000 1. when I am 
fifty Year old" (168). She does not w ant to invest so much in banking, so 
when she accepts the offer, she shows her businessman-like restrain t and 
caution by cutting down the lay-up to seven hundred pounds a year. Roxana
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does show a little of her management in terms of accepting sound financial 
judgm ent and modifying expert opinion.
Roxana’s banking business is only part of her means to make money. 
If  this avenue involves the help of a man like Sir Robert, her career as a 
courtesan is solely done on her own. The la ter married Roxana for one time 
compares herself in her past life of crime to "a Passenger coming back from 
the Indies.... after many Years Fatigues and Hurry in Business," and this, 
interestingly enough, parallels to and equates the Merchant’s "all the 
Fatigues of so many Years Hurry and Business" (243-4). Lois A. Chaber notes 
th a t Moll Flanders has escaped from "the feminine cycle of reproduction into 
the historical social cycle of production," and Carol Houlihan Flynn has 
studied the infamous body economy in  Roxana as a struggle against 
m ateriality.114 Like Moll, Roxana devotes herself to a business th a t also 
involves a social cycle of production, a business of whoredom and of a body 
economy. While Chaber considers an unwed mother like Moll as the producer 
(of babies) and the governess as the capitalistic entrepreneur, both the 
producer (the female body) and the entrepreneur (the pimp) are incorporated 
in Roxana herself. The physical Roxana (her body) is the producer of sexual 
gratification, the "product" purchased by the consumer (the whoremaster), 
who is brought to the site of production by the marketing Roxana, the 
capitalistic entrepreneur. Moreover, like Flynn’s Roxana who presents her 
body for a material gain, "to overcome a fundamental fear of bodily needs,"
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both the producer and the  businesswom an (here all in one) also profit 
financially from the  body; in  some cases, the producer Oike John  Cleland’s 
F anny  Hill) also shares the pleasure and th u s splits the "product" for which 
the  consumer pays. However, Roxana here in  the second phase is not a t a 
stage, where, as F lynn contends, she has to "feign compliance and 
submission" in  order to m aintain  independence. Flynn exam ines how Defoe 
"creates characters driven by desire and necessity to express themselves 
through bodies th a t eventually betray." The presen t study, by contrast, is 
more concerned about the way the body works for the fem inist Roxana.
While S ir Robert helps Roxana w ith  her bank  investm ent, which 
eventually am ounts to 2,000 pounds la te r on, her "Principal" (35,000 pounds) 
comes from the m ain industry  which is kep t back from S ir Robert w ithout 
any  of hiB assistance. "He applauded my Way of m anaging my Money, and 
told me, I  shou’d soon be m onstrous rich; b u t he neither knew, nor 
m istrusted , th a t w ith all th is W ealth, I  was yet a Whore, and  w as not averse 
to adding to my E sta te  a t  the fa rth e r Expense of my Virtue" (171). The 
reason why Roxana is "not averse to" continuing h er reliance on whoring as 
h e r m ain stock is th a t  it  is the only way th a t answers h er end without any 
help from or jo in t venture with a m an like S ir Robert, for she is both the 
producer and the businesswoman. T hat is why she does not w ant to totally 
depend on S ir Robert; th a t  is  why she rejects even the trustw orthy and 
shrewd S ir Robert’s idea of m arrying a  well-to-do m erchant he introduces to
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her, hoping to increase her wealth, not to mention h er earlier refusal of the 
M erchant’s proposal for matrimony. The sole rationale behind all her 
m arriage refusals, a  point th a t she has so painstakingly tried  to establish in 
the novel, is obviously to m aintain her financial independence, for she asserts 
th a t "a M istress m akes the Saying tine , th a t w hat a M an has, is hers, and 
w hat she has, is her own" (132). Or i t  is even more than  tha t, to prove her 
argum ent th a t "a Woman was as fit to govern and enjoy her own Estate, 
w ithout a Man, as a Man was, w ithout a Woman" (149), and she really is 
such a woman.
Finally, Roxana’s repudiation of cultural codes in  the m aternal chora 
resides in  her denial of the (male) divine order. In  contrast to Robinson 
Crusoe, who evolves from the Im aginary into the Symbolic "through the 
desire of the other" in  his recognition of God’s p lan  and his religious 
conversion, Roxana rejects th a t Symbolic and openly disobeys the power of 
God in  her m aternal chora. Defoe in  his early years was surely educated in 
Calvinistic principles, and in  m any of his conduct books he adhered to those 
values. However, i t  is not surprising th a t Defoe, other th an  dealing with 
accepted ideas in  his fiction, may develop a  different voice in  it. Such a voice 
tends to be dissonant from the public voice in  his nonfiction. Many critics 
have identified Defoe’s private voice about religion in  his novels. W att points 
out th a t  impotence of religion or secularization and de-horrification of 
Calvinist notions of physical labor contribute a  g reat deal to individualism in
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Robinson Crusoe. In  contrast to J . Paul H unter’s linking Crusoe’s "original 
sin" to stories of Jonah and the prodigal son, (which "were frequently used as 
exemplar by the P uritan  preachers to w arn against restlessness, filial 
disobedience, and failure to follow one’s calling"), Leopold Damrosch argues 
th a t "Defoe’s story curiously fails to sustain the m otif of the  prodigal."115 In 
sim ilar m anner, Roxana rejects the divine power when it  comes to the laws 
of matrimony.
Once again as the voice of reason, and public opinion, the  M erchant 
presents to Roxana the traditional views of matrim ony after hearing her 
lengthy infamous argum ent about the difference between a wife and a whore. 
"He first hinted, th a t M arriage was decreed by Heaven; th a t i t  was the fix’d 
S tate of Life, which God had appointed for M an’s Felicity" (151). The 
M erchant’s rem arks surely echo Defoe’s idea of matrimony in  his Conjugal 
Lewdness (1727), where Defoe defines m atrim ony as "GOD’s holy 
Ordinance."116 But Defoe’s private voice is different in  fiction from his public 
voice in  non-fiction. Declining to m arry and determined to give b irth  to the 
baby out of wedlock, Roxana renounces the laws of matrimony and says "I 
cou’d not reconcile my Judgm ent to Marriage" because, as she argues with 
the M erchant, "the Laws of M atrimony puts the Power into your Hands; bids 
you do it; commands you to command; and binds me, forsooth, to obey" (151). 
Roxana’s rem arks here are a harsh  criticism of the eighteenth century 
m atrim onial law  th a t has troubled her, which puts a  woman in  a financially
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and social inferior position, for in  the early century, once a woman "entered 
into m arriage her husband had legal rights to any real or personal property 
th a t she owned."117 W hat is im portant here is th a t Roxana implies injustice 
in  w hat the M erchant deems as the sacred laws of matrimony. Not only is it 
the male subject in  a husband th a t Roxana w ants to reject, bu t also the 
(male) divine power th a t she disobeys. T hat is why the M erchant w arns her 
against blasphemy. "You restra in  yourself from th a t Liberty, which God and 
N ature has directed you to take; and, to supply the Deficiency, propose a 
Vicious liberty" is "neither honourable nor religious" (157). But Roxana 
insists on doing i t  in  spite of his religion.
Furtherm ore, the divine power, according to Spacks, is the ultim ate 
extension of the father’s authority, power, and terror. The supreme power, 
which bestows the power of the patom al, belongs to His paternal nature. This 
paternal connection between God and man, Spacks finds i t  in  Burke’s notion 
of sublimity, which is "an essentially ‘masculine’ quality, associated w ith ‘the 
authority  of a father.’" This paternal bond between the divine and the human 
perfectly corresponds to the Calvinist doctrine th a t m an was created in  His 
own image, for John Calvin believes th a t m an is "the m ost noble and most 
excellent masterpiece, in whom the justice, wisdom, and goodness of God 
appears."118 The paternal figure in  the image of God, for instance, is no 
stranger to Defoe’s Captain Singleton. He reveres William the Quaker and 
calls him  "my Ghostly Father." The title rightly suits him, as discussed in
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Chapter 3. Besides William’s foresight and prophetic power in  his dream 
about meeting with Captain Avery, he has for many times saved Singleton 
from disasters; one among them is the narrow escape (Singleton thinks i t  is 
God’s deliverance) from the Island of Ceylon where the savages try  to entice 
Singleton and the crew to come ashore, a would-be catastrophe for Singleton. 
Also as Chapter 3 indicates, Roxana takes her M erchant as such a male 
incarnation of the supreme power. After the Merchant, who she la ter thinks 
is a prophet and has more than  hum an knowledge (160), has helped her 
through the Jew’s attem pted blackmail, Roxana tells the reader: "Had I had 
any Religion, or any Sense of a Supreme Power managing, directing, and 
governing in  both Causes and Events in this World, such a Case as this wou’d 
have given any-body room to have been very thankful to the Power who had 
not only pu t such a Treasure into my Hand, but given me such an  Escape 
from the Ruin th a t threaten’d me" (121). Had Roxana any sense of the 
"managing, directing, and governing" God, she would in terpret the message 
as a reward, not punishment, by the supreme power for all her "mischiefs," 
quite opposite to the standard religious revelation. Even worse than  that, 
Roxana juxtaposes the supreme power with the hum an power and shows her 
gratitude to the M erchant for her deliverance while she is aware tha t the 
religious creed ordains th a t power solely in  God. O ther than being 
unreligious, Roxana here ensures the paternal link between the divine and 
the hum an only to defy such paternal power in her m aternal chora.
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5.3. Roxana’s Androgyny and the Degenderization of Man
In the late seventeenth century, as David Blewett points out, "the idea 
th a t m utual affection was an essential ingredient in marriage emerged and 
prevailed" against the patriarchal idea of property trading. The idea of 
m utual affection is advocated in Defoe’s conduct books, where Defoe states 
th a t "the Matrimony Duty is all reciprocal" and th a t the union of the sexes 
is for "compleating their mutual Felicity."119 In  similar fashion, the Dutch 
Merchant, a representative of the public voice, tells Roxana about matrimony 
th a t "where there was a mutual Love, there cou’d be no Bondage; but tha t 
there was but one interest; one Aim; one Design; and all conspir’d to make 
both very happy" (149). Roxana’s marriage to the Merchant, however, 
complicates such an ideal. The marriage is not a symbol of m utual affection; 
the discussion about Roxana’s feigned obedience in  Chapter 3 proves that. If 
Roxana as a whore in  the second phase, in the maternal chora, poses a threat 
to patriarchy, the married Roxana is no longer such a figure in the last part 
of the novel. Roxana knows tha t she cannot solve the problem of injustice in 
gender hierarchies by sustaining the terrifying Medusa’s face to men as an 
evil woman, perpetuating the maternal chora and reversing the gender roles, 
preserving "herstory" in place of "history," or subsuming the other sex under 
dominance.120 It is also far from tru th  th a t Roxana in marrying the Merchant
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retu rns to the proper sphere for women designed by the paternal order—losing 
h e r identity , as W illiam Blackstone sees i t  in  Com m entaries on the Laws of 
England (1753): "By m arriage, the husband and wife are  one person in law: 
th a t is, the  very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during 
the  m arriage, or a t  least is  incorporated and consolidated into th a t of 
husband."121 Instead, Roxana departs from those ideologies and idealizes her 
man-womanhood. R ather th an  incorporating "the very being of woman" into 
th a t of husband, or vice versa, her aim  is tru ly  to carve u p  m en’s territory  of 
liberty, for she says "I knew no Reason the Men had  to engross the whole 
Liberty of the  Race" (171), and to claim her equal s ta tus in  it. In  so doing she 
ends up as an  androgynous "Man-Woman" who embodies the cultural 
a ttribu tes of both sexes as an interplay, deterritorializes the either/or 
th inking in  gender hierarchies, and degenderizes the hum an being.
While Roxana’s interplay between the  paternal and the m aternal is 
sim ilar to Langbauer’s discussion of the woman’s double role in  Mary 
Wollstonecraft, degenderization should be distinguished from such a  double 
role. Roxana, while engaging an  interplay, does not fall back into the 
Symbolic for a struggle for total control b u t is degenderized into the sexual 
androgyny sta te  of the  Lacanian triad . Such a  degenderization does not 
consist in  th e  reversed role of a woman, as in  Roxana’s m aternal chora, or in 
a re tu rn  to the paternal, bu t in  the heroine’s androgynousness th a t unifies 
both gender boundaries within one individual. According to Langbauer, the
m other in  Wollstonecraft’s novel The Wrongs of Woman (1798) is a ha lf man 
and carries out a double role, both outside and inside romance. Romance, 
"female" in  natu re (a patriarchy-designated sphere proper only to women) and 
an  inferior genre as the other of the novel, is derided ju s t as woman is in 
patriarchy. Langbauer regards romance as a  world of m aternal chora and 
outside the male order. She re-evaluates th is genre and gender subordination 
of romance and women as being excluded from the paternal power structure 
b u t re-inserts the dynamic force of genre and gender back into the paternal 
or the Symbolic to struggle for power in relation to the subject’s use of 
language. The m other in  Wollstonecraft, Langbauer writes, is both inside the 
K ristevan Symbolic (outside romance), a  phallic m other "in command of 
language even to speaking new term s for her own self-definition," and a t the 
sam e tim e outside i t  in  the m aternal chora (inside romance), "subverting the 
order and m eaning of language, partaking of the romance of the infantile and 
unutterable." This double role or the Kristevan interplay between the 
paternal and the m aternal is recognized in  M aria’s desire "to be a father, as 
well as a  mother." However, Langbauer’s half-m an woman, after the 
interaction between the paternal and the m aternal, progresses in  the 
direction of the Lacanian triad  not to the primordial sexual androgyny bu t 
back to the paternal Symbolic, for the double role, writes Langbauer, allows 
the woman w riter "to m ake sense—and nonsense-w ithin the paternal order." 
J u s t  as she tries to establish "the novel’s connections to the romance it
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rejects" in  positing th a t "women and romance also collapse back into the male 
order" (the novel) in  Charlotte Lennox’s The Female Quixote (1752), 
Langbauer has th ru s t the dynamic inteiplay between the paternal and the 
m aternal into the paternal order as a (female) subject’s power struggle within 
the  paternal Symbolic by using the subject’s power of representation through 
language. The fem inist power struggle w ithin the paternal Symbolic is the 
inevitable outcome of Langbauer’s genre and gender study, for she deems 
subordinating women and romance as patriarchal "local power" a t best but 
women’s "system of construction and representation" in the Symbolic as "total 
control."122 After the interplay between the Im aginary and the Symbolic, 
fem inist characters in Langbauer’s reading move in  one direction, b u t Roxana 
moves in  the other along the line of the Lacanian triad.
F irst, Roxana's m arriage to the M erchant stands a sharp contrast to 
Pam ela's to Mr. B., where Pam ela makes all efforts to reconcile w ith the 
family and to get accepted finally by Lady Davers, Mr. B.’s sister. Similar to 
Langbauer’s project, Richardson’s novel in  the first p a rt creates a Pam ela who 
obtains her social mobility through the subject’s use of discourse (the paternal 
Symbolic), through her le tte rs and the stories told in  them ,123 and her desire 
for reconciliation and acceptance in  the second p a rt secures her place in the 
paternal order. Roxana, however, does not m arry  the M erchant ju s t to move 
back into the paternal order bu t to m aintain her fem inist self-government 
and be a  m arried woman a t  the same time w ithout coming to term s with the
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laws of matrimony. She no longer wants to be a  "She-Devil" to men as she 
used to be in her m aternal chora, but she still preserves part of it  and 
borders on her past devilish independence (masculinity) and her past virtues 
as a wife and a  mother (femininity). She is both inside and outside a paternal 
institution like m arriage and becomes a subverting force to the either/or 
thinking in  gender studies, for to remain inside the paternal order or stays 
outside is to reinforce th a t distinctive thinking pattern or to reside in th a t 
gender "home." A M arried woman in traditional views, as Roxana says to the 
M erchant when she refuses to tie the knot with him in her m aternal chora, 
is "a meer Woman ever after, th a t is to say, a  Slave" (148). The m arried 
woman envisioned in patriarchy is only the other to her husband. W hat 
Roxana longs to become is an androgynous being, for she asserts, "I wou’d be 
a Man-Woman: for as I was bom  free, I wou’d die so" (171). Her m arriage to 
the M erchant epitomizes her ideal feminist vision of such an androgynous 
"Man-Woman" state.
By the time Roxana gets m arried again she is "pretty near Fifty, and 
too old to have any Children" (245). A woman already passing her child­
bearing age and no longer performing her physiological function as a woman 
participating in  the patriarchal reproduction cycle, Roxana tells her Merchant 
th a t she would like to offer what she has left with her--to "join Stocks" or 
combine the "two Pockets" with him. This is  because, she says, "he had offer’d 
and promis’d th a t I  shou’d keep all my own Estate in  my own Hands; yet,
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th a t since I had taken him, I wou’d e’en do as other honest Wives did, where 
I thought fit to give myself, I shou’d give what I  had too" (250). I t is mistaken 
to consider Roxana is surrendering control of her estate to the M erchant.124 
While she still clings to her idea of independence and reminds the Merchant 
of his early promise not to touch her estate, Roxana is aware of the 
consequences of marriage tha t she has chosen to enter into; th a t is, she is 
aware of w hat expectations a husband has for a woman who is already inside 
matrimony. The laws of matrimony enable the m an to take control of the 
woman’s possessions, but since she has achieved economic independence 
outside marriage, Roxana can manage to remain outside his control. Even 
before her proposal for mixing the "two Pockets," Roxana has already given 
the reader a sign of being both inside and outside the paternal order, for she 
has had about eight thousand pounds in reserve and has kept it  back from 
the Merchant, to provide for her two daughters (260). On the one hand, 
Roxana is not an  honest wife after all as she protests in w hat is la ter shown 
as her faked attem pt to join estates. Her cheating about the reserve reminds 
the reader of her wicked past, the demonic m aternal side of her th a t is 
frightening to the male. On the other hand, she is also attached to the heart 
of an  affectionate mother who worries about the fate of her two daughters 
(before the troublesome Susan turns up in her narrative), ju st as she is 
supposed to do as a caring mother when she is in the symbolic order in the 
first part of the novel.
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Judging from the Merchant's promise and his character, Roxana knows 
she will not have to "join Stocks," but her tongue-in-cheek proposal is not 
risk-free. As Roxana shows the Merchant all the mortgages and rents she 
owns, all laid down on the table for him to take, she says "I trembled every 
Joint of me" because for her "all this was acting." Thank goodness, the 
M erchant "look’d a t them a-while" and says "I will not touch them" (259). 
Roxana’s estate, the Merchant says as he has promised as one of the terms 
of marriage (244), is "for your own Use, and the Management wholly your 
own." Given the fact of Roxana’s "acting" and of her early equation of 
whoredom with business, the reader cannot miss the irony here when Roxana 
reasons to herself for not insisting on mixing her tinted money with the 
Merchant’s honest estate: "Shall my ill-got Wealth, the Product of Prosperous 
Lust, and of a vile and vicious Life of Whoredom and Adultery, be 
intermingled with the honest will-gotten Estate of this innocent 
Gentleman...?" Besides this pretension, Roxana also, as Spiro Peterson notes, 
uses "the machinery of the trust" th a t was sanctioned in the late seventeenth 
century by the courts of equity, to acknowledge her right denied by common 
law,125 by declaring to the Merchant, "All the Pretence I can have for the 
making-over my own Estate to me, is, th a t in Case of your Mortality, I may 
have i t  reserv’d for me, if  I outlive you" (259). No m atter w hat pretensions 
she puts on, Roxana has successfully struggled to stay outside the paternal 
grips of marriage while inside it. Paradoxically, she works within the order
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of m arriage while accepting no rules like a  free-woman m istress in  her 
m aternal chora, thus m aintaining her balance between the paternal and the 
m aternal and deterritorializing distinctive gender boundaries. Having now 
kept the "two Pockets" separated and preserved her righ t to govern her own 
estate, Roxana, out of her duty as a "good wife," asks the M erchant to save 
all his money and offers to use her own two thousand pounds a  year ready- 
money as the spending for "the m utual Subsistence of the Family" (259). As 
a  provider and an  independent woman, Roxana is also ap t to contribute to the 
paternal family; she is both a m arried woman subjugated to patriarchy and 
a m asculine "independent m istress" free to m anage her own estate.
Another indication of Roxana’s man-woman sta tus has to do with her 
relationship w ith Susan, her daughter, who is a reintroduction of Roxana’s 
past to h er peaceful m arried life. In response to the symbol of h er past, 
Roxana dem onstrates both her tender femininity and her evil masculinity 
th a t rejects such tenderness, revealing her degenderized identity  of a man- 
woman. F irst, for Roxana, the present represents her virtuous life as an 
"honest wife" and the past her life of wickedness as a  she-devil. Trying to 
prevent the M erchant’s "discovering, th a t he had in  his Arms a  She-Devil, 
whose whole Conversation for twenty-five Years had been black as Hell," 
Roxana tells the reader th a t "all the Satisfaction I could make him, was to 
live virtuously for the Time to come, not being able to retrieve w hat had been 
in Time past" (301). The she-devil in  her past m aternal chora has reversed
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h er gender role as a  female, b u t th a t masculine p ast always sneaks up on her 
so th a t she is ever locked in the past/present predicament, wandering 
between (masculine) wickedness and (feminine) virtuousness and embodying 
degenderization. H er dilemma with her past is clearly shown in her first 
decision for social apartness, which springs from her desire for breaking with 
her wicked past, "retiring from my old Acquaintances, and consequently from 
the vile abominable Trade I had driven so long" (207). She finds her "perfect 
Retreat" in  the Quaker’s country house. B ut the past keeps creeping back on 
her, and she says she is "like a  F ish out of Water" while having a  little peace 
and quiet in  the country (214). W hat Roxana misses is the "tenderest" 
M erchant who, she is sure, is still under her control after eleven years since 
they broke off in  Paris. "I flattered to myself, th a t i f  I  cou’d bu t see him I 
could yet M aster him" (214). Through her maid, Amy, who runs an  errand for 
h er in  Paris inquiring about all her past acquaintances-the Brewer her 
husband, the Jew, the Prince as well as the M erchant-all the bits and pieces 
of information about Roxana’s past, besides the "principal Errand" to find the 
M erchant, keep coming in, despite her initial desire for retirem ent. The 
interaction between the past and the present is a  never-ceasing process in her 
seclusion.
Since Roxana has experienced both her feminine role of subjection (in 
the Symbolic) and her masculine role of power (in the Semiotic) in the novel, 
the p as t can designate both of these gender attributes. Hence, the
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reintroduction of Susan complicates the mother’s reaction to her past. 
According to John Richetti, "Susan’s reappearance is the direct and ironic 
result of Roxana’s attem pt to return  to her ‘natural’ (i.e. institutional) past 
without losing her apartness from its implications and responsibilities." 
Richetti is interested here in Roland Barthes’ formulation of the social th a t 
is transformed into the natural. B ut Richetti’s notion of "a novelistic 
dialectic," in  Hegelian terms, is more relevant for the present scene. For 
Richetti, the "natural" (feminine) biologiral and psychological ties between 
Roxana and Susan can be regarded as the Hegelian thesis th a t has been 
negated by Roxana’s (masculine) "freedom a t the expense of social forms and 
institutions," th a t is, the antithesis. Roxana’s retu rn  to the "natural" past 
then justifies the Hegelian synthesis where both the self (thesis) and the 
other (antithesis) are incorporated--the re-establishm ent of the mother- 
daughter ties without sacrificing the negating freedom.126
Roxana’s degenderization or androgyny involves a synthesis of both her 
feminine "natural or biological destiny" (her virtuous feminine past) and her 
masculine negating freedom (her masculine evil past), instead of her mere 
re tu rn  to her feminine "institutional" past in which the male ideology 
allocates her. Such an  interaction between her feminine and masculine past 
resides in  the play of passion and judgment or emotionality and rationality 
in  the climax of the episode when she kisses Susan. Rather than  a  return  "to 
the only real identity women are granted, the natural or biological destiny
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contained in  the social forms of m arriage and the family," as Richetti 
m aintains, the emotional climax here indicates th a t Roxana embodies within 
herself both a desire for the re-establishment of w hat Schofield would call her 
"female emotionality" and a desire for masculine judgm ent.127 The eighteenth 
century was fascinated w ith such a gender distinction. H annah More in 
Essays on Various Subjects (1791), for example, writes th a t "one sex will 
th ink  it  betrays a w ant of feeling to be moderate in their applause, the other 
will be afraid of exposing a w ant of judgement by being in  raptures with any 
thing. —Men refuse to give way to the emotions they actually feel, while 
women sometimes affect to be transported beyond w hat the occasion will 
justify." The notion about lack of judgm ent in women, though rendered as 
m an's own making, is always on Defoe’s fancy. In  his Review. Defoe states 
th a t "we always thought the Women had the quickest and justest Notions of 
things a t first sight, tho* we have rob’d them  of the Judgment, bv denying 
them  earlv Instruction." Defoe’s contemporaries, such as the satirist and 
philosopher Bernard de Mandeville, also think along sim ilar lines. Lucinda, 
a fictional character in  Mandevill’s The Virgin Unmask’d (1707), admits tha t 
"a sound and penetrating judgement only belongs to man, as the m asters of 
reason and solid sense."128 One can identify a fusion of these gender 
distinctive qualities, passion and judgment, in Roxana as she kisses Susan. 
F irst, Roxana tells the reader, "it was secret inconceivable Pleasure to me 
when I kiss’d her, to know th a t I kiss’d my own Child; my own Flesh and
Blood, bom of my Body" (277). Roxana’s past femininity she has experienced 
in  the first part of the novel in the paternal Symbolic returns to her, and 
secret passion takes over her. The pleasure, the child, and her own flesh and 
blood and body all suggest the "institutional" past to which the patriarchal 
system intends to nail her by the ideology th a t conceives the family as her 
proper place in  society and her biological and psychological destiny with her 
daughter as the "natural" bond between women. However, Roxana does not 
return  to her "natural" past, for this part of her feminine past contradicts her 
masculine one th a t enables her to enjoy power. Her masculinity has to keep 
her femininity in secrecy and in balance. Her passion for Susan or her 
feminine "Disorder had almost discover'd itself," Roxana says, and "I rous’d 
up my Judgment, and shook it off' (277). Here Roxana employs her reason or 
judgment to control her passion and feelings towards Susan, feminine feelings 
balanced by masculine judgment, feminine feelings she has to entertain for 
the rest of her life. That is one of the reasons why she cannot approve of 
Amy’s proposal to m urder the troublesome wench.
The human being’s sexual androgyny is a homeless voice in Defoe’s 
fiction, for i t  has never been articulated in  the Western civilization until now 
in  critical theory, a t least not as articulated as it is in the phenomenon of the 
"berdache" in American Indian culture. A "berdache" is an American Indian 
boy raised up as a girl and has both male and female qualities. This is a 
natural phenomenon for American Indians because "the Great Spiritual
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Being" in  Indian  tribal religions is conceived as an  androgynous combination 
of both m ale and female.129 The closest thing to the degenderization of m an 
in  the  W estern civilization is perhaps in  John  Locke's political thinking. For 
Locke, m an  and woman have an  equal place in  the  eyes of God and therefore 
in  the ir political rights, b u t he never conceives m an as an  androgynous being 
in  gender term s. Placing an  em phasis on the  sole political righ t of the male 
is for Locke "half Reason." In his critique of Robert Film er’s argum ent for 
patriarchal monarchy "to confirm the N atural Right of Regal Power in  
P atriarcha. Locke w rites "I hope ’tis no Injury to call an  h a lf  Quotation an  
half  Reason, for God says, Honour thy  F ather and M other; b u t our Author 
contents him self with half, leaves out thv  M other quite, as little  serviceable 
to h is purpose." His stance is certainly not fem inist, for Locke resorts to a 
distinctive gender hierarchy in  the domestic life of family. Locke argues th a t 
i f  God gives "any Power to Adam, i t  can be only a  Conjugal Power, not 
Political, the Power th a t every H usband h a th  to  order the  things of private 
Concernm ent in  his Family." Locke also considers the husband as "a M aster 
of a F a m ily  with all these subordinate Relations of Wife. Children. Servants 
and  Slaves united under the Domestick Rule of a Family." Locke still w ants 
to preserve paternal authority. W hat he renounces is Film er’s analogy 
between the authority  of the king in  the sta te  and the authority  of the father 
in  the  family.130
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The homelessness of the voice also applies to an  implication of the 
degenderization of God as an  androgynous Being. The religious notion of m an 
created in  the image of God enables A lthusser to assert th a t while God’s 
people are subjects, God is the Subject: "the Subject needs to become a 
subject, as if  to show empirically, visibly to the eye, tangibly to the hands (see 
S t Thomas) of the subjects, th a t if  they are subjects, subjected to the Subject, 
th a t is solely in order th a t finally, on Judgem ent Day, they will re-enter the 
Lord’s Bosom, like Christ, i.e. re-enter the Subject." Inherently, both the male 
and the female subjects, for Althusser, will eventually "re-enter" the Body of 
the Subject on Judgm ent Day. Also Spacks has a sim ilar notion about the 
subjects as an  integral p a rt of the Subject in  her in teresting critical 
observation about the sentim ental novel after the middle of the eighteenth 
century. In  light of Adam Smith’s distinction between "soft power" and 
"stronger power" against Edmund Burke’s analogy between fathers’ authority 
over sons and the link of God to hum anity, Spacks argues th a t sentim ental 
novels of the period sometimes do not correspond to Burke’s elucidation. "If 
God reta ins the power of the father, He may assum e also attribu tes of the 
mother." Spacks notes in Henry Brooke’s novel The Fool of Quality (1766) this 
degenderizing aspect of God: the female "sunshine and gentle dews of his 
providence and benignity" in  contrast to his male "lightnings and thunders, 
his clouds and his tempests." Woman’s disguised form of soft power, for 
Spacks, is associated w ith God’s "sunshine and gentle dews."131 Although
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Spacks still th inks of the female as distinct from the male, her argum ent 
about God’s two sides of gender implies His androgynous qualities. Thus, the 
male He God should have the female She attached to Him  and be rewritten 
as a She/He God or with the She/He combined as a SHe God. Even if  there 
was no such th ing  as a SHe God, the degenderized hum an subjects, following 
A lthusser’s logic, would eventually re-enter the Subject and bring to It the 
she/he attribu tes on Judgm ent Day.
Unlike her denouncement of the (male) divine order in  her m aternal 
chora, Roxana’s a ttitude towards Providence undergoes a modification in  the 
la s t p a r t of the novel, and this modification also shows the homeless voice 
about a SHe God. Roxana no longer defies the male suprem e power; instead, 
she relies on her benign female God ("the sunshine and gentle dews") without 
denying the punishing male God (His "thunders" and "tempests"), a 
degenderization of the Supreme Subject in  whose image the hum an subject 
has been created. Calvinist apologists of Defoe’s tim e, who had exerted 
enormous influence on Defoe, justified God’s role as governor of the universe 
and of hum an affairs. Likewise, m any of Defoe’s fictional characters, a t some 
point in  the ir lives, sense the governing power of Providence. After Robinson 
Crusoe is driven by the violent storms to the island, he contemplates th a t "I 
had  great Reason to consider it  as a Determ ination of Heaven, th a t in this 
desolate Place, and  in  th is desolate M anner I should end my Life." Having 
been kidnapped to Virginia plantations by slave smugglers, Colonel Jack, too,
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believes "God had order’d every thing, the most Minute, and least Transaction 
of Life, insomuch, That not a  H air of our Heads shall fall to the Ground 
without his Permission."132 But Providence in Roxana works on the benign 
female side, providing Roxana with "soft power" to escape the "tempests" and 
the "lightnings" of the male side of the Supreme Subject tha t punishes evil. 
The omnipresent God who governs the least as well as the greatest affairs of 
men more than once has delivered Roxana from what would otherwise be 
disasters and the ruin of her in  the last part of the novel. First, before setting 
out for Holland by boat, the Captain invites Roxana and the Merchant to dine 
with his family on board the ship. That is the climax scene where Roxana and 
Susan confront each other. The last thing Roxana would see happen to her 
is Susan’s recognition of her a t tha t critical moment. Roxana tells the reader, 
"it is hardly possible for me to conceive what wou’d have been our P art in this 
Affair, had my woman Amy gone with me on-board this Ship; it  had certainly 
blown-up the whole Affair, and I m ust for-ever after have been this Girl’s 
Vassal" (280). Amy, who has been in charge of handling Roxana’s children 
and has m et with Susan before for many times, is luckily "not a t home when 
we accepted this Invitation, and so she was left out of the Company" (275). 
If  God’s "tempests" have arranged Susan coming out of nowhere to this 
meeting to ruin Roxana, His "sunshine and gentle dews" have reduced the 
punishment and prevented the key witness from being part of the company. 
Later on when Susan and the Captain’s wife barge into Roxana’s house to see
her, the benign God is on Roxana’s side again. "Had not the kind QUAKER, 
in  a lucky Moment, come running in before them, they had not only clapp’d 
in  upon me, in  the Parlour, as it  had been a surprise, but, which wou’d have 
been a thousand times worse, had seen Amv with me" (282). After Roxana 
separates from Amy and retreats to another abode unknown to Susan, the 
troublesome "Hound" somehow manages to find it and stops by for the last 
time, and Roxana has to sneak out of the back door and hide in the neighbor’s 
house. B ut "it was a very good Chance in the middle of a bad one, th a t my 
Husband had taken out the Coach tha t very Morning, and was on to London" 
(318), so the Merchant will not be able to know anything about it. Even the 
ending is vague about punishment for Roxana’s crime (see Chapter 3). I t says 
nothing about punishing her for her past wicked life as a whore. Roxana only 
savs the divine w rath falls on her for the m urder of Susan, which is obviously 
not her own doing. Time and time again God has forgiven Roxana whom the 
reader would see punished for poetic justice. "The Fortunate Mistress" finally 
m aintains her "Man-Woman" identity and disappears, so to speak, out of the 
last page of the novel into a distant no-home land.
EPILOGUE
A final word about the th ree "vocal" modes of in terpretation  in  the 
alternative M arxist approach. Since the public and private voices of the self 
a re  related to dom inant and radical ideologies, i t  is  im portan t to distinguish 
between the  ideologies th a t are dom inant and established and those th a t are 
no t in  a particu lar historical period, and  th is  distinction can be made by 
historical studies. Dom inant and  radical ideologies, for instance, can be 
distinguished by a historical study of th e  a ttitudes towards religion in the 
la tte r  h a lf  of the sixteenth century, which are related to the dom inant 
Calvinistic doctrines and a radical Epicurean revival. According to Epicurus’s 
principle of happiness, the gods will not bother to interfere w ith the affairs 
down below. "Now hum an happiness," Epicurus w rites, "consists of the 
absence of worry or, a t least, th is absence of worry is its  condition.... The 
same considerations apply to  the gods. I t is absurd, then , to im agine th a t the 
gods constantly concern themselves w ith the  governm ent of the universe and 
hum an affairs." In  refutation of this Epicurean revival, John  Calvin asks, "to 
w hat end serveth i t  to confesse as Epicure doth, th a t there is a  God which 
doth onely delight him self w ith idlenesse, having no care of the world?".133 
About the issue of religion in  Defoe’s day, one can also discern its  dominance 
over secular beliefs through evidence in  Defoe’s other works such as Religious 
Courtship. Conjugal Lewdness, his Review, etc. Especially in Religious
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Courtship, m arriage to an  atheist or a truly religious m an determ ines a 
woman’s fate of misery or happiness in life. Concerning the dom inant place 
of religion in  Defoe’s works and his time, critics like Backscheider, H unter, 
and S tarr, among others, have offered us convincing and stim ulating insights. 
As for the homeless voice of the self, it  indicates an obliteration of relations 
with Defoe’s ideology and historical ideas, although the present study 
exercises only p a rt of its implications, its over-lapping w ith the influence of 
the institutional discourse over the reader’s in terpretations of Defoe (e.g. 
deterritorialization, romantic irony, and feminist theory). I t would be 
senseless for any critic to suggest th a t he or she is an  "initiator of discursive 
practices" and has established a new paradigm of critical thinking. Critics 
may consciously depart from one paradigm  or another, to argue against the 
established notions in  a particular held, bu t their critical consciousness, as 
Said has noted, often fluctuates between "filiation" and "affiliation" or 
between different modes of the institutional discourse. Theoretically speaking, 
there is no way critics themselves would know they have reached the d istan t 
real th a t is shaped by the future reader’s interpretive paradigms, which is for 
the future critic to assess, and also theoretically speaking, the homeless voice 
of the self may exist outside the constraints of the "interpretive community," 
which characterizes the alternative nature of the current M arxist approach.
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(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 9, 22. Backscheider, "Defoe and 
the Geography of the Mind," Tennessee Studies in Literature 29 (1985): 52.
76. Daniel Defoe, The Fortunes and Misfortunes of the Famous Moll 
Flanders, ed. G. A. S tarr (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 190. All 
subsequent page references are to this edition.
77. Richetti. Defoe’s Narratives: Situations and Structures (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1975), 103-04, 96.
78. Ibid., 112, 113. Also see Ellen Poliak, "Moll Flanders. Incest, and the 
Structure of Exchange," The Eighteenth Century: Theory and Interpretation 
30,1 (1989): 16. For Poliak, the incest manifests Moll’s transgressiveness (in 
her quest for female power against the cultural gender codes) and its lim it (in 
her ultim ate repudiation of the incest). Moll’s transgressiveness can be looked 
a t as her de-creation of the moral self while her repudiation of the incest as 
her re-creation of the self in alignment with the cultural codes.
79. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970), 304, 311-2. Locke, Essays on the Law of 
Nature. I l l ,  119, 189. Also see John W. Yolton, Locke: An Introduction 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1985), 70-1. W. von Leyden, "John Locke and 
N atural Law," Philosophy 31 (1956): 25-6. S. B. Drury, "John Locke: Natural 
Law and Innate Ideas," Dialogue 19 (1980): 531. Novak, "Conscious Irony in 
Moll Flanders." 200-3. Novak, Defoe and the Nature of Man. 1-14. John Z. 
Zhang, "Defoe’s Moll Flanders." Explicator 47,3 (1989): 13. Robinson Crusoe 
certainly is aware of Locke’s theory of appropriation when he says "we enjoy 
ju s t as much as we can use, and no more" although "I possess’d infinitely 
more than I knew what to do with." Defoe, Robinson Crusoe. 129.
80. Van Ghent, 38. Koonce, 50. Watt, The Rise of the Novel. 124. Novak, 
Realism. Myth, and History in Defoe’s Fiction. 87.
81. Zhang, 14.
82. Iser, The Implied Reader. 274-78, 32-55. For more insight into reader- 
response criticism, see the Active reader versus the actual reader, in Iser, The 
Act of Reading. 27-30.
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83. Defoe, Robinson Crusoe. 1. Also see Captain Singleton. 1. Roxana. 1. The 
first paragraph of Captain Singleton serves as the preface to the book, in 
which Singleton claims th a t he is going to "give full Accounts" and to record 
actions like "great Persons" do, without obvious intentions to preach. "The 
Preface" of Roxana also begins with "THE History of this Beautiful Lady, is 
to speak for itself."
84. Malinda Snow, "The Origins of Defoe's First-Person Narrative Technique: 
An Overlooked Aspect of the Rise of the Novel," Journal of Narrative 
Technique 6 (1976): 181-84. Henry N. Rogers IH, "The Two Faces of Moll," 
Journal Narrative Technique 9 (1979): 122-23. S tarr. Defoe & Casuistry. 118. 
In  the burning house scene of Moll Flanders, for example, besides drawing 
the reader's attention to the objects in the bundle, Moll, Snow points out, 
"indicates her own emotional responses, saying ‘It is with Horror tha t I tell 
what a Treasure I found there.’" Rogers argues for Moll’s honesty and 
repentance as a narrator looking back on her past life. For Starr, Moll’s 
preaching is aimed for the effect of sympathy.
85. Gregory King, "A Scheme of the Income and Expense of the Several 
Families of England Calculated for the Year 1688," in Seventeenth-Centurv 
Economic Documents, ed. Joan Thirsk and J. P. Cooper (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1972), 780-81. "The common annual subsistence of working 
people" anywhere in the country, according to the British M erchant in 1713, 
was four pounds per head. See Bridget Hill, Eighteenth-Centurv Women: An 
Anthology (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 168.
86. Critics have noted signs of sympathy in Defoe for his fictional 
protagonists. See Starr, Defoe & Casuistry. 111-15,151-52; Novak, Realism. 
Myth, and History in Defoe's Fiction. 73. Novak states th a t Defoe "excused 
many of Moll's acts on the grounds of poverty and necessity." Sympathy for 
Moll, S tarr argues, lies in  Defoe’s use of casuistry in th a t circumstances may 
alter cases. As for this bundle episode, Defoe adopts the technique of detailed 
realistic depiction of Moll’s escape through lanes and streets to sympathize 
with her. S tarr holds tha t "an atmosphere of moral perplexity thus gives way 
to one of physical alarm. We are caught up in the pace and perils of her 
flight, and in  wishing her good speed we move still further towards being her 
accomplices."
87. Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of 
the Sublime and Beautiful (1757), ed. and intro. Jam es T. Boulton (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968), 44. Adam Smith, The Theory 
of Moral Sentiments (1759), reprinted from the London 1853 ed. and intro. 
E. G. West (New Rochelle, New York: Arlington House, 1969), 22-3.
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88. See Novak’s comments on Defoe’s principles of excusing crime on the 
grounds of self-preservation but making restitution and not robbing a 
destitute person in  "Conscious Irony in Moll Flanders." 200-3, and "The 
Problem of Necessity in Defoe’s Fiction," Philological Quarterly 40.4 (1961): 
516-17.
89. Such a  reading of the narrator who drives the reader away from herself 
is different from Nicholas Hudson’s notion of Fielding’s technique of "negative 
orientation" in Tom Jones. Hudson argues th a t the response of the "good" or 
"grave" reader to the novel stems from the reader's "spontaneous impulses of 
the good-heart" activated by Fielding’s rhetorical device of driving readers 
away from the "bad" or "profane" reader addressed in  the text. The "good" 
reader is created by the author with the Iserian "controls" in  the text. Here, 
Hudson assumes a connection between authorial intention and the reading 
activity. See Nicholas Hudson, "Fielding’s Hierarchy of Dialogue: ‘Meta- 
Response’ and the Reader of Tom Jones." Philological Quarterly 68,2 (1989): 
179, 187-88. Also, there is a vital difference between the double role of the 
Schlegelian narrator and the lack of control of the picaresque narrator. The 
Schlegelian narrator keeps the narrative moving and draws the reader into 
the chaotic world so tha t the reader’s world identifies with the narrator’s 
chaotic fictional world, but the reader for the picaresque novel stays above 
the chaotic world of the picaro and laughs a t the narrator’s blunder in his 
inability "to keep his narrative on the path." See Miller, 106.
90. For instance, Nussbaum notes th a t "oppression based on gender, mediated 
by testimonies of benevolent domination, cuts across class lines." Also see 
Nussbaum’s discussion of William Blackstone's passage about how a  woman 
is "held in place by a  domination based on gender." Her politics of class and 
gender means to show th a t although women can disrupt social power 
relations, they still reflect the male social formation and are still fixed as 
subjects by the dominant male ideologies (52, 137-41, 146-49). Mary Anne 
Schofield also maintains th a t "women are to remain virtuously immobile and 
undefined, whereas men actively seek self-definition and justification, and 
tangentially provide women with a self," and tha t "this controlling ideology 
firmly fixes a woman to her subordinate, second-class state." (Masking and 
Unmasking the Female Mind: Disguising Romances in Feminine Fiction. 
1713-1799. Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1990,19). Patricia Meyer 
Spacks has also exposed the male fantasy of fixing an ideal woman in 
Pamela, Fanny, or Amelia as a changeless character in virtue, as a  toy for 
pleasure, or as a manageable Other. (Desire and Truth: Functions of Plot in 
Eighteenth-Century English Novels. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1990, 93-9).
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91. Schofield’s discovery of the female disguised voice in eighteenth-century 
romance, for example, indicates a  transcendence of ideology and an 
expression of women’s true experiences. She "attempts to reveal the power 
th a t lies beneath the disguise of feminine submission and m arital compliance, 
romantic love and female powerlessness, the controlling ideologies of the 
eighteenth century" (10).
92. Laurie Langbauer has focused on women’s power to "move within and use 
the language and structure of dominance itself, simply by operating as 
subjects who use language." She argues th a t "subordinating women and 
romance grants those ranked above them  a t  best local (although effective and 
destructive) power, for total control resides in the system of construction and 
representation in which all terms are determined." One such system of 
construction and representation, ensuring women’s implication of authority 
and control, is the female body as the site of discourse ra ther than  the site 
of disease. (Women and Romance: The Consolations of Gender in the English 
Novel. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990, 9, 120-26).
93. According to Nussbaum, Hester Thrale’s resistance to prescribed 
identities lies in  her recording the "’trivial’ details of a woman's lived 
experience" and in insisting on "an inverted hierarchy of values in tha t 
private sphere" (xxi). K. K. Ruthven notes tha t resistance of the male order 
can find one form of transcribing "history" as "his story” and then "countering 
i t  w ith the neologism ’herstory’ as a  feminist righting of a patriarchal wrong." 
(Feminist Literary Studies: An Introduction. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1984, 57-8). Langbauer argues tha t romance is "an 
appropriate sphere" for women; i t  is a world of female power ra ther than  
prison; i t  is a world outside the male order and out of boredom, seclusion, and 
submission (85). Living outside the male order is also crucial for a  woman in 
eighteenth-century fiction. Spacks writes th a t "only in isolation and social 
alienation can she function effectively. Then she can demonstrate her 
fortitude, her faithfulness-even her sexuality, denied and obscured before." 
Imagining a  Self: Autobiography and Novel in Eighteenth-Century England. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 61.
94. Ruthven, 99. Since Kristeva focuses on the interaction between the 
m aternal Semiotic or le semiotiaue ("an alternative mode of signification to 
the Symbolic") and the paternal Symbolic, Ruthven argues th a t from 
Kristeva's position, "it would be somewhat naive to conceive of the 
relationship between men and women as oppositional, for if women can be 
’masculine’ and men ’feminine’ in negotiating the transaction between le 
semiotiQue and the Symbolic, there is no point in  isolating ‘women’ as a 
special category on biological grounds and inventing something called
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feminism to protect their interests." Langbauer, 101-8,120-26; Spacks, Desire 
and Truth. 122-23.
95. Note tha t Roxana’s private voice starts with her relationship with the 
Jeweller in Chapter 3 because she is breaking the laws of matrimony. But in 
terms of gender roles in the present chapter, Roxana is conceived in this first 
stage as a "commodity" dependent on the male. In this sense, her feminine 
role as a whore is part of Defoe’s public voice defined by male ideologies.
96. Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis. 204-5, cited 
in Silverman, 152. Kaja Silverman, The Subject of Semiotics (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1983), 152-56. Lacan, "The Mirror Stage as 
Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience," 
725, 734-7. See Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1983), 164, for the blurring sense of the self 
and the other. Eagleton maintains th a t although the child’s relation to the 
"mirror" image is still of "an ‘imaginary’ kind - the image in the mirror both 
is and is not itself, a blurring of subject and object still obtains, - it has begun 
the process of constructing a center of self."
97. Julia Kristeva, "The Semiotic and the Symbolic," trans. Margaret Waller, 
in The Kristeva Reader, ed. Toril Moi (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1986), 93-5. For a useful introduction of Lacan’s Imaginaiy and Symbolic and 
Kristeva’s Semiotic and Symbolic see Ruthven, 63, 98; Eagleton, Literary 
Theory. 163-67; and Raman Selden, A Reader’s Guide to Contemporary 
Literary Theory (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1985, reprinted 
1986), 79-83. See a useful passage in Ruthven, 63, for the Imaginary being 
associated with the m aternal and the Symbolic with the paternal. Julia 
Kristeva, "The Semiotic and the Symbolic," 93-101. Also see Kristeva, Desire 
in Language: A semiotic Approach to Literature and Art. ed. Leon S. Roudiez, 
trans. Thomas Gora, Alice Jardine, and Leon S. Roudiez (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1980), 133. Olga Kenyon, Writing Women: 
Contemporary Women Novelists (London: Pluto Press, 1991), 6-8.
98. Silverman, 36. For a more detailed discussion about Roland Barthes’ 
theory of the cultural codes in relation to a symbolic order, see Silverman 
274-83.
99. Nussbaum, 210, 150. Spacks, Imagining a Self. 57-8; Desire and Truth. 
117-18. For discussions about differences between male and female utterance 
and about the role tha t gender plays in eighteenth-century literature, also see 
the essays in Gender a t Work, ed. Ann Messenger (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 1990). Schofield, 9.
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100. The notion of m an as the self and woman as the other is first developed 
by Simone de Beauvoir in  her exposition of "alterity or otherness." The 
Second Sex, trans. and ed. H. M. Parshley (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953),
71. Following Levi-Strauss’ anthropological observations, Beauvoir holds th a t 
women have always been regarded as the "absolute Other" and have never 
been "a separate group set up on its  own account over against the male 
grouping. They have never entered into a direct and autonomous relation 
w ith the men." Shoshana Felm an also writes th a t "theoretically subordinate 
to the concept of masculinity, the woman is viewed by the m an as his 
opposite, th a t is  to say, as his other, the negative of the positive" ("Woman 
and Madness: The Critical Phallacy," Diacritics. 5, W inter 1975, 3). Also see 
Ruthven, 41. "Beauvoir," Ruthven argues, "starts from the insight th a t 
societies are organised on the assum ption th a t m an is Self and woman Other, 
and th a t the consequences are always deleterious to women. The reason for 
th is is th a t the Self trea ts  the O ther as either a  supplem ent or a threat."
101. Defoe, Roxana. 6.
102. Defoe, An Essav Upon Projects (1697), a  facsimile (Menston, England: 
The Scolar P ress Limited, 1969), 284-85, 292-93, 290, 296, 302-3. For Defoe’s 
satire on the female take-over of the government, see Mason, 15-7. One can 
connect Defoe’s ideal woman in  th is pam phlet to th a t in other novelists’ 
fantasies to render the "public character" of women in  order to hold them  in 
place as the O ther. See Spacks, Desire and Truth. 93-9.
103. Marx and Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party. 502. Lukacs, 
H istory and Class Consciousness: Studies in  M arxist Dialectics, trans. Rodney 
Livingstone (Cambridge: The M.I.T Press, 1971), 14, 83, 86, 94. Berm an, 141. 
In  light of the notion of reification, W att has commented on the equation of 
the women on Robinson Crusoe’s island with commercial goods and 
necessaries (The Rise of the Novel. 68). In the eighteenth century, the 
husband regarded his wife as his goods and could p u t her up to "auction to 
be sold to the best bidder, as though she was a  brood-mare, or a  milch-cow," 
although i t  was practiced "among the common people" and was "grossly 
against public decency and good manners." Anon, from The Laws Respecting 
Women (1777), in  Eighteenth-Century Women: An Anthology, ed. Bridget Hill 
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 118. Also see Langbauer, 114-16, for 
her comments on M arx’s notion of the prostitute as a symbol for property.
104. Langbauer, 118. For comments on the alignm ent of the m ateriality of the 
female body w ith m aterial conditions and historical fact in  Marx, see 
Langbauer, 114. Langbauer’s em phasis on the female body is m eant to 
transcend its m ateriality and to tu rn  it into a  m etaphor for w riting or into 
the female body as discourse in  Wollstonecraft in  order to initiate a power
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struggle within the Symbolic, which, I think, is influenced by Helene Cixous’ 
notion of writing the female body and her equation of "text" w ith "my body." 
See Cixous’ essay "The Laugh of the Medusa," reprinted from Signs 1 
(Summer 1976), trans. Keith Cohen and Paula Cohen, in Adams and Searle, 
312-13.
105. Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which is Not One, trans. Catherine Burke 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 133. Robyn Wiegman, "Economies 
of the Body: Gendered Sites in Robinson Crusoe and Roxana." Criticism 31,1 
(1989): 41.
106. Defoe, Robinson Crusoe. 153. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning 
Hum an Understanding (1748), ed. Eric Steinberg (Indianapolis: H ackett 
Publishing Company, 1977), 98.
107. Homer O. Brown, "The Displaced Self in the Novels of Daniel Defoe," 
ELH 38 (1971): 570-73.
108. Silverman, 152. W att, The Rise of the Novel. 68.
109. Eagleton, Literary Theory. 165.
110. Cixous, 311.
111. Backscheider, Daniel Defoe: Ambition & Innovation. 186, 208-9. 
Backscheider argues th a t Roxana’s relationship with the M erchant indicates 
one of the three strains in women’s fiction; th a t is, "she is one of the newly 
fascinating evil women." One of the "‘dangerous’ characteristics men assign 
to women," Backscheider m aintains, is th a t "she weakens and unmans." 
Spacks, Desire and Truth. 112-3. Spacks contends th a t Roxana is one of the 
eighteenth-century characters who resist men’s notion of an ideal woman as 
"changeless" and th a t her character change in  the novel "endangers herself 
and implicitly endangers men." Nussbaum, 113. For Nussbaum, women in 
Jam es Boswell’s journals "destroy male identity but they also, through sexual 
license, confuse traditional class and gender hierarchies." Ray states th a t "it 
is only through masculine succor th a t she is saved from starvation and, in 
tu rn , launched on her infamous career.... Roxana, thus, rejects the traditional 
economic role of women and prefers to be her own person, financially and 
socially" (30). At this second stage, Roxana surely has a masculine role in the 
novel. Then, Richetti is certainly partly right when he argues th a t Roxana is 
not quite a  plausible figure and remains "untouched by the special quality of 
female experience" because, Richetti thinks, she is a male creation. "The 
Portrayal of Women in  Restoration and Eighteenth-Century English 
Literature," in  W hat M anner of Women: Essays on English and American
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Life and Literature, ed. Marlene Springer (New York: New York University 
Press, 1977), 87-8.
112. For Defoe, to make a whore of the very woman a m an intends to marry 
is to defile his own bed, pollute his own seed, and spread bastardy in his own 
race, Conjugal Lewdness. 65-6.
113. Ray, 30.
114. Chaber, 213, 221. Chaber delights the reader with an  interesting 
comment on the governess’ m aternity ward in  Moll Flanders as the 
approximation of the mass production, where the unwed mother is considered 
the producer (of babies) and the governess the capitalistic entrepreneur. If  it  
holds true  th a t Roxana considers her whoring as an industry, her la ter 
concern about not mixing her tinted money with "the honest well-gotten 
Estate" of the M erchant is an ironic pretense for separating her estate from 
his. For a more detailed discussion, see Section HI of the present chapter. 
Carol Houlihan Flynn, The Body in Swift and Defoe (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 1, 5, 67. Flynn’s book studies the body economy in 
relation to Swift’s and Defoe’s response to a  struggle between idealization (the 
soul) and m ateriality (the body). Both authors, Flynn argues, "reflected the 
struggle against m ateriality th a t characterized their age."
115. For Defoe’s dissenting family background and the influence of the 
Puritan  community, especially the influence of Samuel Annesley, the Foe’s 
family pastor, on the young Daniel Foe, see Backscheider, Daniel Defoe: His 
Life (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1989), 7-21. Braudy, 76. W att, The 
Rise of the Novel. 71-4, 82-5. H unter, 133-39. Leopold Damrosch, Jr. God’s 
Plot and Man’s Stories (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 188. For 
disbelief in God’s intervention in Defoe’s time and Defoe’s the conviction of 
the supernatural, see Baine, 3, 5.
116. Defoe, Conjugal Lewdness. 21. Also see Spiro Peterson, "The 
Matrimonial Theme of Defoe’s Roxana." PMLA70.1 (1955): 184-88, for Defoe’s 
Christian views on m utual affections between a  m an and his wife.
117. Mason, 30. Also see Kanowitz, 36. Ray, 25. About Roxana’s affliction 
with matrimonial law, see Peterson, 185-90. W att also notes th a t to achieve 
economic independence outside marriage, under the common law, was 
increasingly difficult in  the eighteenth century (142). Defoe actually advises 
the wife not to leave the husband because "the Law gives him  great 
Advantages, and Custom Loads her w ith Numberless Difficulties." Defoe, 
Review. Saturday, February 3, 1705, Vol. I, 399.
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118. Soacks. PeBire and Truth. 117-18. Burke. A Philosophical Enquiry into 
the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, quoted in Spacks 117. 
Richard Stauffer, "Calvin.” in  International Calvinism: 1541-1715. ed. Menna 
Prestwich (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 31.
119. David Blewett, "Changing Attitudes toward M arriage in the Time of 
Defoe: The Case of Moll Flanders," The Huntington Library Q uarterly 44 
(1981): 78. Defoe, Conjugal Lewdness. 27.
120. About the notion of women posing the Medusa’s face as a th rea t to turn  
men into petrification, see Allan Gardner Lloyd-Smith, The Uncanny 
ATnaripjin Fiction: The Medusa’s Face (New York: St. M artin’s Press, 1989), 
46, 59, 71. About the substitution of "history" with "herstory," see Ruthven, 
57-8.
121. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (1753), 4 
vols. (Philadelphia: Robert Bell, 1771-72), 1:442, also in  Nussbaum, 146, Hill, 
112.
122. Langbauer, 1-11, 101-4,15, 91-2.
123. For readings on the effects of Pamela’s writing on Mr. B., see Temma F. 
Berg, "From Pamela to Jane Gray; or How not to Become the Heroine of Your 
Own Text," Studies in the Novel 17 (1985): 117. Sheila C. Conboy, "Fabric 
and Fabrication in  Richardson’s Pamela." ELH 54 (1987): 91. Richard Hauer 
Costa, "The Epistolary Monitor in Pamela." Modem Language Quarterly 31
(1970): 45. John Z. Zhang, "Free Play in Samuel Richardson’s Pamela," 
Papers on Language and Literature 27,3 (1991): 311-2.
124. Novak, "Crime and Punishm ent in Defoe’s Roxana." Journal of English 
and Germanic Philology 65 (1966): 455. Novak believes i t  is punishm ent for 
Roxana th a t she is "married to an upstanding middle-class m erchant to whom 
she has surrendered control of her wealth."
125. Peterson, 189-90.
126. Richetti, "The Family, Sex, and Marriage in  Defoe’s Moll Flanders and 
Roxana." Studies in  the Literary Imagination 15,2 (1982): 33-4. Roland 
Barthes, Mythologies, trans. Annette Lavers (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1972), 141-42. For Richetti’s Hegelian dialectical interpretations, see his 
Defoe’s Narratives. 96-105.
127. Schofield, 21. Schofield notes th a t eighteenth-century romance "exists on 
two levels: male rationality and female emotionality." Novak, "Crime and
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Punishment," 455-46. Novak has discussed the combat between Roxana’s 
"strong natural affection for Susan" and her judgment, and he rightly regards 
i t  as part of the punishm ent for Roxana, although he does not look a t i t  as a 
symbol of Roxana’s both female and male qualities.
128. More's passage and Mandevill’s are reprinted in  Bridget Hill, 50, 49. 
Defoe, Review. Tuesday, July  4, 1704, Vol. 1 ,156.
129. W alter L. Williams, The Spirit and the Flesh: Sexual Diversity in 
American Indian Culture (Boston: Beacon Press, 1986), 18-25, 65-86.
130. Locke, Two Treatises of Government. 163, 192, 341. Stone, 239.
131. Althusser, Essays on Ideology. 53-4. Spacks, Desire and T ruth . 118-23. 
Henry Brooke, The Fool of Quality: or. The History of Henry Earl of Moreland 
(1766), 5 vols. (New York: Garland, 1979), 1:155-56.
132. H unter, 51, 55. Defoe, Robinson Crusoe. 62. The History of the most 
Remarkable Life of the Truly Honourable Col. Jaaue. Commonly Call’d Col. 
Jack (1722) (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 170. For a discussion 
about Defoe’s conviction in God’s intervention in  hum an affairs, also see 
Earle, 38-9 and Baine, 3-5.
133. William R. Elton, King Lear and the Gods (San Marino: Huntington 
Library, 1966), 9. For Epicurus’ concepts, see Andre Marie Jean  Festugiere, 
Epicurus and his Gods, trans. C. W. Chilton (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955), 
57, 58-61 and Elton, 10. John Calvin, The Institution of Christian Religion 
(1536), cited in  Elton, 18.
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